In Re Term of Parental Rights as to E.R. and J.R.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO E.R. and J.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0107
FILED 03-04-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015JD202200045
The Honorable Aaron Michael Demke, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Harris & Winger PC, Flagstaff
By Chad Joshua Winger
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Autumn Spritzer
Counsel for Appellee
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.C. et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins
joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Alexis R. (“Father”) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to his biological children under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(2), the neglect or wilful abuse of a child. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
juvenile court’s findings. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 479
¶ 32 (2023). Father is the biological parent of twins, E.R. and J.R., born in
August 2021. Shortly before the twins were born, their mother and her two
children from other relationships, C.C. (born in February 2008) and M.F.
(born in November 2013), moved in with Father.

¶3 Later that year, DCS received a report of abuse in the home.
After receiving another report in March 2022, DCS employees went to the
family’s home to investigate the abuse allegations. When they met with
M.F., they observed multiple bruises on his body, including his face and
arms, which were in various stages of healing. DCS investigators also spoke
to his mother, who admitted that she would have M.F. and C.C. kneel on
rice as a form of punishment.

¶4 Given the severity of M.F.’s injuries and mother’s admission,
DCS took temporary custody of all four children and placed them with their
maternal grandmother. DCS then filed a dependency petition.

¶5 By June 2022, the juvenile court had adjudicated all four
children dependent. For Father’s children E.R. and J.R., the juvenile court
affirmed a family-reunification case plan and DCS agreed to provide
reunification services.

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¶6 Father engaged in DCS services, which included referrals to
the Nurturing Parenting Program, anger-management counseling, Love
and Logic parenting classes, co-parenting classes, a psychological
evaluation, and supervised visitation with his children. But despite his
participation in services, DCS reported that he was “checking boxes” and
not making real behavioral changes because he continued to minimize his
abuse of M.F. and C.C.

¶7 In July 2022, DCS petitioned to terminate Father’s and
mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). In December 2022,
mother was convicted on child-abuse charges and sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment, and DCS amended its petition to include new allegations
against her.

¶8 The juvenile court held a termination trial in February and
March 2023. DCS presented evidence that Father abused mother’s children
and was particularly cruel towards M.F.—the younger, more vulnerable
child. The DCS investigator testified that C.C. told her that Father forced
him to smack M.F., and that if M.F. “didn’t react to a smacking it would
have to be harder smacking.” The DCS supervisor then testified that when
she interviewed C.C., he reported that Father would force him and M.F. to
kneel on rice as a punishment. She also testified M.F. reported to her that
Father would punish him by holding his head under water. The DCS case
manager testified that C.C. disclosed that he had to hit M.F. with a bat and
force him to remain kneeling on rice if he stopped, and that Father would
force M.F. to sleep in the bathtub or outside. A Kingman City police officer
later testified that when he interviewed M.F., the child reported that Father
would (1) force him to stay outside in the cold, (2) douse him with water
and put him in the garage, (3) slap, kick, and throw him, and (4) force him
to kneel on uncooked rice.

¶9 Father testified on his own behalf, denying the allegations
that he abused mother’s children. He also testified that M.F.’s injuries were
the result of bullying and mother’s abuse. He testified to having a loving
relationship with his children and having benefited from reunification
services. Although he acknowledged pending criminal charges against
him, he asserted that if he were convicted and sentenced to prison, his
family could act as the children’s placement until his release.

¶10 At the end of the trial, the juvenile court ruled from the bench
that DCS proved statutory grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights by
clear and convincing evidence. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). The court also ruled
that the termination was in the children’s best interests by a preponderance

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of the evidence. In support of these conclusions, the court found clear and
convincing evidence that Father physically abused M.F. and emotionally
abused C.C. by compelling him to hurt M.F. The court further found that
Father’s abuse included dunking M.F.’s head in water, compelling him to
kneel on rice, forcing him to sleep in a bathtub, making him do jumping
jacks, tripping him, and throwing him. The court found that the wounds
M.F. suffered were not the result of inappropriate discipline but “a sign of
ongoing and consistent and chronic child abuse.” Finally, the court found
that termination was in the children’s best interests because “it is not safe
for the twins to be in the care of someone who is engaged in this behavior,
this type of abuse, for a prolonged period with half-siblings.”

