Cited by

Opinions in Arizona that cite Marriage of Roden v. Roden, 949 P.2d 67.

30 citing documents.

  • Hurtado v. Hurtado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Hurtado v. Hurtado Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2022
  • Chauncey v. Chauncey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
  • Chauncey v. Chauncey Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2021
    See Cooper, 130 Ariz. at 260; (superseded in part by statute on other grounds); Porter, 67 Ariz. at 279.
  • Butler v. Butler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Butler v. Butler Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    (stating that the trial court correctly considered the “over $100,000 in temporary support” received by the wife during pendency of the dissolution petition as a reason to deny spousal maintenance)
  • Wellman v. Waits Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
  • Wellman v. Waits Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2018
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court FILED: AA 4 for the proposition that “[i]t is an abuse of discretion to deny attorneys’ fees to the spouse who has substantially fewer resources, unless those resources are clearly ample to pay the fees.” As we have explained, however, this is an inaccurate statement of current law and litigants should be cautio
  • Schickner v. Schickner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
  • Schickner v. Schickner Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2017
    Schickner, 237 Ariz. at 197, ¶ 13 ( ¶ 8 (App. 2014)).
  • Shacknai v. Shacknai Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Shacknai v. Shacknai Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Schickner v. Schickner 348 P.3d 890 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Schickner v. Schickner 348 P.3d 890 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the opinion of husband’s expert when determining the value of a community business interest).
  • Lynch v. Brakebill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
  • Lynch v. Brakebill Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2015
    superseded by statute as stated in Myrick, 235 Ariz. at 494, ¶ 8, 333 P.3d at 821.
  • Myrick v. Maloney 333 P.3d 818 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
  • Myrick v. Maloney 333 P.3d 818 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2014
    In support of her argument, she relies on this court’s statement that “‘[i]t is an abuse of discretion to deny attorney’s fees to the [party] who has substantially fewer resources, unless those resources are clearly ample to pay the fees.’”
  • Nachiappan v. Subramanian Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Nachiappan v. Subramanian Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Cutter v. Cutter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
  • Distinguished Cutter v. Cutter Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2014
    P.2d 67 (App. 1997), upon which Husband relies, is distinguishable.
  • In Re the Marriage of Williams 200 P.3d 1043 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
  • In Re the Marriage of Williams 200 P.3d 1043 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2008
    As we previously noted, although the decision whether to award attorney fees and the amount of any award is for the trial court to determine in the exercise of its sound discretion, , the legal errors committed here constitute an abuse of that discretion and require reversal.
  • Rueschenberg v. Rueschenberg 196 P.3d 852 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
  • Rueschenberg v. Rueschenberg 196 P.3d 852 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2008
    Only if such return has not been paid, or was not reasonable, would the community have a claim to the growth in value of [the] separate property.” , (citing Nace, 104 Ariz. at 20 , 448 P.2d at 76 ).
  • In Re Marriage of Robinson and Thiel 35 P.3d 89 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
  • In Re Marriage of Robinson and Thiel 35 P.3d 89 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2001
    rder a party to pay a reasonable amount to the other party” for attorney’s fees and costs “after considering the financial resources of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the proceedings.” In considering their financial resources, the court “must consider both the claimant’s need and the other spouse’s capacity to bear the burden.”
  • Marriage of Gerow v. Covill 960 P.2d 55 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
  • Marriage of Gerow v. Covill 960 P.2d 55 Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 1998
    section 25-314(D) allows the court to join parties “necessary for the exercise of its authority.” , permits the dissolution court to decide related matters.