In Re Term of Parental Rights as to C.G.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G., O.G., and
L.G.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0039
FILED 8-24-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300SV202200014
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant

Prescott Law Group, PLC, Prescott
By Pennie J. Wamboldt
Counsel for Appellee
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.G. et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding
Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Genevieve Thibodeau (“Mother”) appeals from an order
terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and David Goode (“Father”) have three children
together, Christopher,1 born in 2014, Orson, born in 2018, and Logan, born
in 2019. The parents began dating around 2012 and eventually married. The
relationship was on-and-off and tumultuous.

¶3 Mother has long-standing mental-health issues that
sometimes cause her to act erratically and aggressively and experience
suicidal ideations. Over the years, Mother accrued diagnoses of bipolar,
attention-deficit hyperactivity, post-traumatic stress, borderline
personality, premenstrual dysphoric disorders, and cannabis dependence.
Mother has not consistently taken her medications as prescribed.

¶4 Father noted that Mother’s personality and demeanor would
change almost daily during the relationship. According to Father, Mother
displayed bouts of rage and would have a mental-health episode “about
every 3-4 months.” Several times, Mother accused Father of abusing her
and the children, but police and the Department of Child Safety
(“Department”) could not substantiate the claims.

¶5 At Orson’s birth in 2018, Mother tested positive for marijuana
and told a Department investigator that marijuana use affected her
parenting ability. The Department offered Mother substance abuse
treatment and counseling. Mother scheduled an intake for those services
but did not show up. At a follow-up visit from the Department in October
2018, Mother stated that she had relapsed on marijuana, claiming she was
trying to stop using the drug by seeking help at a pain management clinic.

1 We use pseudonyms to protect the children’s identities.

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She also declined services from SENSE, or Substance-Exposed Newborn
Safe Environment.

¶6 In March 2019, while Mother was pregnant with Logan, the
parents argued, leading Father to be convicted of criminal damage. Father
attended domestic-violence classes, moved out of the home, and separated
from Mother. The conviction was then set aside.

¶7 Upon Logan’s birth, Mother decided to “get serious with [her]
mental health and meds and therapy” and placed the children with Father.
Mother visited the children about twice a month until June 2021. At a visit
around May 2021, Mother began accusing Father of abusing Orson,
insisting the children had dairy allergies when they did not, and forcing
herself into Father’s vehicle, upsetting Christopher. At a June 2021 visit,
Mother cornered Christopher in a bathroom and offered him presents if he
would come home with her.

¶8 In July 2021, Mother was arrested after she allegedly
distributed explicit photos and videos of Father and harassed the children’s
paternal grandmother. Mother underwent competency proceedings in her
criminal case. Mother later pled guilty to domestic violence charges of
attempted unlawful distribution of images and harassment and attempted
destruction of a public jail. Meanwhile, Father petitioned for divorce, and
the court issued temporary orders granting Father sole legal
decision-making and suspending Mother’s parenting time.

¶9 In May 2022, Father petitioned to terminate Mother’s parental
rights, as relevant here, under the neglect and mental-illness grounds. See
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2)–(3). After a trial, the juvenile court found that Father
had proven both grounds and that termination was in the children’s best
interests. Mother appealed. This court has jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶10 Mother challenges the order terminating her parental rights
under the mental-illness ground. A parent’s right to her children’s
companionship, care, custody, management, and association is a
fundamental, constitutionally protected right. Michael M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 198, 200, ¶ 8 (App. 2002). These fundamental rights do
not evaporate simply because the natural parent is not a model parent. Id.

¶11 But while fundamental, a parent’s right to custody and
control of a child is not absolute. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196

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Ariz. 246, 248–49, ¶ 12 (2000). Severance of a parental relationship may be
warranted where a petitioner proves one statutory ground under A.R.S.
§ 8-533 by “clear and convincing evidence.” Id. “Clear and convincing”
means the grounds for termination are “highly probable or reasonably
certain.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284–85, ¶ 25 (2005). The court
must also find that severance is in the child’s best interest by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 285, ¶ 29.

¶12 This court “will accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact
unless no reasonable evidence supports those findings” and “will affirm a
severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). We will not reweigh the evidence
but “look only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the court’s
ruling.” Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App.
2004).

¶13 The juvenile court may terminate a parent’s rights to a child
if she cannot discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness,
and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue
for a prolonged indeterminate period. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶14 Mother argues that insufficient evidence supports the
determination that her mental illness renders her incapable of discharging
her parental responsibilities and that her condition will continue for a
prolonged, indeterminate period.

¶15 Mother has had significant mental health issues for over a
decade. During that time, various services were made available to her,
including in-home Department services, SENSE services, Arizona Families
First substance-abuse services, and individual counseling; West Yavapai
Guidance clinic case management, direct support services, individual and
group therapy, psychiatric services, and psychiatric nursing services;
Polara Health outpatient mental health services, inpatient treatment,
individual therapy, case management, ACE team, psychiatric services,
medication reviews; and Yavapai County restoration services.

