Kristi C. v. Dcs, A.R.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Gilliland v. Rodriquez 268 P.2d 334
- City of Phoenix v. Consolidated Water Company 415 P.2d 866
- Miller v. McAlister 728 P.2d 654
- Monica C. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security 118 P.3d 37
Opinion text
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE
KRISTI C.,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, A.R.,
Appellees.
No. 1 CA‑JV 20‑0072
FILED 6-25-2020
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD532959
The Honorable David K. Udall, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Maricopa County Public Advocate, Phoenix
By Suzanne Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant
Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
By Tom Jose
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
KRISTI C. v. DCS, A.R.
Decision of the Court
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Vice Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani
joined.
M c M U R D I E, Judge:
¶1 Kristi C. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
adjudicating her daughter, Alisha, dependent. For the following reasons,
we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 In October 2019, 14-year-old Alisha was placed at Aurora
Behavioral Health (“Aurora”) for rehabilitation concerning behavioral
issues. On November 8, 2019, after Aurora notified Alisha’s parents that she
had been discharged, her parents refused to pick her up, prompting a call
to the Arizona Department of Child Safety (“DCS”). The following day,
DCS served Mother, as the sole legal parent of Alisha, with a notice stating
that it had taken custody of Alisha. The next week, DCS filed a dependency
petition, alleging Alisha’s parents’ neglect and unwillingness to care for
Alisha caused her to be a “dependent child” as defined under Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-201(15)(a), and asked the court to
make her a ward of the court and place her in DCS’s custody. The court
served Mother with notice of the dependency proceeding, which indicated
that an attorney had been assigned to represent her in the matter.
¶3 In January 2020, Mother failed to attend a pretrial conference
regarding the dependency petition. At the hearing, the court received a
DCS report, found Alisha was a dependent child, and ordered her a ward
of the court committed to the custody of DCS. The minute entry stated:
THE COURT FINDS, pursuant to the Rules of Procedure for
the Juvenile Court, that the allegations of the petition are true
by a preponderance of the evidence and the child is
dependent as to [Mother] as defined by the Arizona Revised
Statutes.
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KRISTI C. v. DCS, A.R.
Decision of the Court
¶4 Thereafter, Mother filed a motion to clarify the court’s order
regarding Alisha’s dependency. Mother requested the court make written
findings under Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court (“Juvenile
Rule”) 55(E)(3), outlining the evidence it relied upon when making its
determination so that she could assess any appealable issues. DCS filed a
notice of no objection to Mother’s motion. The court denied the motion
summarily.
¶5 Mother appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 8-235(A) and Juvenile Rule 103(A).
DISCUSSION
¶6 On appeal, Mother argues that the court erred by failing to
make sufficiently specific written findings under A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1)(a)(ii)
and Juvenile Rule 55(E)(3). DCS argues the court made sufficiently specific
factual findings, and regardless, if an error occurred, it was harmless.
¶7 DCS has the burden to prove a child is dependent under
A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a). A dependent child includes a child who is “[i]n need
of proper and effective parental care and control and who has . . . no parent
or guardian willing to exercise or capable of exercising such care and
control”; and “[a] child whose home is unfit by reason of . . . neglect . . . by
a parent.” A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(i), (iii). Even when a parent fails to appear
at a dependency hearing, the court may not adjudicate the child dependent
until it finds, based upon the record and evidence presented, that “the
petitioner has proven grounds upon which to adjudicate the child
dependent.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 55(D)(2). Then, “[t]he court shall enter its
findings and orders pursuant to subsection (E) of [Juvenile Rule 55].” Id.
(emphasis added); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 55(E)(3) (“All findings and orders shall
be in the form of a signed order or contained in a minute entry. As to each
parent, . . . the court shall: . . . [s]et forth specific findings of fact in support
of a finding of dependency . . . .”); A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1)(a)(ii) (the court must
make a finding of the factual basis for the dependency if it “[f]inds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the allegations contained in the petition
are true”).
¶8 The requirement imposed on the juvenile court to make
factual findings is not discretionary; it is a mandatory requirement in every
dependency proceeding. Francine C. v. DCS, 1 CA-JV 19-0366, 2020 WL
3422523, at *3, ¶ 12 (Ariz. App. June 23, 2020). However, an appellate court
does not necessarily have to reverse when the superior court fails to comply
with the Juvenile Rules. Id. at *5, ¶ 20; Monica C. v. ADES, 211 Ariz. 89, 94,
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KRISTI C. v. DCS, A.R.
Decision of the Court
¶22 (App. 2005). When a court fails to make or makes insufficient findings
of fact and conclusions of law, a reviewing court “must tailor the proper
remedy [for] each case.” Miller v. Bd. of Supervisors, 175 Ariz. 296, 300 (1993);
Miller v. McAlister, 151 Ariz. 435, 437 (App. 1986). This generally means the
appellate court will remand for further findings, but it “may also decide an
appeal without those findings if it is in a position to do so.” Miller, 175 Ariz.
at 300. For example, in the rare case that does not turn on contested facts,
and the appellate court can fully understand the issues raised without
findings, we may affirm without findings. Id. (citing Davis v. United States,
422 F.2d 1139, 1142 (5th Cir. 1970)). Stated differently, where the record is
so clear that the appellate court does not need the aid of findings, a court
may waive such defect on the ground that the error is not substantial in that
case. See City of Phoenix v. Consolidated Water Co., 101 Ariz. 43, 45 (1966);
Gilliland v. Rodriquez, 77 Ariz. 163, 167-68 (1954) (unnecessary to make
findings on undisputed matters). This is such a case.
¶9 Here, DCS’s petition alleged that: (1) Mother refused to pick
up Alisha from Aurora after being notified Alisha had been discharged; and
(2) the following day, DCS served Mother with a “Temporary Custody
Notice” that stated DCS had taken custody of Alisha because Mother was
“unable or unwilling to perform essential parental responsibilities and
there [was] no other appropriate caretaker immediately available.” The
petition further alleged Mother neglected Alisha by failing to provide her
with basic necessities. The court served Mother notice of the dependency
proceeding, but she failed to attend. The uncontroverted evidence
overwhelmingly supports the finding of dependency. Thus, the court’s
failure to detail its factual findings as required by Juvenile Rule 55(E)(3),
while error, was harmless in this case.
CONCLUSION
¶10 We affirm the dependency order.
AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA
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