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“simply refuses to engage.” Relying on Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, the court stated it was “unable to find by clear and convincing evidence that further reunification efforts would be unproductive.” ¶6 On appeal, C.M.

See Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 11 (App. 2014) (A child’s subjective belief that a parent cannot keep him safe, without more, “cannot be the sole basis to determine as a matter of law that [the parent] will be unable to parent him in the near future.”).

Sec., ¶ 4 (App. 2002); see also Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7 (App. 2014) (“A ruling is clearly erroneous if unsupported by substantial evidence.”).

Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7 (App. 2014).

Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7 (App. 2014).

Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7 (App. 2014); ¶ 12 (App. 2003) (stating that substantial evidence is any relevant evidence that allows a reasonable mind to draw the same conclusion).

er the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional health because the child refuses to have any contact with Mother, and forcing the child to 7 GONZALES v. VARGAS Decision of the Court have contact with Mother could cause severe emotional distress to the child.” Cf. Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, –35, ¶¶ 11-13 (App. 2014) (holding, in the context of termination of parental rights, an eleven-year-old’s “subjective belief” that Mother could not keep him safe, and child’s refusal to particip

¶19 Father also argues the superior court improperly terminated his rights based solely on best interests of the child

¶ 11 (App. 2014) (insufficient evidence supported severance when parent had remedied circumstances by "successfully complet[ing] all of the reasonable services offered to implement family reunification").

As a result, Father’s ¶ 11 (App. 2014) (no evidence in the record supported the superior court’s findings mother was unable to remedy the circumstances bringing her child into DCS’s care or to parent her child) is distinguishable.

Father cites Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, in support of his argument.

at ¶ 4 (citation omitted); see Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7, ¶ 12

See Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7, ¶ 12

We will only disturb a court’s determination if it is unsupported by substantial evidence, Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7, recognizing that the court, as the trier of fact, “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings,” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

A determination is clearly erroneous if it is “unsupported by substantial evidence.” Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7 (App. 2014).

A termination order is clearly erroneous if it is “unsupported by substantial evidence.” Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7, ¶ 12, (“Substantial evidence is any relevant evidence from which a reasonable mind might draw a conclusion.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

A determination is clearly erroneous if it is “unsupported by substantial evidence.” Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 7, ¶ 12, (“Substantial evidence is any relevant evidence from which a reasonable mind might draw a conclusion.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1 “‘[W]e view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court’s order.’” Desiree S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, n.2, ¶ 1 (App. 2014) (quoting Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.