¶16 Despite the availability of services since at least 2010, the
record supports the court’s findings that Mother failed to stabilize her
mental health, which rendered her unable to parent the children. In October
2019, just after Logan’s birth, Mother was admitted to the hospital for
suicidal ideations and told her provider that she could not care for the
children. Mother reported having “considerable mood swings, especially
when she is not taking her medications” and that when she feels low, she

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“becomes very depressed,” stops caring for herself, “pay[s] her children
less attention,” stops attending her mental-health appointments, and “has
frequent thoughts of suicide, usually with a plan.” Mother also reported
that when manic, she “stops sleeping [and] becomes aggressive with her
family members,” including screaming, cursing, and assaulting them.
Recognizing these issues, to her credit, Mother placed the children in
Father’s care. Outside the supervised visitation offered by Father, she has
not parented them since and has never parented Logan.

¶17 Despite her significant behavioral health needs, for years,
Mother stopped taking her medications, changed doses on her own, and
took medication with other substances such as Fentanyl, marijuana, and
alcohol. Mother also sought out various providers to prescribe her
medications at the same time.

¶18 Mother’s unstable mental health has led to several
hospitalizations, and she has attempted suicide at least a dozen times.
Granted, most of these attempts occurred when she was a teenager. Yet
even as an adult and a mother, she has had several suicidal episodes,
including placing a gun to her head, writing a goodbye letter, driving
recklessly near a cliff, and trying to overdose on Fentanyl. Four months
before the trial, Mother again attempted suicide by mixing her medication
with alcohol and writing another goodbye letter. These facts reasonably
support the juvenile court’s termination order.

¶19 Mother still argues that once her providers found the right
balance of medications in the summer of 2022, she achieved lasting stability.
Although there is some evidence that Mother more regularly engaged in
mental-health treatment in the five months before the trial, as of June 2022,
her provider noted Mother’s “[i]nsight is impaired by illness,” she has
“ongoing struggles with med[ication] management,” and had questioned
her housing stability. Moreover, in July 2022, Mother again reported
experiencing suicidal ideations.

¶20 Mother also continued to struggle with relationships and
substance use. Although disputed, the trial evidence supports a finding
that, in September 2022, Mother left an inpatient drug treatment center after
only three days and against her provider’s advice with a male who
apparently moved in with her. After that, Mother began missing her
appointments, and the provider reported she was “falling into old
behaviors and currently actively using [marijuana].” Within a few weeks,
Mother reported having a different roommate she described as “highly

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dysregulated” and “using substances.” Because Mother was not keeping
her appointments, the provider closed her referral.

¶21 The next month, contrary to her argument that her
medications had stabilized her, Mother expressed frustration with her
medications not meeting all her needs and asked about taking Ketamine or
mushrooms. Reasonable and adequate evidence supports the court’s
finding that “Mother’s inability to safely parent the children due to her
mental illness will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period.”

¶22 Citing the Parent’s Bill of Rights, Mother asserts that the
juvenile court should have only advanced the children’s best interests using
the least restrictive means. See A.R.S. § 1-601. She thus argues that the case
should have been resolved in family court rather than through severance
proceedings. Mother, however, did not raise this argument in the juvenile
court. See Englert v. Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 21, 26, ¶ 13 (App.
2000) (This court “generally [does] not consider issues, even constitutional
issues, raised for the first time on appeal.”). And regardless, the Parent’s
Bill of Rights “does not prohibit a court from issuing an order that is
otherwise allowed by law.” A.R.S. § 1-602(B).

¶23 The juvenile court must determine what is in the child’s best
interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22.
Once the court finds a parent unfit under at least one statutory ground for
termination, “the interests of the parent and child diverge,” and the court
goes on to balance the unfit parent’s “interest in the care and custody of his
or her child . . . . against the independent and often adverse interests of the
child in a safe and stable home life.” Id. at 286, ¶ 35. “[A] determination of
the child’s best interest must include a finding as to how the child would
benefit from a severance or be harmed by the continuation of the
relationship.” Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5
(1990). “[C]ourts must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at
the time of the severance determination” when assessing best interests.
Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018).

¶24 Mother contends that severance causes no affirmative benefit
to the children. But the juvenile court must find only a detriment or a benefit
to satisfy the best interests inquiry. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at 5.

¶25 The juvenile court found that denying the termination
petition would harm the children because they “do not have a normal
parent-child relationship with Mother,” who has not parented them since
October 2019 and has never parented Logan. Furthermore, they will be “at

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[a] continued risk of fear, uncertainty, and confusion,” as Christopher “has
expressed fear that Mother will break his window and kidnap him,” and
Orson and Logan “do not know Mother.” Although not required to, the
court also found that the children would benefit from severance because “it
will remove all risk of uncertainty and promote a safer, more stable
upbringing for” them.

¶26 Reasonable evidence supports these findings, and we will not
reweigh the juvenile court’s assessment of that evidence on appeal. Jesus
M., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002) (“The resolution of such conflicts in
the evidence is uniquely the province of the juvenile court as the trier of
fact; we do not reweigh the evidence on review.”).

CONCLUSION

¶27 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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