¶11 In April 2023, the juvenile court entered a written order
terminating Father’s parental rights. In the order, the court further
explained that termination was in the children’s best interests because the
children would benefit from termination because severance “would further
the plan of adoption” and the children “are residing in an adoptive
placement which is meeting all of their needs.” Father timely appealed and
we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A), 12-2101(A); Ariz. R.P.
Juv. Ct. 601(a). This decision, however, was delayed because of disclosure
issues in the juvenile court. On January 29, 2025, the juvenile court resolved
those issues, and we subsequently lifted the stay.

DISCUSSION

¶12 Father argues the juvenile court erred by terminating his
parental rights because it did not make specific factual findings to
demonstrate that his abuse of M.F. and C.C. presented a risk of future harm
to his non-abused biological children. DCS responds that he waived this
claim by raising it for the first time on appeal.

¶13 In general, the failure to raise an argument in the juvenile
court waives the issue on appeal. Marianne N. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 243
Ariz. 53, 56 ¶ 13 (2017). But we may exercise our discretion to consider the
merits of a waived argument when a “good reason exists.” City of Tucson v.
Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 209 Ariz. 544, 552 ¶ 33 n.9 (2005) (citation
omitted). Here, good cause exists to reach the merits because this case
involves termination of Father’s parental rights and affects his fundamental
liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of his children. See
Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 538 ¶ 16 (App. 2018). We
therefore exercise our discretion to address the merits of Father’s claim.

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I. The Juvenile Court’s Written Findings Are Sufficient to Support
Its Termination Order.

¶14 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find by
clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one statutory ground
under A.R.S. § 8-533, and by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Brionna
J., 255 Ariz. at 474 ¶ 1; A.R.S. § 8-537(B). We accept the court’s factual
findings so long as they are supported by reasonable evidence and
inferences, and we affirm the court’s legal conclusions about the statutory
grounds for the termination unless they are clearly erroneous. Brionna J.,
255 Ariz. at 478–79 ¶¶ 30–31. “We review the sufficiency of findings of fact
de novo as a mixed question of fact and law.” Francine C. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 249 Ariz. 289, 296 ¶ 14 (2020).

¶15 One such statutory ground is wilful abuse, which includes
“serious physical or emotional injury or situations in which the parent
knew or reasonably should have known that a person was abusing or
neglecting a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). If a parent neglects or abuses a
child, “the court may terminate that parent’s rights to their other children
on this basis, even if there is no evidence that the other children were
harmed.” Sandra R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 224, 227 ¶ 13 (2020)
(citations omitted). But to protect the parent’s fundamental rights, the
juvenile court must find “a demonstrable connection between the ground
for termination and the harm or risk of harm to a child.” Id. at 229 ¶ 24.

¶16 Relying on Sandra R., Father argues that the juvenile court’s
written findings do not show how his abuse of M.F. and C.C. demonstrates
a future risk of harm to his non-abused biological children. But Sandra R.
does not require written findings of a risk of harm. Id. at 230 ¶ 27. Although
it encourages the court to make express findings, it requires only that the
record contain clear and convincing evidence of a risk of harm to the non-
abused child. Id. In some cases, “the record may implicitly support a
juvenile court’s termination order where a parent’s proven neglect or abuse
of a young child readily demonstrates a comparable risk to the parent’s
other vulnerable young non-abused children.” Id.

¶17 In this case, the termination order contains the following
findings and legal conclusions about Father:

[Father] has willfully abused a child or failed to protect a
child from willful abuse. A.R.S. § 8-201(2), 8-533(8)(2).
Father is currently facing criminal charges for Child Abuse

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as well as two (2) counts of Aggravated Assault by
Domestic Violence, due to injuries sustained to the child,
[M.F.]. The child was observed with several bruises in
various stages of healing on his body, including his face
and arms. That child, reported sleeping in the bathtub due
to wetting the bed and given only [a] pillow and a blanket.
The children, [C.C.] and [M.F.], were reported to kneel on
rice as a form of punishment per the Mother. [Father]
denies inflicting any of the injuries on [M.F.] and the
mother and [Father] report the child, [C.C.], caused the
injuries, which [C.C.] denies. Both [C.C.] and [M.F.]
disclosed Mother and Father [] were the perpetrators. It
is reported Father will yell at the twins when they cry.
The abuse of [M.F.] and [C.C.] causes a substantial risk of
harm to the children, [E.R.] and [J.R.].

