Cited by

¶ 39 (App. 1999); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 cmt.

¶ 39 (App. 1999) (citing Yetman, 168 Ariz. at 76-79).

¶ 4 (App. 1999); see Green Acres Tr.

¶ 40, (providing that the appellate court addresses arguments not ruled upon by trial court “only when the record is so fully developed that the facts and inferences are perfectly clear”); (providing that where b

1537 , 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970), personal characterizations of manner, Turner, 174 Ariz. at 207-08 , , and “rhetorical political invective [or] opinion,” ¶ 39 , therefore are not actionable.

¶ 39, (internal citations and quotations omitted) (citing Yetman, 168 Ariz. at 76- 79, 811 P.2d at 328-31).15 ¶29 False light invasion of privacy is recognized in Arizona as a tort separate from defamation.

4 he argues it is “‘highly undesirable’” for this court “to address issues not decided below,” such as the effect of § 13-716 on his claim.

¶ 5 , ("To determine if a privilege, absolute or qualified, exists, we first examine the applicable case law.

¶¶ 40-41, (appellate court does not address issues trial court has not ruled on absent a record “so fully developed that the facts and inferences are perfectly clear”).

However, the “meaning of words and státements should not be construed in isolation; rather, consideration should be given to the context and all surrounding circumstances, including the impression created by the words used and the expression’s general tenor.” ¶ 39 , see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 563 comment d (“The context of a defamatory imputation includes all parts of the communication that are ordinarily heard or read with it.”).

¶ 6 , (“We are not bound by the Restatement____Moreover, although we generally follow the Restatement absent statutes or case law to the contrary, we will not do so blindly.”); , (“we do not follow the Restatement blindly”); -62 , -26 (App.1999) (‘When the law is not settled on a particular subject, we look to the Restatement with favor.”).

¶ 5 , (explaining that Arizona courts “look to the Restatement for guidance” in the absence of ease law to the contrary); , (noting that “Arizona courts will follow a restatement of the law in the absence

¶¶ 13, 15, -25 (App. 1999) (noting that qualified privilege balances competing policies of protecting reputation and free communication).

1943); see also Sobol, 131 P.3d at 490 (“Because absolute immunity immunizes absolutely, it is reserved for ‘“those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant’s motives.”’”), quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 293 A.2d 767, 769 (N.H. 1972).

“Because absolute immunity immunizes absolutely, it is reserved for ‘“those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant’s motives.”’” Sobol, 131 P.3d at 490, quoting Supry v. Bolduc, 293 A.2d 767, 769 (N.H. 1972).

-59, ¶ 4 , -23 (App.1999)

¶ 5 , (absent law to contrary, Arizona follows Restatement with respect to privileges) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, on this issue of first impression, “we look to the Restatement for guidance.” see also Bruce v. Chas Roberts Air Conditioning, Inc., P.2d 456 (App. 1990) (Arizona appellate courts follow Restatement absent case law to the contrary).