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“We do not hastily find a clash between a statute and court rule,” ¶ 11 (App. 1988), and where possible we “avoid 5 MORALES v. HON COFFEY/STATE Opinion of the Court interpretations that unnecessarily implicate constitutional concerns,” Scheehle v. Justices of the Sup.

Also, when conducting this analysis, “[w]e do not hastily find a clash between a statute and court rule,” ¶ 11 (App. 1998), and “avoid interpretations that unnecessarily implicate constitutional concerns,” Scheehle v. Justices of the Sup.

¶14 “We do not hastily find a clash between a statute and court rule,” ¶ 11 (App. 1998), and we avoid interpretations that “unnecessarily implicate constitutional concerns.” Scheehle, 211 Ariz. at 288 ¶ 16.

¶12 Although this court has recognized that the "right to appeal from [ § 12-133 ] arbitration is a statutorily created substantive right," Graf v. Whitaker , , ¶ 9, we have found no Arizona authority, and the parties have cited none, that addresses whether the initial assignment of a case to § 12-133 arbitration-or to FASTAR or some other mode of proceeding-is itself a substantive right or is instead "the manner in which [a] right may be exercise

However, recognizing "the procedural/substantive distinction is 'always elusive at the margins,' " Graf v. Whitaker , , 406 ¶ 10, , 1010(App. 1998) (citation omitted), the court assumes, without deciding, that Section 13-106 is procedural, see Hansen , 215 Ariz. at 289 ¶ 10, 160 P.3d at 168 -69 .

Parties involved in arbitration proceedings may “waive[] their right to jury trials through their disregard for court procedure.” ¶¶ 15–16 (App. 1998) (construing the former arbitration rules).

¶ 16 (App. 1998); Ariz. R. Civ.

of Water Quality Appeals, (citations omitted); ¶ 16 (App. 1998) (“Courts have the power to control the proceedings before them and enter orders of default or dismissal when a party fails to abide by the procedural rules of the court.”) (citing AG Rancho Equip.

Section 12-133 creates the system of compulsory non-binding arbitration and “mandates the arbitration of certain cases filed in the superior court.” ¶ 6

¶ 15 , (rule providing that a party waives its right to a trial de novo from court-ordered arbitration for failure to participate in the arbitration proceeding does not violate the right to a jury trial, but merely regulates such right by setting prerequisites for its exercise); see al

403, 407-08, ¶ 18, -12 (App.1998).

P.2d 815 (1999) (citing Pompa for proposition that statute setting reduced time limits for filing petitions for post-conviction relief that conflicted with procedural rule was unconstitutional); P.3d 1058 (App. 1999) (citing Pompa for proposition that procedural rule controls over conflicting eminent domain statute); P.2d 1007 (App. 1998) (citing Pompa for proposition that procedural rule permitting dismissal does not diminish substantive right to appeal).

at 418 , 403 P.2d at 565 ; ¶ 16 , (“parties may be deemed to have waived their right to jury trials through their disregard for court procedure”) (citing Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 17).

¶12 The requirements of Rule 76(a) were addressed by the 5 P.2d 1007 (App. 1998).

ed rule — formerly Uniform Rule 7(a), now Civil Rule 76(a) — restricts the right of appeal to a party “who appears and participates in the arbitration proceedings.” We interpret the two rules “in harmony to require more than minimal participation in arbitration proceedings; both require a party to participate in good faith in order to satisfy the spirit of the arbitration laws.” -08, ¶ 18 , -12 (App.1998).