1 CA-JV 23-0176 Nonprecedential Processed

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to H.F.

Arizona Court of Appeals · Filed July 9, 2024

Opinion text

Highlighting matches for “termination of parental rights” · clear

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.F.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0176
FILED 07-09-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. B8015JD202104060
The Honorable Rick A. Williams, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Harris & Winger, P.C., Flagstaff
By Chad Joshua Winger
Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Autumn Spritzer
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.F.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Cody F. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights over H.F. for abandonment, arguing the
court abused its discretion by finding termination in H.F.’s best interests.
Because reasonable evidence supports the court’s order and the court did
not fail to consider the totality of the circumstances, as Father argues, we
affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Father Did Not Maintain Contact with H.F. or DCS,
Ultimately Leading DCS to Move to Terminate His Parental
Rights.

¶2 When H.F. was born on September 2, 2021, the Department of
Child Safety (“DCS”) received a report that Rachal H. (“Mother”) could not
care for H.F. Through investigation, DCS discovered Mother was unstable
and “detached from reality.” At no point did Father visit H.F. in the
hospital, nor was DCS able to contact Father. Mother would not provide
DCS with Father’s phone number or allow DCS to visit the family home.

¶3 On September 5, 2021, the court authorized DCS to take H.F.
into temporary custody. Four days later, DCS petitioned the court to
determine that H.F. was dependent due to abuse or neglect as to Mother
and Father. After a hearing, the court found H.F. dependent. DCS
provided Mother with services, but Mother did not benefit from the
services in which she engaged and refused to participate in other services.
Meanwhile, DCS could not reach Father and had no interactions with him.
Father contacted Mother only through unknown phone numbers and rarely
saw her. Father knew DCS had custody of H.F. but made no efforts to
reunify with H.F. Father claimed he expected Mother to reunify him with
H.F. as he sought employment in other states.

¶4 DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights, claiming
mental deficiencies and six months time-in-care, and moved to terminate
Father’s parental rights for abandonment. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(1), (B)(3),

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.F.
Decision of the Court

(8)(b). The court terminated both parents’ rights on these grounds in
September 2022. However, DCS shortly thereafter moved the court to
vacate its order of termination because it learned H.F. was subject to the
Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”). The court granted DCS’s motion,
restoring Father’s parental rights while leaving the termination proceeding
in place.

B. After DCS and H.F. Still Had No Contact with Father, DCS
Moved to Terminate His Rights for a Second Time, Which
the Juvenile Court Granted.

¶5 After the court vacated the September 2022 termination order,
Father did not form a relationship with H.F. He failed to cooperate with
DCS by avoiding contact, blocking the case manager’s phone number, and
failing to create an email account for communication. DCS made efforts to
pay for Father’s flight from Missouri to Arizona to visit H.F., but Father
refused. DCS also requested a visit to his home pursuant to the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”) to evaluate whether it was
sound for H.F. Though the ICPC unit reported Father’s home was unsound
and smelled like urine, Father made no changes to the home. Father
intended to make Mother H.F.’s primary caregiver if he obtained custody
of her even though Mother was unstable.

¶6 In February 2023, DCS moved to terminate both parents’
rights based on the same grounds. In August 2023, the court held a hearing
on DCS’s motion. Father testified he was working out of state to provide
for H.F. and had tried to visit H.F. only for DCS to cancel the visit, and
wanted H.F. to grow up knowing the Cherokee language and traditions.
DCS, meanwhile, introduced testimony that since the fall of 2022, Father
did not contact H.F., DCS, or his court-appointed attorney, and failed to
attend hearings. The Cherokee Nation’s ICWA specialist explained that
continuing parental custody would cause H.F. emotional and/or physical
damage.

¶7 The court granted DCS’s motion to terminate both parents’
parental rights. The juvenile court found termination would benefit H.F.
by furthering an adoption plan, thus providing H.F. permanency and
stability. The court also found H.F. was living in an adoption placement
that met all her needs, and that H.F. would be adoptable if her current
placement fell through. The court found that not terminating both parents’
rights would be harmful because H.F. spent most of her life out of Mother’s
and Father’s care and both parents lacked a relationship with H.F.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.F.
Decision of the Court

¶8 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 8-
235, 12-120.21, and 12-2101(A)(1); Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Father appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating his
rights over H.F. on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to find
termination in H.F.’s best interests and that the juvenile court failed to
appropriately weigh the totality of the circumstances when considering
H.F.’s best interests.

¶10 We review a best-interests finding for an abuse of discretion
and reverse only if there is “no reasonable evidence to support [the
findings].” Mary Lou C. v. Arizona Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8
(App. 2004) (citations omitted). When considering the child’s best interests,
the court must consider the totality of the circumstances, which includes
the child’s stability and security. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz.
146, 150 ¶¶ 12-13 (2018). It is in a child’s best interests to terminate parental
rights if the child would either be benefitted by terminating the relationship
or harmed by its continuation. Id. at 150 ¶ 13. The State may show
termination is in a child’s best interest by showing either that they are
adoptable or in an adoptive placement. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz.
1, 4
¶ 12 (2016).

¶11 Father’s first argument fails because there is reasonable
evidence in this record to support the court’s findings. First, DCS spent two
years trying to help Father form a relationship with H.F., but he refused to
cooperate with DCS. Second, the court found adoption would benefit H.F.
because it would give her permanency and stability, her current adoptive
placement was meeting her needs, and she would be adoptable if the
current placement did not work out. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13;
Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4 ¶ 12. Third, the court found that staying in
Father’s care would harm H.F. because she had been out of Mother’s and
Father’s care for almost her entire life, and neither parent had a relationship
with her. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13. Fourth, as DCS points out, Father
concedes he failed to maintain a relationship with H.F. though he knew H.F.
existed, and did not visit her, even after DCS offered to pay and planned
for Mother, who could not care for H.F., to be her primary caregiver. The
court did not abuse its discretion because reasonable evidence supported
its findings that terminating Father’s rights was in H.F.’s best interests.
Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47 ¶ 8.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.F.
Decision of the Court

¶12 Father’s second argument likewise fails. By making each of
those findings, the court weighed the totality of the circumstances. Alma S.,
245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 12. It did so by exploring Father’s dealings with DCS and
his degree of effort to create a bond with H.F., the potential benefits of
adoption, and the character of the parental relationships with H.F.

CONCLUSION

¶13 For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order
terminating Father’s parental rights.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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