In Re Term of Partental Rights as to O.N.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO O.N.

No. 1 CA-JV 22-0232
FILED 4-13-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS520170
The Honorable Christopher Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate’s Office, Mesa
By Suzanne Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Co-Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

The Huff Law Firm, Tucson
By Laura J. Huff, Daniel R. Huff
Co-Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
 IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHS AS TO O.N.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Destini V. (“Mother”) appeals from the superior court’s order
terminating her parental rights to her child (“Daughter”). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother is the biological parent of Daughter, born in
September 2021. At Daughter’s birth, Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamines, marijuana and fentanyl. Daughter
suffered withdrawal symptoms and convalesced in neonatal intensive care.

¶3 Daughter is Mother’s seventh child; she used drugs during
each of her six prior pregnancies. Mother’s parental rights were terminated
to several other children because of substance abuse.

¶4 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of
Daughter upon her release from the hospital and placed her with a relative.
As before, DCS sought dependency on chronic substance-abuse grounds
and the court found Daughter dependent. The court set a case plan for
severance and adoption. DCS offered Mother a panoply of reunification
services, but Mother did not partake. DCS moved to terminate Mother’s
parental rights to Daughter on grounds of chronic substance abuse.

¶5 The termination hearing was set for March 2022, but was
continued at Mother’s request and rescheduled for June 2022. Mother did
not appear for the June 2022 hearing, and the court found she lacked good
cause for her absence.

¶6 A DCS caseworker testified that DCS had offered Mother
“substance abuse treatment through Terros, a Nurturing Parent provider,
visitations and random UA testing,” but that Mother had not appeared for
drug testing since the dependency first opened, and had not actively
engaged in visitations, missing “at least one visit a week.” The caseworker
also testified that Daughter’s current placement was prepared to adopt her.

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Decision of the Court

¶7 Ruling from the bench, the court found that DCS had proven
the statutory grounds of chronic substance abuse by clear and convincing
evidence, and that termination was in Daughter’s best interest. It observed
that Mother’s substance use had “been going on for a long time[,]” and
Mother had “ignored all . . . opportunities to treat it, to test for it, [and] to
get assessed at Terros.” The court also found that Mother had not
“expressed any desire to be [Daughter]’s parent” and had not “really
engaged in services.”

¶8 DCS lodged a proposed order, replete with findings of fact
and conclusions of law, which the court later signed. Mother timely
appealed, and we have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1),
and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Parents have a fundamental, but “not inalienable” liberty
interest in the care and custody of their children. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 8 (2021). To terminate parental rights, the court
must find at least one statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B) by clear and convincing evidence; it must also find that termination
is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Alma S.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149–50, ¶ 8 (2018). “We review the
court’s termination decision for an abuse of discretion and will affirm
unless no reasonable evidence supports the court’s findings.” Jessie D., 251
Ariz. at 579, ¶ 10. The sufficiency of factual findings is a mixed question of
fact and law that we review de novo. Francine C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 249
Ariz. 289, 296, ¶ 14 (App. 2020).

¶10 For termination based on prolonged substance abuse, DCS
must provide clear and convincing evidence that Mother (1) has a “history
of chronic abuse of controlled substances,” (2) cannot “discharge parental
responsibilities because of [her] chronic abuse of controlled substances,”
and (3) “there are reasonable grounds to believe that [her] condition will
continue for a prolonged and indeterminate period.” Raymond F. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 377, ¶ 15 (App. 2010); A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶11 Mother argues the juvenile court violated her due process
rights by “fail[ing] to make a single finding of fact regarding its conclusion
of law that there existed a substantial likelihood that substance abuse
rendered Mother unable to discharge parental responsibilities toward
[Daughter].” Mother did not raise this argument in the superior court, but

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Decision of the Court

we exercise our discretion to reach the merits. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536, ¶ 9 (App. 2018).

¶12 Arizona law mandates that “[e]very order of the court
terminating the parent-child relationship . . . shall be in writing and shall
recite the findings on which the order is based.” A.R.S. § 8-538(A). Written
findings are required on “all of the ‘ultimate’ facts—that is, those necessary
to resolve the disputed issues,” and the court must make at least one finding
of fact to support each conclusion of law. Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 240–41, ¶¶ 22, 25 (App. 2012). This requirement allows
the appellate court to “determine exactly which issues were decided and
whether the lower court correctly applied the law.” Id. at 240, ¶ 24.

¶13 The superior court did not err. In its written order, the court
observed:

• “Mother is unable to discharge her parental
responsibilities because of a history of chronic abuse of
dangerous drugs, controlled substances and/or alcohol
and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
condition will continue for a prolonged indeterminate
period.”

• “Mother has now used methamphetamines and marijuana
throughout six pregnancies.”

• “Despite her extensive history and the positive test results clearly
showing she was using substances, Mother has denied using any
substances.”

• “[Mother] refused to speak with the DCS specialist about the
substance abuse allegations.”

• “[Mother] was not present for her termination hearing, despite
receiv[ing] an admonition notifying [her] of the need to attend all
court hearings and that the failure to appear could result in a
finding that [she has] waived [her] legal rights, admitted the
allegations in the motion and that the Court could proceed with
termination of [her] parental rights based upon the record
presented.”

¶14 That was enough to support the court’s conclusion that
Mother was unlikely to be able to parent. See Francine C., 249 Ariz. at 299,
¶ 27. Mother’s prolonged history of substance use, her failure to address

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Decision of the Court

the problem despite using drugs in six prior pregnancies, and her disregard
for services and refusal to cooperate with the DCS caseworker all support
the court’s conclusion that Mother could not safely parent her child. The
order satisfied due process.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: CC

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