Printz v. greathearts/pacific

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

JENNIFER PRINTZ, Petitioner Employee,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

GREATHEARTS AMERICA, Respondent Employer,

PACIFIC COMPENSATION INSURANCE CO., Respondent Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 24-0058
FILED 08-05-2025

Special Action - Industrial Commission
ICA Claim No. 20231720030
Carrier Claim No. 1000072421
The Honorable Colleen Marmor, Administrative Law Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Taylor & Associates P.L.L.C, Phoenix
By Thomas C. Whitley, Nicholas C. Whitley
Counsel for Petitioner Employee

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
By Afshan Peimani
Counsel for Respondent
Pacific Compensation Insurance Company, Phoenix
By Travis M. Wheeler
Counsel for Respondent Employer and Carrier

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge David B. Gass and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner Jennifer Printz challenges the denial of her
workers’ compensation claim for mold exposure while working for
Respondent Greathearts America. The Industrial Commission of Arizona
(“ICA”) precluded Printz from bringing her claim a second time after she
failed to timely challenge the denial of an identical claim she filed earlier.
We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining
the ICA award. W. Millwork v. Indus. Comm’n, 256 Ariz. 177, 180, ¶ 13 (App.
2023).

¶3 In September 2022, Printz worked as a teacher at Scottsdale
Preparatory Academy, owned and operated by Greathearts. According to
her injury report, she became “uncharacteristically ill” and took pictures of
mold at the school. She obtained a sample of the mold and had it tested,
which she reported came back positive for aspergillus, a fungus that can
cause respiratory and sinus infections.

¶4 In October 2022, she reported that she had been treated by
specialists for several ailments: “I have no doubt that my illness was
directly tied to the mold exposure I experienced at Scottsdale Prep.” She
then filed a worker’s report of injury on October 17, 2022 (“the first
application”), in which she described her injury as “[s]inus infection
cause[d] by Aspergillus mold . . .” and listed her date of injury as September
13, 2022.

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Decision of the Court

¶5 Respondent Pacific Compensation Insurance Company
issued a November 7, 2022 notice of claim denying Printz’s claim. Printz
had 90 days to protest the denial of her claim, see A.R.S. § 23-947(A), but
failed to do so.

¶6 On June 21, 2023, Printz filed another injury report for mold
exposure, this time with an injury date of May 15, 2023 (“the second
application”). Respondents again timely denied her claim. This time, Printz
timely filed a hearing request. The assigned ICA Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) set the case for an evidentiary hearing.

¶7 Before the hearing, Respondents asked the ALJ to vacate the
hearing and dismiss Printz’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. They argued
Printz was not entitled to a hearing on the denial of her second application
because she did not timely request a hearing on the denial of her first
application. Printz responded, urging the ALJ to treat the first filing as
“mere[] speculation” and a “nullity” because she did not have medical
diagnoses “based on all of her symptoms and conditions” at that time.

¶8 The ALJ rejected Printz’s argument, concluding the second
application was “for the same alleged exposure to mold” as the first filing.
Because Printz did not request a hearing within 90 days of the denial of the
first filing, the ALJ reasoned, Printz was not entitled to a hearing on that
claim. Printz moved for reconsideration, maintaining she lacked sufficient
medical evidence in October 2022 when she filed the first claim, but she
obtained that evidence by May 2023 when she filed the second application.
For that reason, she contended, the ALJ should treat the first application as
a “nullity.” Printz did not argue her second application concerned a
different injury than the first. The ALJ rejected that argument and affirmed
the second denial.

¶9 Printz filed a statutory special action for judicial review of the
ICA award denying her claim. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(B) and 23-951(A).

DISCUSSION

¶10 We will affirm the Department’s determination unless it is
“contrary to law, is not supported by substantial evidence, is arbitrary and
capricious or is an abuse of discretion.” A.R.S. § 12-910(F). We defer to the
ALJ’s factual findings, but review questions of statutory interpretation de
novo. See Special Fund Div. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 252 Ariz. 267, 269, ¶ 6
(App. 2021). And we “interpret all statutes and all agency rules without
deference to any previous determination that may have been made on the

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question by the agency.” Indus. Comm’n of Ariz. Lab. Dep’t v. Indus. Comm’n
of Ariz., 253 Ariz. 425, 514, ¶ 10 (App. 2022) (citation modified) (discussing
A.R.S. § 12-910(F)).

¶11 Section 23-947 is a statute of limitations. Asarco Inc. v. Indus.
Comm’n, 204 Ariz. 118, 120 (App. 2003). A claimant is not entitled to a
hearing “on any question relating to a claim,” unless the claimant (1) files a
proper and timely application for compensation and (2) requests a hearing
within 90 days of a notice of denial of the claim. A.R.S. § 23-947(A). If a
claimant does not timely request a hearing, the denial becomes “final and
res judicata to all parties.” § 23-947(B).

¶12 Here, Printz filed her first application in October 2022, but did
not timely request a hearing when Pacific Compensation denied that
application in November 2022. Instead, she filed her second application,
which Pacific Compensation also denied. She first requested a hearing in
October 2023.

¶13 Reasonable evidence supports the ALJ’s findings. Printz’s
second application was for the same injury as the first, and Printz makes no
argument to the contrary. Because Printz filed the October 2023 request for
hearing more than 90 days after Pacific Compensation denied her
application, A.R.S. § 23-947(A) precludes a hearing, and § 23-947(B) makes
the denial final.

¶14 Nor do we find persuasive Printz’s contention that her first
filing was a “nullity” because she did not fully understand the medical
consequences of what she believed was exposure to mold in her workplace.
The ALJ found that Printz “recognized the nature of her injury, the
seriousness of it, and the probable relationship between the injury and her
employment” when she first reported her injury in 2022. Nothing more is
required. Pitts v. Indus. Comm’n, 246 Ariz. 334, 336, ¶ 12 (App. 2019); accord
A.R.S. § 23-1061(A). And filing the same claim multiple times, even if it is
denied multiple times, does not extend the time to request a hearing under
A.R.S. § 23-947(A).

¶15 Printz relies on Henry v. Industrial Commission, 157 Ariz. 67
(1988), to show she could not file her application until she was aware of the
severity of her medical condition. In Henry, our supreme court concluded
an application was timely even though the injury occurred 24 years earlier.
Id. at 69–70. Henry explained that the one-year statute of limitations to file a
claim under A.R.S. § 23-1061(A) “runs from the time the injury becomes
manifest.” Id. at 69. And in that case, the injury had not manifested until

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many years later. Printz misplaces her reliance on Henry because her injury
was manifest and she timely filed her first application in October 2022. She
simply failed to request a hearing within 90 days of receiving the Pacific
Compensation’s denial of that application. Section 23-947(A) therefore
applies, and Henry does not.

¶16 Refiling a claim for the same injury does not extend the time
to request a hearing under § 23-947(A). Once Pacific Compensation denied
Printz’s claim, she had 90 days to request a hearing. She did not. Her failure
to do so rendered the denial “final and res judicata” under § 23-947(B).

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm the denial of Printz’s claim.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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