These findings describe the abuse Father and mother inflicted on her older
children and support the court’s conclusion that Father wilfully abused or
neglected a child. They further support the conclusion that Father’s abuse
of the older children presented “a substantial risk of harm to” his biological
children. These summary findings therefore sufficiently address “the
ultimate facts” the court relied on when it granted the petition. See Ruben
M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 236, 240–241 ¶¶ 22, 25 (App. 2012)
(citations omitted) (requiring “at least one factual finding sufficient to
support each of those conclusions of law”); see Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
353(h)(2)(A).

¶18 Moreover, the juvenile court’s written findings are supported
by reasonable evidence in the record, including the DCS case manager’s
testimony that Father’s biological children would be placed in a significant
risk of harm if they were returned to him because of their vulnerable age
and the extensive child abuse M.F. and C.C. suffered while living with him.

¶19 Father disputes that this evidence was clear and convincing.
But we will not re-weigh the evidence on appeal, see Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn
F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 9 (2016), and the juvenile court’s written findings about
statutory grounds are legally sufficient and supported by evidence in the
record.

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II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Finding the
Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship Was in the
Children’s Best Interests.

¶20 Father asserts that he is a fit parent to his biological children
because he did not abuse them, and the juvenile court erred in concluding
that he posed a risk to their safety. Because he is a fit parent, he continues,
his children’s interests in maintaining a familial relationship did not
“diverge” from for his own and “DCS failed to prove [he] could not provide
a stable home.” He further argues the juvenile court focused on his
children’s adoptability and adoptive placements but ignored the evidence
that he had rehabilitated himself by the time of the trial. He contends that
the court failed to weigh the evidence of his rehabilitation, which
demonstrated that he did not present a risk of harm to his children.

¶21 “At the best-interests stage of the analysis, ‘we can presume
that the interests of the parent and child diverge because the court has
already found the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination
by clear and convincing evidence.’” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz.
146, 150 ¶ 12 (2018) (quoting Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 286 ¶ 35
(2005)). In balancing these interests, although the court must consider the
totality of the circumstances—“including the parent’s interest in
maintaining a positive parent-child relationship and the parent’s efforts
and ability to do so”—the court’s primary concern is the “child’s interest in
stability and security.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 478
¶ 31 (2022). In other words, courts “should consider a parent’s
rehabilitation efforts” as part of the best-interests analysis, but “the focus of
the best-interests inquiry is on the child.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 15
(emphasis added). Thus, a parent’s efforts at rehabilitation and
reunification are relevant to the extent they impact the child’s best-interests.

¶22 Once the court found the statutory ground of wilful abuse,
Father’s interests diverged from the children’s because, as he
acknowledges, most statutory grounds are “proxies for parental unfitness
because they demonstrate a parent’s inability to properly parent his/her
child.” Id. 150 ¶ 10 (cleaned up). Further, at the best-interests stage, “it is a
given that the child’s best interests predominate,” and not the parent’s
interests. Timothy B., 252 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 31.

¶23 Here the court found the children would benefit from
termination because it would provide them with permanency and stability
through adoption by a relative placement who was able to meet their needs.
This alone is sufficient to find that termination is in the children’s best

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interests. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3–4 ¶ 12 (In state-initiated severance
actions, “[t]he best interest requirement may be met if . . . the petitioner
proves that a current adoptive plan exists for the child, or even that the child
is adoptable.” (quoting Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43,
50 ¶ 19 (App. 2004))). This conclusion is supported by reasonable evidence
and was not an abuse of discretion. Thus, even if the court did not credit
Father’s rehabilitation efforts, the court could still properly terminate his
rights.

¶24 However, when the court ruled from the bench, it both
recognized that Father’s biological children were not “the target children”
of his abuse and that Father had completed services and appropriate
visitation. But the court concluded that his abuse of M.F. and C.C. was “of
such a nature that he is not safe, even with the children who were not the
target children.” Although the court’s oral pronouncements are not a
substitute for the written findings it must make under A.R.S. § 8-538(A), the
court’s statements demonstrate that it weighed evidence of Father’s
engagement in services. See Logan B., 244 Ariz. at 538–39 ¶ 19.

¶25 The court did not err by terminating Father’s rights to E.R.
and J.R.

CONCLUSION

¶26 For these reasons, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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