Karpova v. Icare adult/copperpoint

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

PHOENIX KARPOVA, Petitioner,

v.

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

ICARE ADULT DAY CENTER LLC, Respondent Employer,

COPPERPOINT INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO,
Respondent Carrier.

No. 1 CA-IC 26-0002
FILED 10-27-2026

Special Action - Industrial Commission
ICA Claim No. 20241940143
Carrier Claim No. 1000095898
The Honorable Paula R. Eaton, Administrative Law Judge

AWARD SET ASIDE

COUNSEL

Phoenix Karpova, Flagstaff
Petitioner

Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
By Afshan Peimani
Counsel for Respondent

CopperPoint Indemnity Insurance Company, Phoenix
By Travis M. Wheeler
Counsel for Respondent Employer and Carrier

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Phoenix Karpova appeals an Industrial Commission of
Arizona (“ICA”) award dismissing a challenge to the closure of Karpova’s
claim. An ICA Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) determined that Karpova
had abandoned the claim by not appearing for two hearings. For the
reasons below, we conclude that Karpova did not abandon the claim and
therefore set aside the dismissal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In July 2024, a resident at the group home where Karpova
worked as an employee of iCare Adult Day Center, LLC (“Employer”)
assaulted Karpova, causing injuries to his right shoulder, spine, and head.
Employer and its insurer, CopperPoint Indemnity Insurance Co.
(collectively “Respondents”), accepted the claim and Karpova received
benefits. In September 2024, Respondents closed the claim based on an
independent medical examination concluding that Karpova’s injuries were
medically stationary. Karpova timely requested a hearing.

¶3 In March 2025, the ICA held a virtual initial hearing in which
Karpova participated without counsel. Respondents’ counsel explained
that Karpova had recently submitted medical records indicating that he
sought psychological treatment after the claim was closed. After reviewing
those records, counsel requested the ALJ to postpone Karpova’s testimony
so he could obtain an independent psychiatric evaluation to determine
whether the claim remaining closed was appropriate. The ALJ granted the
request postponing Karpova’s testimony for a later date.

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¶4 Karpova subsequently participated in hearings in May and
June, which the ALJ acknowledged. During the June hearing, Karpova
testified that he was struggling financially, had no food, had given up his
dogs, and was “about to become homeless.” Karpova also testified that he
had no gas or other means to travel to Phoenix from Flagstaff and that
seizures had prevented him from driving.

¶5 The ALJ ultimately scheduled a hearing for September 3 to
take testimony from Karpova’s physical therapist and another hearing for
September 9 to take Karpova’s testimony. Karpova did not appear on
September 3. The ALJ attempted to reach him by telephone, but Karpova
did not answer. Because the physical therapist was present, the ALJ took
his testimony. He testified that Karpova continued to need treatment for
balance and gait speed and that testing showed visual impairment
consistent with a concussion or traumatic brain injury. After the physical
therapist testified, the ALJ and Respondents confirmed that the hearing
would reconvene on September 9. Just as Respondents were about to
disconnect from the hearing, the ALJ stated: “Oh, wait. Did you want to
make a Motion to Dismiss based on their failure to appear today?”1
Respondents obliged, and the ALJ took the motion under advisement.

¶6 After the hearing, the ALJ warned Karpova by letter that his
request for hearing would be dismissed if he failed to appear at the
September 9 hearing without a sufficient explanation. The letter was signed
September 3 and sent by U.S. mail from Phoenix to Karpova’s Flagstaff
address. The record does not establish when the letter was mailed or
whether Karpova received it before the September 9 hearing.

¶7 Karpova did not appear at the September 9 hearing. The ALJ
granted Respondents’ renewed motion to dismiss and, on September 10,
found that Karpova had abandoned his request for hearing by failing to
appear. The ALJ issued an award dismissing Karpova’s request for hearing,
making the claim’s closure final.

¶8 Within two weeks, Karpova submitted documents and a
letter explaining his absence. He reported financial and mental-health
difficulties, problems maintaining phone and internet service, and

1 We caution courts against the solicitation of motions from parties,
particularly if the motion is case-dispositive. “A judge must be careful
never to act in the dual capacity of judge and advocate.” State v. Brown, 124
Ariz. 97, 100 (1979).

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KARPOVA v. ICARE ADULT/COPPERPOINT
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confusion about the September 9 hearing date. Karpova stated that he had
mistakenly believed the hearing was scheduled for September 23,
expressed his intent to testify, and asked that the hearing be reopened. The
ALJ treated the filings as a request for review but denied relief and affirmed
the award, finding that Karpova’s explanation and accompanying medical
records did not establish a basis for his failure to appear or respond to the
warning.

¶9 Karpova filed this statutory special action. We have
jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(B) and 23-951(A).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Karpova contends the dismissal violated due process due to
“procedural irregularit[ies]” and requests a “reopening” of the case.
Respondents contend Karpova failed to show good cause for failing to
attend the hearing sessions in September 2025.

