1 CA-JV 24-0007 Nonprecedential Processed

In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to C.C.

Arizona Court of Appeals · Filed July 30, 2024

Opinion text

Highlighting matches for “termination of parental rights” · clear

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0007
FILED 07-30-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS520688
The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant Troy C.

Barreda Law PLLC, Gilbert
By Bonnie Platter
Counsel for Appellee
IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Anni Hill Foster and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Troy C. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order granting
Alexis P.’s (“Mother”) petition to terminate his parental rights. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Mother have a minor child in common, C.C., born
in 2012. Father was active in C.C.’s life from the time he was born through
his and Mother’s divorce in 2013. Around the time of the divorce, Mother
met and began dating C.C.’s now-stepfather. Stepfather has been in C.C.’s
life since he was six months old. When Father enlisted in the military in
2014, he agreed to grant Mother sole legal decision-making authority and
sole physical custody at the Army’s urging. Father left the military shortly
thereafter but has not been a regular presence in C.C.’s life, with his visits
and contact becoming less frequent over time.

¶3 Father filed three petitions to modify parenting time but did
not show up to any of the scheduled mediations. The first was in July 2016,
when Father did not appear because he was not “picking up the mail” at
his residence. The next petition came in 2020, after about six months of not
contacting Mother or C.C. Father provided no explanation for his absence.
In 2023, Father filed yet another petition and once again failed to appear at
mediation, this time because his counsel told him not to attend.

¶4 Later in 2023, Mother petitioned to terminate father’s parental
rights on abandonment grounds. The court held two evidentiary hearings
where it heard from the parties and their witnesses. In January 2024, the
court granted Mother’s petition, terminating Father’s parental rights after
finding Father abandoned C.C. and termination was in C.C.’s best interests.

¶5 We have jurisdiction over Father’s timely appeal pursuant to
Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised
Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

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IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.C.
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶6 On appeal, Father asserts the court abused its discretion in
finding (1) Father abandoned C.C. and (2) termination was in C.C.’s best
interests.

¶7 When reviewing the court’s order terminating parental rights,
we are directed to “affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court
abuses its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported by reasonable
evidence.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 29 (2023)
(internal quotation omitted). In so doing, we engage in a two-part analysis.
Id. at ¶ 30. First, we review the court’s factual findings and accept them if
they are supported by reasonable evidence and inferences. Id. And “we do
not reweigh evidence because the court is in the best position to weigh the
evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve
disputed facts.” Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 582 ¶ 23 (2021)
(internal quotation omitted).

¶8 Second, we examine the court’s legal conclusions as to
whether the statutory ground for termination—in this case abandonment—
was established by clear and convincing evidence and will affirm these
conclusions unless they are clearly erroneous. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–
79 ¶ 31. When a party challenges whether a conclusion is supported by clear
and convincing evidence, we do not disturb the court’s determination
unless we determine “as a matter of law that no one could reasonably find
the evidence to be clear and convincing.” Id. at 479 ¶ 31.

I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Finding Father Abandoned C.C.

¶9 Abandonment of one’s child constitutes legal grounds to
terminate a parent’s parental rights to the child so abandoned. A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(1). “Failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child
without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie
evidence of abandonment.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). To establish the abandonment
ground, the court must “consider whether a parent has (1) provided
reasonable support to the children, (2) maintained regular contact with
them, and (3) provided normal supervision.” Steven M. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 254 Ariz. 426, 430 ¶ 12 (App. 2023). A parent’s conduct determines
abandonment, not their subjective intent. Id.

¶10 Here, the court properly found Father abandoned C.C. The
court found Father had failed to maintain contact with C.C. for “a period
that significantly exceed[ed] six months.” It further found Father did not

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IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.C.
Decision of the Court

support C.C. financially, did not maintain regular contact with him, and
did not provide normal supervision. The record supports these findings.

¶11 Over multiple stints, Father would go more than six months
without seeing or contacting C.C. Father agreed to give Mother sole legal
decision-making authority and parenting time upon enlisting in the
military. However, Father did not resume regular parenting time with C.C.,
nor did he seek to reestablish custody when he left the military only a few
months later. By the time of these proceedings, Father had not had physical
contact with C.C. since 2020. Between 2014 and 2016, he paid no child
support, did not provide for C.C.’s medical, dental, or vision insurance as
he had agreed to do in the parties’ dissolution decree. For a limited period
in 2019, Father made only eight child support payments, and has not made
any further payments since then. Nor has he sent C.C. cards, gifts, or letters.
The evidence is sufficient, and the court did not err in finding Mother
successfully established Father’s abandonment.

¶12 Father relies on Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292 (App.
2013)
to argue Mother obstructed his efforts to be present in C.C.’s life. In
Calvin B., a mother withheld her child from the father in violation of the
parenting time orders, even after being held in contempt for doing so. Id. at
295 ¶ 11. The court found the father overcame the hurdles the mother put
in place to prevent parenting time. Id. at 297 ¶ 25. Here, putting aside issues
of conflicting evidence that we leave to the juvenile court to resolve, Calvin
B. requires the obstructed parent to exert effort to overcome the obstacles
placed in their way. Father’s efforts in this case consist of filing court
petitions, with which he failed to follow through. Indeed, Father did not
appear for multiple mediations on petitions he filed. Such abortive and
anemic efforts fall far short of the persistence and vigorous assertion of legal
rights required of parents to excuse their non-contact. Thus, Calvin B. does
not apply.

II. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Finding Termination Was in
C.C.’s Best Interests.

¶13 Father argues the court erred in finding termination was in
C.C.’s best interests. “Termination of parental rights is in a child’s best
interests if the child will benefit from termination or will be harmed if the
relationship continues.” Steven M., 254 Ariz. at 292 ¶ 15 (citation omitted).

¶14 Though Father asserts the court erred by allegedly ignoring
testimony offered by him and his girlfriend, he has provided no basis to
conclude that the court did so other than the bare fact that the issue was

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IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO C.C.
Decision of the Court

resolved against him. Rather, it appears on this record that the court
decided conflicting evidence in favor of termination. The court found C.C.
was bonded to stepfather and wished to be adopted. Conversely, based on
testimony from Mother and avowals from C.C.’s own attorney, the court
found C.C. was opposed to being forced to reconnect with Father. Thus,
sufficient evidence supports these findings. And it is not for us to second-
guess the court’s weighing of the evidence. Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 582 ¶ 23.
Accordingly, the court properly determined termination to be in C.C.’s best
interests.

CONCLUSION

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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