Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Foy v. Thorp, 920 P.2d 31.

27 citing documents.

Priority v. Durbin Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
¶12 and similar cases, to argue that membership status is a merits question for the arbitrator.
Turley v. Beus Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
Turley v. Beus Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
§ 12-1502(A); -54 (App. 1996) (citing City of Cottonwood v. James L. Fann Contracting, Inc., -90 (App. 1994)).
Fisher v. Edgerton 336 P.3d 167 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
Fisher v. Edgerton 336 P.3d 167 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
cireum- *80 stances, Hernandez, 216 Ariz. at 472, ¶ 8 , 167 P.3d at 1267 , the fee award provisions arising from mandatory arbitration are rationally related to a legitimate state goal of reducing the high cost of litigation and encouraging alternative dispute resolution, Valler, 190 Ariz. at 395 n. 7, 949 P.2d at 55 n. 7 (“Arizona law and public policy favor arbitration.”) ( , ).
National Bank v. Schwartz 283 P.3d 41 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
National Bank v. Schwartz 283 P.3d 41 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2012
§ 12-1502(A), (B) (2003); -54 , -34 (App.1996).
Cortez v. Avalon Care Center Tucson, L.L.C. 245 P.3d 892 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Cortez v. Avalon Care Center Tucson, L.L.C. 245 P.3d 892 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2010
Yeung v. MARIC 232 P.3d 1281 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Yeung v. MARIC 232 P.3d 1281 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2010
Poulson v. OFACK 205 P.3d 1141 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Poulson v. OFACK 205 P.3d 1141 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2009
Thus, the presumed intent of the sanction provision is to discourage parties from pursuing marginal appeals of arbitration awards, as an appeal “effectively defeats the purpose behind compulsory arbitration.” n. 7 , n. 7 (App.1997), , (Arizona law and public policy favor arbitration).
Short v. Petty 139 P.3d 621 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Short v. Petty 139 P.3d 621 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
¶ 23 As we have held, “the policy of this State is to avoid, rather than promote, litigation.” ¶ 29 , , (stating that Arizona law favors arbitration as a matter of public policy); , (same); A.R.S.
Valder Law Offices v. Keenan Law Firm 129 P.3d 966 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
Valder Law Offices v. Keenan Law Firm 129 P.3d 966 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2006
See, , (stating that Arizona law favors arbitration as a matter of public policy); see also A.R.S.
Brake Masters Systems, Inc. v. Gabbay 78 P.3d 1081 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Brake Masters Systems, Inc. v. Gabbay 78 P.3d 1081 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2003
Hallmark Industries, L.L.C. v. First Systech International, Inc. 52 P.3d 812 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
Hallmark Industries, L.L.C. v. First Systech International, Inc. 52 P.3d 812 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2002
¶ 12 Third, to some extent the intertwining doctrine runs counter to Arizona law that clearly “favors arbitration, both statutorily, see A.R.S § 12-1501, and by the courts as a matter of public policy.” , see also Einhorn v. Valley Medical Specialists, P.C.
Valler v. Lee 949 P.2d 51 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Valler v. Lee 949 P.2d 51 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
(Arizona law and public policy favor arbitration).
Wages v. Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co. 937 P.2d 715 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
Wages v. Smith Barney Harris Upham & Co. 937 P.2d 715 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1997
6 , supports the position that the question of timeliness of an arbitration demand is a matter for the court.
Matter of Noel R. Shahan Trust 932 P.2d 1345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997
Matter of Noel R. Shahan Trust 932 P.2d 1345 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 1997