Fateama M. v. Dcs, J.W.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

FATEAMA M., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.W., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 19-0103
FILED 5-19-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Apache County
No. S0100JD201600024
The Honorable C. Allan Perkins, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Fateama M., Long Beach, CA
Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Dawn Rachelle Williams
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Law Office of D. Bryce Patterson, St. Johns
By D. Bryce Patterson
Counsel for Appellee J.W.
 FATEAMA M. v. DCS, J.W.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Fateama M. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
terminating her parental rights to J.W. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother is the natural parent of J.W., a minor son born in
December 2003. In June 2015, Mother and J.W. were driving from
Oklahoma to their home in California when Mother’s vehicle broke down
in Arizona near the Petrified Forest National Monument, leaving them
stranded with limited food and water.

¶3 A Department of Public Safety officer found Mother and J.W.
on the shoulder of Interstate 40. Mother was paranoid and delusional. Her
behavior was erratic—she declined food and water for fear she was being
poisoned. She berated the tow truck driver. She also required J.W. to
remain inside the hot vehicle, refusing the officer’s request that he be
allowed to cool off. Mother was involuntarily admitted to a local hospital
for three days, where she underwent a mental health evaluation. The
Department of Child Safety took temporary custody of J.W and petitioned
for dependency based on neglect.

¶4 The long and tortured procedural history of this case is
recounted in earlier decisions of this court. See Fateama M. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 1 CA-JV 17-0079, 2017 WL 4837644 (Ariz. App. Oct. 26, 2017) (mem.
decision); Fateama M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 16-0024, 2016 WL
5939730 (Ariz. App. Oct. 13, 2016) (mem. decision). As relevant here, the
juvenile court conducted a dependency hearing in September and October
2015 and found J.W. dependent as to Mother. We vacated the dependency
finding.

¶5 DCS then filed a new dependency petition in October 2016,
providing additional allegations to substantiate neglect. The juvenile court
held another dependency hearing in January and February 2017 and again
found J.W. dependent in March 2017. But we dismissed the proceeding

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 FATEAMA M. v. DCS, J.W.
Decision of the Court

after determining that California had exclusive jurisdiction under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. Fateama M., 1
CA-JV 17-0079, at *3-4, ¶¶ 12, 17-18, 20, 22.

¶6 California ceded its jurisdiction to Arizona a few months
later. DCS then moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights in March 2018
on grounds of neglect or willful abuse. The juvenile court held a contested
four-day severance hearing in February and March of 2019. The court
heard testimony from 17 witnesses, including three DCS supervisors, two
DCS case managers, one DCS specialist, three psychologists, three
therapists, a psychiatric nurse, a visitation aide, Mother’s aunt, Mother’s
friend and Mother. The court terminated Mother’s parental rights in April
2019. Mother timely appealed.

¶7 We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-235(A).1

DISCUSSION

¶8 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding of
statutory grounds for termination based on neglect and emotional abuse,
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2), or its findings that termination is in J.W.’s best interests.
She therefore waives and abandons any challenge to the termination order.
See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577, ¶ 5 (App. 2017) (“By
failing to challenge the time-in-care ground, Mother has abandoned and
waived any contention that the court erred in granting severance on that
basis.”).

¶9 Mother’s arguments are instead directed at the juvenile
court’s 2015 dependency finding, along with J.W.’s out-of-state placement,
a post-termination order, due process, jurisdictional issues and the grant of
DCS’s motion to amend. But the termination order renders the dependency
finding moot, see Rita J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 512, 515, ¶ 10
(App. 2000) (otherwise appealable order from permanency hearing
essentially moot due to later order terminating parental rights), and divests
Mother of standing to challenge J.W.’s placement and the post-termination

1 Mother moved for another extension of time to file her reply brief.
This court already granted Mother three extensions, including one
extension for her reply brief that explained no further extensions would be
granted absent unforeseen and extraordinary circumstances. For her latest
request, Mother only references a general “technical problem” with her
email. Because Mother offers no unforeseen or extraordinary
circumstances, we deny the motion.

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 FATEAMA M. v. DCS, J.W.
Decision of the Court

order, A.R.S. § 8-539 (“An order terminating the parent-child relationship
shall divest the parent . . . of all legal rights, privileges, duties and
obligations.”). Moreover, California ceded its jurisdiction to Arizona, see
A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(3), and Mother received notice and an opportunity to
be heard, see Cruz v. Garcia, 240 Ariz. 233, 236, ¶ 11 (App. 2016) (citations
omitted) (“Due process entitles a party to notice and an opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”). Lastly, Mother
does not develop her argument concerning DCS’s motion to amend and
thus waives it. See ARCAP 13(a)(7).

¶10 Even without waiver, however, the record contains ample
support for the juvenile court’s termination order. The court heard from
Mother’s family and friends who testified about her “troubling behaviors”
before and after J.W.’s removal, raised concerns about her “mental state,”
and shared “substantial fears” over her parenting abilities. The court also
heard from mental health professionals who “cast doubt on [Mother’s]
mental status and her ability to meaningfully parent J.W.” Indeed, the
professionals most familiar with this case “uniformly expressed significant
concerns and doubts on her ability to appropriately parent J.W.” and
“uniformly believe[d]” that returning J.W. to Mother would be “very
harmful to [his] wellbeing.” The court also heard from Mother and was
“[m]ost trouble[d]” by her “complete inability or refusal to accept any
responsibility” for the current circumstances. The court found that Mother
has “emotionally bullied her son for years.” Above that, the court received
evidence and heard testimony about J.W.’s “remarkable progress” since
removal.

CONCLUSION

¶11 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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