Halloum v. Black Diamond
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Malinski v. Industrial Commission 439 P.2d 485
- Salt River Project v. Indus. Com'n of Ariz. 627 P.2d 692
- Carranza v. Industrial Commission 529 P.2d 259
- Circle K Store 1131 v. Industrial Commission 796 P.2d 893
- Avila v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA 193 P.3d 310
- Glodo v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona 955 P.2d 15
- Perry v. Industrial Commission 542 P.2d 1096
- Kaibab Industries v. Industrial Commission 2 P.3d 691
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
AMMAR HALLOUM, Petitioner Employee,
v.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
BLACK DIAMOND NETWORKS LLC, Respondent Employer,
FEDERAL INSURANCE CO, Respondent Carrier.
No. 1 CA-IC 25-0006
FILED 01-26-2026
Special Action - Industrial Commission
ICA Claim No. 20233470497
Carrier Claim No. 40523050481
The Honorable Trudy Rushforth, Administrative Law Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Ahwatukee Legal Office P.C., Phoenix
By David L. Abney
Counsel for Petitioner Employee
Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
By Afshan Peimani
Counsel for Respondent
Ritsema Law, Phoenix
By Meghann Fawcett
Counsel for Respondents Employer and Carrier
HALLOUM v. BLACK DIAMOND/FEDERAL INSURANCE
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.
F U R U Y A, Judge:
¶1 Ammar Halloum seeks reversal of an Industrial Commission
of Arizona (“ICA”) award denying compensability of his workers’
compensation claim. An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found he
intentionally fell while at work and therefore was not injured by accident.
For the reasons below, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
upholding the award. Salt River Project v. Indus. Comm’n, 128 Ariz. 541, 544–
45 (1981).
¶3 In November 2023, Halloum was injured when he fell down
at the bottom of a metal stairway at work. On the bottom step, he fell
forward, headfirst into a landing area with a closed but unlatched metal
gate that swung outward when he hit it. The fall was captured by a security
camera but otherwise not witnessed. While he lay at the bottom of the
stairway, he yelled out for help and others came, including emergency
medical services who had been called to the scene. EMTs found Halloum
conscious but “unresponsive.” He was taken to the hospital. There were no
visible injuries on his face or body. CT scans of the brain, head, neck, and
spine were negative. Other than elevated blood sugar levels, laboratory
tests returned normal results. Nevertheless, Halloum was hospitalized with
a diagnosis of “non-ST elevated myocardial infarction.” He remained in the
hospital for several days and later was transferred to a rehab center where
he received speech therapy, physical therapy, and occupational therapy. A
psychiatric consult while Halloum was in the hospital described potential
psychological conditions based on his unresponsiveness after the incident
as “a question of catatonia versus conversion reaction.”
¶4 Halloum filed a report of injury and sought workers’
compensation benefits. Respondents Black Diamond Networks, LLC and
Federal Insurance Co. denied Halloum’s claim. He requested a hearing and
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HALLOUM v. BLACK DIAMOND/FEDERAL INSURANCE
Decision of the Court
an ICA ALJ heard from several witnesses, including Halloum, Dr. Luay
Shayya who treated Halloum, and an independent medical examiner.
¶5 Halloum testified he did not remember what he was doing
before he fell. He also described his memory of events before the day he fell
as “hit and miss.” He said he only recalled events from what he read in “the
reports” or from what people have told him. He admitted that before he
fell, he believed he was being discriminated against by his employer and
had filed a complaint. In addition, he did not recall he had a felony
conviction for theft in 2004.
¶6 Dr. Shayya is board-certified in “adult neurology,
neuromuscular medicine, and brain injury medicine” and treated Halloum
after he was discharged from the rehab center. Dr. Shayya testified the
emergency services records of the incident showed Halloum was not
responsive and did not verbalize or move and interact with the responders.
He described the emergency treatment Halloum received as “trauma
activation following a fall” in which Halloum had “high blood pressure”
and “a very high blood sugar.” He related that the neurologist who saw
Halloum in the hospital had diagnosed “acute transient encephalopathy.”
Dr. Shayya diagnosed Halloum with a concussion, migraine, and neck pain,
believing Halloum had “passed out” when he fell. Neither a physical exam
nor any of the testing he performed resulted in any significant findings. He
treated Halloum for headaches and concluded six months later “his
concussion had likely resolved.”
