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“[T]his court will uphold the restitution award if it bears a reasonable relationship to the victim’s loss.” ¶ 20 (App. 2002).

–452, ¶¶ 22-23 (App. 2001) (holding that § 13-1202(A)(1) applies to a “true threat,” meaning one that a reasonable person would understand as a genuine threat to inflict harm); –23, ¶¶ 11-14 (App. 2002) (same and explaining the standard is objective).

3 In re JESUS C. Decision of the Court ¶8 The superior court has discretion to fashion an award, in light of the circumstances presented and proven by a preponderance of the evidence, in an amount sufficient “to make the victim whole.” ¶ 20 (App. 2002); ¶ 15 (App. 2003).

2 IN RE LUIS V. Decision of the Court DISCUSSION ¶5 We review juvenile delinquency adjudications for an abuse of discretion, ¶ 16 (App. 2002), and “will uphold a trial court’s finding that a probationer has violated probation unless the finding is arbitrary or unsupported by any theory of evidence.” ¶ 3 (App. 1999).

We will affirm the order if it bears a reasonable relationship to the victim’s loss, ¶ 20 (App. 2002), and is supported by a preponderance of the evidence, ¶ 15 (App. 2003).

The superior court “has discretion to set the restitution amount according to the facts of the case in order to make the victim whole.” ¶ 20 (App. 2002).

¶ 20 (App. 2002) (the court “has discretion to set the restitution amount according to the facts of the case in order to make the victim whole”).

Because this is an objective standard, the State need not prove that the listener subjectively feared or felt threatened by the communication for it to constitute a “true threat.” -23, ¶¶ 9-14 (App. 2002).

23, ¶¶ 9, 13 (App. 2002) (conviction for "threatening or intimidating" under A.R.S.

(civil concept of failure to mitigate "simply do[es] 6 IN RE REYNALDO P. Decision of the Court not fit into the framework of the criminal law"); ¶ 28 (App. 2002) (victim's mother awarded $300 for lost wages from missed appointments even though juvenile argued she could have rescheduled those clients).

resolved constitutional concerns based on the first amendment right to free speech.” ¶ 8 (App. 2002); see United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (“true threat[]” is a category of expression permissibly subject to a content-based restriction on speech); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing the Court’s prior cases that recognize “the First Amendment also p

The court “has discretion to set the restitution amount according to the facts of the case in order to make the victim whole,” but must ensure the “award consists of monies for economic losses that flow directly from or are the direct result of the crime committed.” ¶ 20 (App. 2002).

¶ 20 (App. 2002); ¶ 9 ( ¶ 7 (2002)).

¶ 10–11 (App. 2002) (“It is axiomatic that an objective test does not require a subjective analysis of the belief of the particular person to whom the threat is made.”).

¶ 20 (App. 2002); see also A.R.S.

See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(8); ¶ 29

When used in a statute, we give the term “or” its usual disjunctive meaning, *599 expressing an alternative “choice among one of two or more things.” ¶ 13, (internal citations omitted).

“[T]he trial court has discretion to set the restitution amount according to the facts of the case in order to make the victim whole.” ¶ 20 , (emphasis added); , (“[A] trial court is required to determine the full amount of the victim’s loss to make the victim whole.”); Pima County Juv.

For example, , our supreme court upheld an order requiring a defendant to pay travel expenses and probate attorney’s fees incurred by the victim’s family during an emergency trip to Arizona following her murder, concluding that such expenses were “proper restitutionary items.” -27, ¶¶ 29-32 , -50 (App.2002) (upholding juvenile court’s order requiring juvenile to pay restitution to minor victim’s parents for time missed from employment to voluntarily attend criminal proceedings); ¶ 7 , (affirming

Though not at issue here, restitution "may also be based on other economic losses, such as losses due to attendance at court proceedings, whether voluntaiy or mandatory.” ¶ 20

§ 1-214(B) says use of singular includes plural); ¶ 25, ¶ 25 (App. 2002) (use of “parent” in statute may be construed to mean both parents); (use of plural includes singular).