Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Marriage of Muchesko v. Muchesko, 955 P.2d 21.

62 citing documents.

  • MacNeil v. Carter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • MacNeil v. Carter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Thomas v. Thomas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Thomas v. Thomas Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2026
  • Westbrook Rental, LLC v. Michael Goodman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
  • Westbrook Rental, LLC v. Michael Goodman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2025
    Our case law is “well established that a lis pendens may not be predicated on an action or suit for a money judgment but applies only to an action or suit which directly affects the title to real property.” Coventry Homes, Inc., 155 Ariz. at 217; (seeking real property to recover debt “does not turn the dissolution action into an action affecting real property”).
  • Evans v. Evans Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
  • Evans v. Evans Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2025
    DISCUSSION ¶11 When reviewing the denial of spousal maintenance, this court accepts “the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous and draw[s] our own legal conclusions based on those facts.” ¶ 6 (App. 2018) (-72 (App. 1997)).
  • Agricann v. Natural Remedy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Agricann v. Natural Remedy Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Bordner v. Bates Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • Bordner v. Bates Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
    An enforceable contract requires “an offer, acceptance, consideration, a sufficiently specific statement of the parties’ obligations, and mutual assent.” ¶ 10 (App. 2019) ().
  • Eli v. Procaccianti Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • Eli v. Procaccianti Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
    See Hill-Shafer P’–74 (1990)
  • Plea v. Phoenix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • Plea v. Phoenix Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • Dole v. Dole Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Dole v. Dole Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    (stating that as a contract, a settlement agreement is based on contract principles of "an offer, acceptance, consideration, a sufficiently specific statement of the parties' obligations, and mutual assent" and courts may look to the parties' conduct in deciding "whether a meeting of the minds occurre
  • Carroll v. Carroll Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Carroll v. Carroll Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Ortiz v. Diejuez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
  • Ortiz v. Diejuez Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2020
    (stating that when an appellate decision “substantially alters the status of the decree as written,” the trial court may reconsider related issues on remand).
  • Buckholtz v. Buckholtz 435 P.3d 1032 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
  • Buckholtz v. Buckholtz 435 P.3d 1032 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2019
    ¶10 A marital separation agreement is a contract, see Muchesko v. Muchesko , , 268, , 24 (App. 1997), and when a property settlement agreement is incorporated into a decree, contract law governs the agreement, MacMillan v. Schwartz , , 588, ¶ 12, , 1217 (App. 2011).
  • Wilson v. Wilson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Wilson v. Wilson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    “Arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are deemed waived.” ¶ 25 n.5 (App. 2000) ().
  • In re Cotter 425 P.3d 258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
  • In re Cotter 425 P.3d 258 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2018
    Muchesko v. Muchesko , , 271-72
  • North v. Vps Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • North v. Vps Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Shubhrananda v. Earle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Shubhrananda v. Earle Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    thout a l[i]cense; has criminal history; no billing presented; coercion & intimidation used, and more” are “most certainly factual allegations.” Because Earle did not raise these arguments in his opening brief, “[w]e will not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief.” ¶91, ( ).
  • Quam v. Grove Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Quam v. Grove Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Thompson v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Thompson v. Thompson Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Electronics, Inc. 375 P.3d 1189 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Electronics, Inc. 375 P.3d 1189 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    (citing Savoca Masonry Co. v. Homes & Son Constr.
  • Summers v. Gloor 368 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
  • Summers v. Gloor 368 P.3d 930 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2016
    ¶ 91 , (“We will not consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief.”) ( , ).
  • Scott v. Neal Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Scott v. Neal Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    n.4, ¶ 17 (App. 2008) ( n.2, ¶ 22 (App. 2005), ).
  • Rene Castro v. Hon. Peter J. Hochuli C.C. 343 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
  • Rene Castro v. Hon. Peter J. Hochuli C.C. 343 P.3d 457 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2015
    (treating improper appeal as special action and accepting jurisdiction to address merits of argument).
  • Pachtman v. Pachtman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Pachtman v. Pachtman Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Yollin v. City of Glendale 191 P.3d 1040 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • Yollin v. City of Glendale 191 P.3d 1040 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
    See Savoca Masonry Co. v. Homes & Son Constr., , , (holding that an attorney-proffered offer may bind the client).
  • State v. Lopez 175 P.3d 682 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
  • State v. Lopez 175 P.3d 682 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
    n. 2 , , 695 n. 2 (App.2005); , (noting cases from other jurisdictions would not be considered when cited for first time in reply brief).