In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0099
FILED 10-19-2023

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD39828
The Honorable Jacki Ireland, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Suzanne Sanchez
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix
By Thomas A. Vierling
Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua C. Smith
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda L. Adams
Counsel for Appellee Child
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding
Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Mother and Father appeal from the superior court’s order
terminating their parental rights. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother and Father have a history of substance abuse, leading
to prior termination of parental rights to their other children. When she was
about seven months pregnant with Samantha,1 Mother tested positive for
amphetamines and fentanyl. In August 2022, Samantha was born
substance-exposed to methamphetamine, and Mother again tested positive
for amphetamines.

¶3 The parents failed to submit random urinalysis testing for the
Department of Child Safety (“the Department”). So the Department took
Samantha into care and filed a dependency petition. The court adjudicated
Samantha dependent when the parents failed to appear at a dependency
hearing, and the court adopted a family reunification case plan.

¶4 The Department referred the parents for substance abuse
testing and treatment, and visitation. The Department also asked the
parents to engage in individual counseling through their insurance and
offered them transportation assistance. But the parents failed to participate
in services and did not visit Samantha.

¶5 As a result, at the Department’s request, the court changed
the case plan to severance and adoption, and the Department moved to
terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights because of abandonment,
substance abuse, and a previous termination. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1), (3),
(10). In January 2023, the parents attended a hearing, and the court read
Form 4 of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court. The form
states the parents are “required to appear for every hearing . . . including a

1 To protect the identity of the minor, we use a pseudonym.

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Decision of the Court

pre-trial conference” and that if they failed to appear at a hearing without
good cause, the “court may find that [they have] waived [their] rights” and
“admitted the allegations in the motion.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. Form 4. If they
failed to appear, the court may proceed with the termination hearing and
“terminate [their] parental rights” in their absence. Id. Mother and Father
said that they understood the warning.

¶6 The Department provided notice of the initial severance
hearing, which again warned the parents that their parental rights could be
terminated in their absence if they failed to appear without good cause. The
parents appeared at the initial severance hearing when the court scheduled
a combined pretrial conference and report and review.

¶7 The parents failed to appear at the combined pretrial
conference and report and review. The parents’ counsel objected to
accelerating the termination hearing but provided no good cause for the
parents’ absence. The superior court found the parents were properly
served, had notice of the proceedings, and provided no good cause for their
absence. The court, therefore, took evidence on the termination motion. It
later issued a ruling terminating the parents’ rights to Samantha on the
grounds alleged.

¶8 The parents appealed. This court has jurisdiction under A.R.S.
§ 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶9 The parents do not challenge the court’s finding that they
lacked good cause for their nonappearance at the pretrial conference.
Rather, they only argue that the superior court abused its discretion by
conducting an accelerated termination trial. They assert that the court’s
decision denied them a “full and fair” hearing and was “unnecessarily
harsh,” violating their due process rights. Father also argues that the
superior court erred by not expressly finding that he voluntarily waived his
right to an adjudication.

¶10 This court reviews the superior court’s decision to proceed in
the parents’ absence for an abuse of discretion. Lindsey M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 212 Ariz. 43, 46, ¶ 13 (App. 2006). Whether a party is afforded
due process is a question of law we review de novo. See Brenda D. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 442, ¶ 15 (2018) (constitutional claims are
reviewed de novo). Nonetheless, if a party fails to raise due process claims
in the superior court, we will review only for fundamental error. Id. at 447,
¶ 37. Fundamental error requires a party to prove (1) an error occurred,

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(2) the error goes to the foundation of a case, and (3) prejudice resulted. Id.
at 447-48, ¶ 38.

¶11 Although “[p]arents possess a fundamental liberty interest in
the care, custody, and management of their children,” a juvenile court may
terminate parental rights “so long as the parents whose rights are to be
severed are provided with ‘fundamentally fair procedures’ that satisfy due
process requirements.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24 (2005).
“In termination proceedings, ‘[d]ue process requires notice reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and to afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.’” Monica C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 89, 92, ¶ 16 (App.
2005) (quoting Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 355
(App. 1994)). But a parent may waive procedural due process rights,
including by nonappearance, so long as the waiver is “voluntary, knowing,
and intelligent.” Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 211,
¶ 20 (App. 2008).

¶12 To this end, a parent must be served, receive notice of the
hearing, and be warned that failing to attend a pretrial conference could
lead to an accelerated termination hearing and the loss of parental rights.
A.R.S. § 8-535(D), (E)(3); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 351(c)(2); see also Brenda D., 243
Ariz. at 442, ¶¶ 16-17. Assuming a parent has notice of the pretrial
conference when a parent fails to appear without good cause, the superior
court is allowed to “find [a] parent has waived [his or her] legal rights and
is deemed to have admitted the allegations of the petition by the failure to
appear.” A.R.S. § 8-537(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 351(c)(2); see also Brenda D.,
243 Ariz. at 444, ¶ 24.

¶13 A juvenile court’s “authority to accelerate termination
hearings . . . is discretionary.” Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 84,
87, ¶ 14 (2019). “When exercising this discretion, courts should consider a
parent’s willingness to participate in the case, including availing
themselves of services intended to remedy the issues leading to
dependency, and the stage of the process.” Id. at 87-88, ¶ 14.

¶14 We find no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s decision
to accelerate the termination hearing. The parents received the proper
warnings and had notice of the pretrial conference. They offered no good
cause for their absence.

¶15 The superior court heard evidence of the parents’
unwillingness to participate in the case. Before the pretrial conference, the

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Decision of the Court

parents made no effort to remedy their substance abuse issues or reunite
with Samantha, participating in neither services nor visitation. They also
ignored the Department’s outreach attempts. In doing so, the parents failed
to establish a relationship with newborn Samantha.

¶16 As for their due process claims, the superior court held a
hearing and received evidence, as required in an accelerated hearing. See
Trisha A., 247 Ariz. at 87-88, ¶ 14 (At an accelerated severance hearing, the
Department must still prove its case.). Counsel for the parents was present
and able to participate fully. And the court ensured the parents’ absence
was “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” by giving them the requisite
warnings and notice that they failed to abide. See Manuel M., 218 Ariz. at
211, ¶ 20 (a parent’s waiver of rights is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
if they are admonished of the consequences of failing to appear). There is
no separate requirement that the court make an express finding of the same.
See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 337(e) (The court must find a parent who fails to
appear had notice of the hearing, was admonished about the consequences
of failing to appear, and failed to show good cause for his absence.). We
find no error.

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AA

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