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is in all cases a question of fact and shall at all times be left to the jury.”); Markowitz, 146 Ariz. at 359 , 706 P.2d at 371 (“A contributory negligence issue cannot be taken from the jury by the simple expedient of calling it an issue of causation.”); , (explaining that plaintiffs failure to look before entering a lane of traffic raises the defense of contributory negligence and that issue cannot be taken from the jury by calling it a causation question).

Safety, , Chaparral Dev.

Safety, -74 , -07 (App.1997).

ter negligent disregard of danger was sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury); see also Schwab, 164 Ariz. at 423-24, 793 P.2d at 1090-91 (under art. XVIII, § 5 legislature cannot enact statute making conduct of injured person bar to recovery against one whose negligent conduct was a cause of injury); P.2d 801 (App. 1997) (plaintiff’s failure to look before entering street raises defense of contributory negligence; issue cannot be taken from jury by calling it causation question).

As noted in Tobel v. State, Arizona Dept. of Public Safety, , : Our first duty in interpreting a statute is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the first place to look is the wording of the statute.

Because we must give the language of the statute its plain meaning, see Tobel v. Arizona Dep’t of Public Safety, , and because the language of the statute plainly requires that all of the rules of civil procedure apply in tax court proceedings, we conclude that class actions may be maintained in tax court.

Tobel v. State, Dept. of Public Safety, , (court gives effect to plain language of statute).

Safety, , Chaparral Dev.