In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to C.K.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.K.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0201
FILED 3-2-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD39129
The Honorable Todd F. Lang, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.K.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Stephanie M. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
terminating her parental rights to C.K. (“Child”). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of Child, born in October 2009.
The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) removed Child from Mother’s
care after Mother was hospitalized for mental illness in February 2019. At
that time, Mother warned that she and Child were being “hunted,” and
reported that voices in her head told her to “cut her and [Child’s] wrist[s].”
Child was placed in a foster home and Mother did not contest the
dependency petition.

¶3 Over the next three years, DCS provided Mother with two
psychological evaluations, two psychiatric evaluations, medication
monitoring, individual therapy, three parent-aide referrals, parenting
classes, and visitation. Mother closed out unsuccessfully from all three
referrals for parent-aide services, and she never completed individual
therapy. She often denied having mental health problems and refused to
take her prescribed medication.

¶4 Mother denied any history of mental illness at the first
psychological evaluation in March 2019 and declined psychotropic
medication. The psychologist concluded that Child was “at an elevated risk
for neglect, including failure to protect; emotional abuse; behavioral issues
due to a dysfunctional milieu; involvement in delusions; [and] shared
delusions,” adding that “physical harm” was possible “if the client acts on
her hallucinations and/or delusions,” and psychiatric treatment “appeared
to be critical” to Mother’s stability. That same month, a psychiatrist
diagnosed Mother with borderline personality disorder and post-traumatic
stress disorder.

¶5 At the second psychological evaluation in April 2021, a
psychologist reported that Mother had “significant thought dysfunction,”

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.K.
Decision of the Court

generalized anxiety disorder, and “traits of schizoid and paranoid
personality.”

¶6 The psychologist recommended that Mother engage in
Ph.D.-level counseling, which Mother started in February 2022. The
Ph.D.-level therapist diagnosed Mother with paranoid personality and
delusional disorders. Mother attended therapy for several months before
the termination hearing, but she struggled to control her outbursts and did
not recognize her delusions.

¶7 In March 2022, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental
rights on grounds of mental illness and fifteen-months out-of-home
placement. The court held a termination hearing in June 2022 and
terminated Mother’s parental rights on both grounds. The court also found
DCS made reasonable efforts to provide reunification services. Mother
appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1),
-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 A parent’s right to custody and control of her child is
fundamental but not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz.
246, 248–49, ¶¶ 11–12 (2000). To terminate parental rights, the superior
court must find at least one statutory ground under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by
clear and convincing evidence, and must find that termination is in the
child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 249, ¶ 12.

¶9 Moreover, when moving to terminate a parent-child
relationship on grounds of out-of-home placement, DCS must prove it
“made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.”
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8). To satisfy this requirement, DCS must “undertake
measures with a reasonable prospect of success” and “provide a parent
with the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to
improve the parent’s ability to care for the child.” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶¶ 34, 37 (App. 1999).

¶10 Mother contends that DCS did not make diligent reunification
efforts. We will affirm the court’s decision if supported by reasonable
evidence, Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 555 (App. 1997),
and accept the court’s factual findings if reasonable evidence supports
them, Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2016).

¶11 The superior court found that Mother received ample services
in this case, and that DCS has “made repeated, sincere and serious efforts

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.K.
Decision of the Court

to provide [her] with the services needed for her to address her mental
health issues and parenting skills deficiencies,” but that “Mother has failed
to take advantage of these opportunities and has failed to make significant
progress.”

¶12 The record has reasonable evidence to support these findings.
DCS provided Mother with a multitude of services over the three-year
dependency, each designed to give Mother insight into her mental health
and parenting issues. Mother resisted many of the services. She denied or
minimized her mental illness, and either refused medication or took it
inconsistently, which prevented her from being able to regulate her
emotions.

¶13 Mother stresses that she received only four months of
Ph.D.-level counseling before termination, but we examine the services
Mother received over the entire dependency. See Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 26, ¶ 69 (App. 2019) (“[T]he court was required to
examine not only the final months but the entire dependency.”). Beyond
that, Mother was often erratic during those counseling sessions and refused
to acknowledge her mental health issues. The Ph.D. therapist testified that
Mother did not show progress.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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