Cited by

Extreme and outrageous conduct must be “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” ¶ 23 (App. 1999) (cleaned up).

at 49 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); ¶ 25 (App. 1999) (quotations omitted) (“A private person acts under color of state law when involved in a conspiracy with state officials to deprive someone of federal rights.”).

“Whether a communication is privileged is a question of law for the court; we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law, which we review de novo.” ¶ 2 (App. 1999).

at ¶ 2 ( ¶ 2 (App. 1999)).

¶ 23 (App. 1999) (citation omitted); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt.

¶21 The superior court determines whether the pleaded acts are “sufficiently outrageous to state a claim for relief.” ¶ 23 (App. 1999).

In addition, “[w]hether a communication is privileged is a question of law for the court; we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law, which we review de novo.” n.2, n.2 (App. 2006).

See generally Green Acres, 141 Ariz. at 614-15 , 688 P.2d at 622-23 (although absolute immunity applies to defamatory statements in a judicial proceeding, it does not extend to a communication unrelated to the proceeding); -60, ¶ 19 , -80 (App.1999) (communications by defendants to state legislators failed to have sufficient relationship to judicial proceeding for application of absolute immunity).