Cited by

See Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 68 (App. 2019).

Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, –23, ¶¶ 48, 49 (App. 2019).

When deciding whether DCS has made diligent reunification efforts, the superior court must examine the “totality of the circumstances of the dependency.” See Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 68 (App. 2019).

and Father apart and restricted communication.” ¶ 81 (App. 2019).

on requires DCS to “identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 50 (App. 2019).

Sec., ¶ 22 (App. 2007); see also Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 26 (App. 2019) (court must consider “both the origin [of the dependency] and any cause arising during the dependency”).

To meet its obligation, DCS must “identify the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult.” ¶ 50 (App. 2019).

Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 26 (App. 2019) (“Because the court did not identify the ‘circumstance’ causing the out-of-home placement, both in origin and any cause arising during the dependency, the court was unable to properly conclude that: DCS had made 5 KRISTINA J. v.

“A ‘reasonable effort’ requires DCS ‘to undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success.’” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 46 (App. 2019) (citation omitted).

Sec., ¶ 22 (App. 2007); see also Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 26 (App. 2019) (court must consider “both the origin [of the dependency] and any cause arising during the dependency”) (emphasis in original).

See Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 26 (App. 2019) (court must consider “both the origin and any cause arising during the dependency”).

In Donald W. v. DCS, we held that an “ICPC is not required when evidence does not support a dependency as to the out-of-state parent.” ¶ 38 (App. 2019) (emphasis added).

“When the statutory grounds for termination are challenged, we will affirm a termination order unless we must say as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find the evidence supporting statutory grounds for termination to be clear and convincing.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 25 (App. 2019) (quoting Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

“When the statutory grounds for termination are challenged, we will affirm a termination order unless we must say as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find the evidence supporting statutory grounds for termination to be clear and convincing.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, ¶ 25 (App. 2019) (quoting Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.

§ 8-533(B)(8); ¶ 30 (App. 1999) (discussing the difference between “reasonable efforts” and “diligent efforts”); (requiring DCS to “provide services that have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they arise throughout the time-in-care period”(emphasis omitted)).

In Donald W. v. DCS, we held that an “ICPC is not required when evidence does not support a dependency as to the out-of-state parent.” ¶ 38 (App. 2019).