Cited by

Ct. App. 2023) (quotation omitted), which we review under an abuse of discretion and substantial evidence standard, ¶ 38 (App. 1999).

Sec., ¶ 14 (App. 2001) ( ¶ 20 (App. 1999)).

§ 25-409(E)(4) (requiring the superior court to consider “the potential adverse impact that visitation will have on the child’s customary activities”); ¶ 39 (App. 1999) (affirming a visitation order “because the order does not specify a day of the week on which the visitation must take place; visitation times are flexible and can be worked around the schedules of the Dodge family members”); Bowles v. Trznadel, No. 1 CA-CV 18-0006 FC, 2019 WL 2266623 *4 ¶ 21 (Ari

4 MCPHERSON v. MCPHERSON, et al. Decision of the Court ¶12 Further, parents have a fundamental right, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, to the “care, custody, and control of their children.” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); –24 ¶ 19 (App. 1999).

§ 25-409; ¶ 23 (App. 1999) (“Grandparent visitation is not automatic.”).

¶ 56 (App. 1999) (stating the abuse of discretion standard recognizes the trial court’s opportunity to observe the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct).

“In reviewing a challenge to a statute, we presume that the statute is constitutional and must construe it, if possible, to give it a constitutional meaning.” ¶ 5 (App. 2002); ¶ 17 (App. 1999) (“We .

§ 25-409(H) ); accord Graville v. Dodge , , 125-126 ¶¶ 26-27, , 610-11 (App. 1999).

Before the legislature added the “special weight” provision to § 25-409(E), the court of appeals held that the statute “satisfies the due process concerns identified in Troxel” by “requir[ing] Arizona courts to give weight to the parent’s visitation decisions.” ¶¶ 12, 15 (App. 2000); –26 ¶¶ 26–27 (App. 1999) (holding pre-Troxel that former § 25-409, permitting grandparent visitation only after finding that it is in child’s best interests, was constitutional); ¶ 25 (App. 2003) (recognizing that “

Fenn v. Fenn , , 87, , 132 (App. 1993) ; see also Graville v. Dodge , , 128, ¶ 41, , 613 (App. 1999) ("While we believe the trial court has inherent authority to issue orders as part of its duty to *421 fashion a visitation plan that is in the best interests of the children, we believe that a court must confine its exercise of that authority within the limits of the statute

Graville v. Dodge , , 131, ¶ 56, , 616 (App. 1999).

See, e.g,, , (noting state’s interest in promoting “continuation of caring relationships between family members, particularly among grandchildren and their grandparents”); Hamit v. Hamit, 271 Neb.

Modular Mining Systems, Inc. v. Jigsaw Technologies, Inc., ¶ 21 (App. 2009) (fees); (costs).

“ ‘We presume a statute to be constitutional and will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it conflicts with the federal or state constitutions.’ ” Id.

¶¶ 40-42 , for the proposition that the court’s speech-oriented orders constitute prior restraints.