¶11 Dismissal is a “severe” sanction, and, whenever possible,
cases should be resolved on their merits rather than by procedural motion.
Tucson Elec. Power Co. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 139 Ariz. 80, 83 (App. 1983);
Cook v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 133 Ariz. 310, 311 (1982). This is particularly
the case in workers’ compensation cases because benefits are remedial and
should be administered to grant them to those who qualify and deny those
who do not. See Simmons v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 254 Ariz. 109, 111, ¶ 11
(App. 2022) (explaining that “unemployment benefits are a remedial
measure” requiring liberal interpretation of law and facts to grant benefits
and narrow interpretation to deny them). We review dismissal based on a
claimant’s failure to appear for an abuse of discretion. See Brown v. Indus.
Comm’n of Ariz., 154 Ariz. 252, 255 (App. 1987). An ALJ abuses her
discretion if she commits legal error, fails to consider the evidence, or acts
without substantial evidentiary support. See Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co.,
133 Ariz. 434, 455–56 (1982).

¶12 A party to a workers’ compensation proceeding must
personally appear at a hearing unless excused by the ALJ and, if unable to
appear, must notify the ALJ at least three days in advance. Ariz. Admin.
Code (“A.A.C.”) R20-5-216(A)–(B).2 A party who fails to appear without
notice may be ordered to reimburse the ICA for hearing expenses, including
witness fees. A.A.C. R20-5-216(C). A party also may be sanctioned for

2 Formerly A.A.C. R20-5-149, renumbered at 31 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 4199,

4221 (eff. Oct. 6, 2025).

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failing to comply with an ICA procedure, including by prohibiting the
introduction of evidence, assessing attorneys’ fees and costs, or dismissing
the request for hearing. A.A.C. R20-5-230(A).3 The ALJ may lift a sanction
upon a showing of good cause. A.A.C. R20-5-230(B).

¶13 In determining whether good cause exists to lift a sanction,
the ALJ should consider the party’s explanation for the violation and
whether (1) the party has shown a pattern of failure to cooperate, (2) the
party has acted with due diligence, (3) evidence supports the party’s case,
and (4) the violation prejudiced the other party. Brown, 154 Ariz. at 254.

¶14 In Brown, the ALJ dismissed a claimant’s request for hearing
after she failed to appear at the initial hearing. Id. at 253. Although the
claimant provided an explanation for her absence, the record also showed
that she had otherwise cooperated with the proceedings, had evidence
supporting her claim, required a continued hearing to present other
witnesses, and had not prejudiced the opposing party. Id. at 254–55. We
held that the explanation for the absence, standing alone, did not resolve
whether good cause existed to lift the sanction; the ALJ also had to consider
the other circumstances identified above. Id.

¶15 Here, Karpova had submitted documentary evidence
supporting his claim and had cooperated with discovery and the hearing
process for many sessions over many months before failing to appear. At
the June hearing, Karpova mentioned financial difficulties and possible
homelessness. On September 3, the ALJ heard testimony from the physical
therapist in Karpova’s absence, and that testimony could be viewed as
supporting Karpova’s case. The ALJ then sent Karpova a warning letter by
U.S. mail, but the record does not show when the letter was mailed or
whether it was received at Karpova’s Flagstaff address before the
September 9 hearing.

¶16 We conclude that, without further inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding Karpova’s failure to appear for two hearings six
days apart, this record does not support the abandonment finding. Nothing
other than the two failures to appear suggests abandonment, while the
record shows Karpova’s continued and sustained participation before those
non-appearances. The short time between the hearings and the absence of
evidence establishing when Karpova received the warning letter also call
into question the effectiveness of the warning. We also see no indication

3 Formerly A.A.C. R20-5-157, renumbered at 31 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 4199,

4224 (eff. Oct. 6, 2025).

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that the ALJ considered sanctions less drastic than dismissal, such as
reimbursement of costs or preclusion of evidence.

¶17 Within two weeks of the dismissal, Karpova submitted
medical documentation and a letter explaining the circumstances
surrounding his absences, including financial and mental-health difficulties
and confusion about the hearing dates. The ALJ found that the documents
“fail[ed] to establish any basis for [Karpova]’s failure to appear at [the]
hearing.” The record does not support that finding. Karpova provided an
explanation for his absences, which the ALJ was required to consider as part
of the good-cause inquiry.

¶18 Nothing indicates that, in considering Karpova’s request for
review, the ALJ considered anything beyond the reasons for his failures to
appear. But under the ICA rule, the ALJ must determine whether good
cause exists to lift the sanction of dismissal, not simply whether the party had
good cause for the failure to appear, although that failure is a factor. A.A.C.
R20-5-230(B); Brown, 154 Ariz. at 254. The good-cause inquiry also requires
consideration of the party’s cooperation with the proceedings, whether the
claimant submitted substantive evidence supporting the claim, and
whether the other party was prejudiced. Id. The ALJ’s failure to consider
those factors was error.

¶19 An ALJ considering dismissal for failure to appear should do
so cautiously and only as a last resort, considering lesser sanctions first.
And when considering whether to lift a dismissal sanction, the ALJ must
consider the Brown factors, 154 Ariz. at 254, not merely the reason for the
failure to appear.

CONCLUSION

¶20 Because the ALJ erred, we set aside the dismissal of Karpova’s
request for hearing and remand for proceedings consistent with this
decision.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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