In Re Braden C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE BRADEN C.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0059
FILED 07-21-2020

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300JV201900103
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Law Offices of Michael and Casey, Phoenix
By Robert Ian Casey
Counsel for Appellant

Yavapai County Attorney’s Office, Prescott
By Danalyn E. Savage
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

G A S S, Judge:
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Decision of the Court

¶1 B.C. challenges the superior court’s $182,813.00 restitution
award to the Chino Valley Unified School District and the Arizona School
Risk Retention Trust. Of that amount, B.C. was ordered to pay one fourth,
or $45,703.25. For the following reasons, this court affirms the award.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This court views the facts and all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s restitution
order. See State v. Lewis, 222 Ariz. 321, 323, ¶ 2 (App. 2009). The superior
court properly determines the credibility of the witnesses and the
authenticity of the victim’s documented damages. See Maricopa Cty. Juv.
Action No. JV-132905, 186 Ariz. 607, 609 (App. 1996). This court will not
“reweigh evidence, but only look to determine if there is evidence to
sustain the [superior] court’s ruling.” Id.

¶3 B.C. and three others broke into the School and covered its
basketball court with oil. The oil was “all over the gym floor” from
“basket to basket covering the entire court area.” The School’s
maintenance team tried to remove the oil but realized the job was beyond
its ability. B.C. was charged with third-degree burglary and aggravated
criminal damage, both class 4 felonies. B.C. admitted to solicitation to
commit burglary in the third degree, non-residential structure, a class 6
undesignated felony. The superior court placed B.C. on supervised
probation. The superior court then set and held a contested restitution
hearing.

¶4 The evidence at the restitution hearing showed the District
filed a claim with the Trust once the School realized its maintenance team
could not remove the oil. The Trust then hired Sun Country Flooring. The
Trust previously vetted Sun Country, identifying it as a preferred vendor
because of its pricing, service, professionalism, and quality of its work.

¶5 A Sun Country representative testified in detail about the
efforts to repair the gym floor to avoid having to replace it entirely.
Reluctantly, Sun Country concluded the oil damage was too widespread,
leaving replacement as the only option. The cost to have Sun Country
replace the floor, taking into account discounts, moving the gym
bleachers, and necessary asbestos testing, was $182,813.00.

¶6 B.C.’s expert, who had not inspected the damaged floor,
testified it did not need to be replaced and instead could have been
repaired for about $6,000.00. B.C.’s expert also testified Sun Country’s bid
was too high. For example, Sun Country charged $3.90 per square foot for
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Decision of the Court

the maple wood, but he said he could have secured the same wood from
the same provider for $3.45 per square foot. He said Sun Country
upgraded the padding, increasing the cost by $0.37 per upgraded pad. He
also said he would not have included the $10,300.00 cost of moving the
bleachers, saying it was a separate issue. B.C.’s expert ultimately testified
he would have bid about $150,000.00 for the same job.

¶7 After hearing the conflicting testimony, reviewing the
evidence, and hearing closing arguments, the superior court awarded
$182,813.00 in restitution. Because B.C. was a juvenile, the superior court
allocated one fourth of that amount, or $45,703.25, to B.C.

¶8 B.C. timely appealed the restitution order. This court has
jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S.
§§ 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1, and Ariz. R. Juv. P. 103(A).

ANALYSIS

¶9 On appeal, B.C. argues the award gives the School a
windfall. Specifically, B.C. argues the Trust did not exercise due diligence
when it relied exclusively on its “preferred vendor,” Sun Country, and
decided to replace the floor rather than repair it. B.C. misstates the issue.
Because the superior court resolved conflicting testimony, this court will
uphold the restitution award if the evidence establishes it bears “a
reasonable relationship to the victim’s loss.” See In re William L., 211 Ariz.
236, 239, ¶ 10 (App. 2005).

¶10 When a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent, the superior
court shall order the juvenile to make full or partial restitution to the
victim of the offense. A.R.S. § 8-344.A. The superior court may consider “a
verified statement from the victim . . . concerning damages for . . . loss of
property. . . .” A.R.S. § 8-344.B. Restitution is appropriate for economic
losses occurring because of the juvenile’s delinquent conduct if they are a
direct, not consequential, result of that delinquent conduct. See In re
Andrew C., 215 Ariz. 366, 368, ¶ 9 (App. 2007). “The guiding principle is to
make the victim whole, to the extent permitted by the statutory and
constitutional scheme.” Id. at 369, ¶ 11 (internal quotation omitted).

¶11 This court reviews restitution orders for an abuse of
discretion. See Lewis, 222 Ariz. at 323, ¶ 5. An abuse of discretion occurs
when “the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable,
legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice.” State v. Riley, 248 Ariz.
154, 167, ¶ 7 (2020). The superior court has “substantial discretion” in
determining the amount of restitution owed to a victim. See State v.
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Madrid, 207 Ariz. 296, 298, ¶ 5 (App. 2004); William L., 211 Ariz. at 241,
¶ 17 (restitution based on amount remaining on car loan appropriate even
if it exceeds car’s market value if market value would not make victim
whole).

¶12 Here, the superior court heard detailed testimony from Sun
Country outlining its efforts to mitigate the cost to repair the damage to
the gym floor. Sun Country described how it ultimately, and reluctantly,
concluded it had to replace the floor. The superior court also heard from
B.C.’s expert, who said he would have repaired the gym floor for $6,000.00
and replaced it for $150,000.00.

¶13 In its ruling, the superior court discussed the conflicting
testimony and ultimately found the $182,813.00 cost of replacing the gym
floor reasonable and the District and the Trust were entitled to restitution
in that amount. See Madrid, 207 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 5. The superior court’s order
considered the damage B.C.’s conduct caused, calculated restitution
accordingly, and ordered B.C. to pay $45,703.25. The restitution award,
therefore, bears a reasonable relationship to the economic loss B.C. caused
the victims—the costs incurred in replacing the gym floor. See William L.,
211 Ariz. at 239, ¶ 10.

¶14 B.C. has not established the superior court abused its
discretion in calculating the restitution award. The superior court heard
the conflicting testimony and implicitly found more credible the
testimony from Sun Country, the District, and the Trust. See Action No. JV-
132905, 186 Ariz. at 609. The evidence supports the superior court’s
finding the gym floor had to be replaced because of the extent of the
damage B.C. and the other three caused. See William L., 211 Ariz. at 241,
¶ 17. The reasonable cost for replacement was $182,813.00. An award of
that amount was necessary to make the School and the Trust whole. See id.
The superior court reasonably allocated one fourth of that amount to B.C.

CONCLUSION

¶15 Based on the above, this court affirms the superior court’s
restitution award.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT
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