Cited by

–25 (1970) (“A person can be very negligent and still not be guilty of gross negligence.”); Noriega, 243 Ariz. at 329 ¶ 41 (“We recognize that proving gross negligence is no easy task.” ( ¶ 19 (App. 1998))).

¶ 17 (App. 2009) (“[S]tandard principles of statutory construction require that we do not judicially impose a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.”); ¶ 14 (App. 1998) (“When the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.”).

¶ 14 (App. 1998) (We do not read terms into a provision from which they are specifically excluded.).

See SolarCity Corp., 243 Ariz. at 480, ¶ 8 (“The best indicator of [the legislature’s] intent is the statute’s plain language, which we read in context with other statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose[.]”); ¶ 14 (App. 1998) (“When the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.”).

¶ 20 (App. 1998) (stating that a motion to dismiss should be denied unless it is “beyond doubt” that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief) (–06 (App. 1991)).

Id.; , (“When the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.”).

Id.; (“When the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.”).

We assume the truth of all of the complaint’s material allegations and give the plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences which the complaint can reasonably support.” ¶ 17 (App. 1998) (quoting Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins.

¶ 14, (“When the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.”).

¶ 17, (citing Gatecliff v. Great Republic Life Ins.

§ 12-820.02(A); & n.4, & n.4 (App. 1998).

5 ¶ 14 , (“When the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.”).

¶ 14 , (“When the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.”).

¶ 14 , (“When the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.”); see also U.S. Parking Sys.

(“‘[W]hen the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.’”), ¶ 14

¶ 31 Further, “[w]hen the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.” ¶ 14

Fund Manager & Adm’r, , (‘Where the legislature has specifically used a term in certain places within a statute and excluded it in another place, courts will not read that term into the section from which it was excluded.”)

We also consider the application of another rule of statutory construction, which states that “[wjhen the legislature has specifically included a term in some places within a statute and excluded it in other places, courts will not read that term into the sections from which it was excluded.” ¶ 14 , (citing Ariz. Bd.