¶7 Dr. J. Michael Powers, a board-certified neurologist,
conducted a March 2024 independent medical examination. He reviewed
relevant medical records and physically examined Halloum. He testified
that the psychiatric consult in the hospital thought Halloum’s condition
was psychological. Dr. Powers had viewed the security camera video and
opined that the fall was a “protected fall” because Halloum held his hand
out in front of his head as he fell. He concluded that “there’s no evidence
that he directly hit his head on the floor.” Dr. Powers also opined there was
no evidence of a mild traumatic brain injury. Dr. Powers believed the fall
“was intentional and that no concussion occurred.” He explained that upon
initial presentation to the hospital, it was reasonable to consider whether
Halloum had suffered a traumatic brain injury. As time went on, the
doctors thought Halloum may have been suffering from a toxic or
metabolic encephalopathy. In the end, Dr. Powers testified, the doctors
settled on a psychiatric condition as the explanation for Halloum’s
unresponsiveness.
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HALLOUM v. BLACK DIAMOND/FEDERAL INSURANCE
Decision of the Court
¶8 Along with testimony from two other witnesses—a private
investigator and Black Diamond’s human resources director—the ALJ
reviewed the medical documentation and security camera footage of the
fall. She found Halloum’s testimony not credible. She concluded
“[Halloum]’s fall was intentional” and thus not compensable. She also
concluded Halloum had not shown a work-related injury, crediting Dr.
Powers’ testimony over Dr. Shayya’s testimony.
¶9 Halloum sought administrative review of the decision. The
ALJ affirmed her decision denying compensability. Halloum then filed this
statutory special action. We have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 12-120.21(B), 23-951(A).
DISCUSSION
¶10 When reviewing workers’ compensation awards, “we defer
to the ALJ’s factual findings but review questions of law de novo.” Avila v.
Indus. Comm’n, 219 Ariz. 56, 57 ¶ 2 (App. 2008). We view the evidence in the
light most favorable to upholding an award. Id. Further, the ALJ is
responsible for resolving conflicts in the evidence. See Kaibab Indus. v. Indus.
Comm’n, 196 Ariz. 601, 609 ¶ 25 (App. 2000). We defer to the ALJ’s
resolution of conflicting evidence and affirm the ALJ’s findings if any
reasonable theory of the evidence supports them. Perry v. Indus. Comm’n,
112 Ariz. 397, 398–99 (1975).
¶11 Halloum had the burden to show a compensable injury. See
Malinski v. Indus. Comm’n, 103 Ariz. 213, 216 (1968) (claimant must prove
entitlement to compensation). To receive compensation, Halloum must
show he suffered an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment. A.R.S. § 23-1021; Glodo v. Indus. Comm’n, 191 Ariz. 259, 261
(App. 1997). To be compensable under the statute, an injury must not be
purposefully self-inflicted. Glodo at 261; A.R.S. § 23-1021 (specifically
excluding injuries that are “purposely self-inflicted” from receiving
compensation).
¶12 In Glodo, a worker became frustrated with his supervisor and
punched a metal door, breaking his hand. Glodo, 191 Ariz. at 261. We held
the worker’s intentional act was not an “accident” eligible for
compensation: “An intentional act of violence that produces an injury that
should be expected is not accidental.” Id. at 262. Here, the ALJ found
Halloum intentionally fell. She viewed the security camera footage and
concluded that the evidence showed an intentional fall. Carranza v. Indus.
Comm’n, 22 Ariz. App. 547, 550 (1974) (we presume the ICA considered all
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HALLOUM v. BLACK DIAMOND/FEDERAL INSURANCE
Decision of the Court
relevant evidence). This conclusion is a reasonable theory of the evidence.
Therefore, we will not disturb the award. Perry, 112 Ariz. at 398–99.
¶13 Halloum argues we should apply the “unexplained fall”
doctrine to his case. We disagree. In an unexplained fall case, an injury for
which the cause is unknown will be presumed compensable if it occurs in
the course and scope of employment. Circle K Store No. 1131 v. Indus.
Comm’n, 165 Ariz. 91, 96 (1990). Here, Halloum’s fall was found to be
intentional, which makes the “unexplained fall” doctrine inapplicable.
¶14 We also reject Halloum’s argument that the fall must be
treated as unexplained because Dr. Powers testified outside his area of
expertise when he gave his opinion that the fall was a protected fall and
therefore intentional. The ALJ, as the trier of fact, was able to view the video
footage and determine the nature of the fall without expert testimony.
While expert testimony is required to show medical causation, Hackworth v.
Indus. Comm’n, 229 Ariz. 339, 343 ¶ 9 (App. 2012), whether someone falls
intentionally is not a question of medical causation. Further, the ALJ gave
Dr. Powers’ opinion more weight only regarding “the conflict in the
medical evidence.” Thus, there is no indication the ALJ improperly
weighed or considered Dr. Powers’ testimony and report for any
impermissible purposes.
¶15 Because Halloum was not injured by accident, he is not
eligible to receive benefits. We therefore need not address his argument that
he suffered a work-related injury.
CONCLUSION
¶16 We affirm.
MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT
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