Cited by

Sec., ¶ 17 (App. 2012) (finding no prejudice when other overwhelming evidence supported father’s abuse of the children).

Sec., ¶ 22 (App. 2012) (holding the court’s legal conclusion for the statutory ground at a termination hearing must be sufficiently supported by at least one factual finding).

Sec., ¶ 17 (App. 2012) (finding no prejudice in the erroneous admission of evidence where “other overwhelming evidence” established the parent’s abuse of the children).

¶13 which held that the court’s two legal conclusions in a termination hearing (statutory grounds and best interests) must be sufficiently supported by at least one factual finding.

Sec., ¶ 21 (App. 2012) (“[T]he legislature has imposed significant procedural safeguards to ensure due process [at termination proceedings].”).

§ 8-538(A); see also Logan B. v. DCS, 1 CA-JV 17-0327, 2018 WL 2356128, at *1, ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. May 24, 2018); ¶ 21 (App. 2012).

Sec., this court held that to comply with Rule 66(F)(2)(a), the order must specify the juvenile court’s conclusions of law and “at least one factual finding sufficient to support each of those conclusions of law.” -41, ¶¶ 22, 25-26 (App. 2012).

Sec., ¶ 24 (App. 2012) (finding a juvenile court’s findings of facts must be specific enough to allow this court to “determine exactly which issues were decided and whether the lower court correctly applied the law” (citation omitted)).

ecause a court’s factual findings are to enable an appellate court to effectively examine the basis for the superior court’s decision, only findings of the ultimate facts are required for an effective review, without the need to “bolster them by subsidiary findings on evidentiary matters upon which such ultimate facts are based.” ¶ 25 (App. 2012); In re U.S. Currency in Amount of $26,980.00, ¶ 7 (App. 2000); see also Ariz. R. Civ.

Sec., ¶ 24 (App. 2012) (citations omitted).

Sec., ¶¶ 21-22 (App. 2012).

Sec., ¶ 24 (App. 2012) ("The primary purpose for requiring a court to make express findings of fact and conclusions of law is to allow the appellate court to determine exactly which issues were decided and whether the juvenile court correctly applied the law.").

Sec., ¶ 15, (noting that the doctrine of fundamental error is rarely used in civil cases, but has been applied in severance cases “[b]ecause of the constitutional ramifications inherent in termination proceedings”).

Sec., ¶ 14 (App. 2012) (absent fundamental error, a party who fails to raise an issue at trial waives the right to assert it on appeal).

Sec., ¶¶ 13-17, (reviewing evidence at termination hearing for fundamental error when respondent parent did not object in the juvenile court).

Sec., ¶ 24 (App. 2012) (“The primary purpose for requiring a court to make express findings of fact and conclusions of law is to allow the appellate court to determine exactly which issues were decided and whether the lower court correctly applied the law.”).

Sec., -40 (App. 2012), quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); (“[A] parent is entitled to due process whenever his or her custodial rights to a child will be determined by a proceeding.”).