In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0008
FILED 06-18-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. P1300JD202200021
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant Father

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer PC, Anthem
By Florence M. Bruemmer
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Dawn Rachelle Williams
Counsel for Appellee DCS

Myers & Associates PLLC, Scottsdale
By Jamie N. Myers
Counsel for Appellee Child

Law Offices of Stacie B. Robb PLLC, Prescott
By Stacie B. Robb
Counsel for Appellee Child Guardian
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge James B. Morse Jr. joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Patricia V. (“Mother”) and Robert C. (“Father”) (together,
“the Parents”) appeal the juvenile court’s termination of their parental
rights as to R.C. (“Child”). Because the record sufficiently supports the
juvenile court’s findings, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father are Child’s parents. The Department of
Child Safety (“DCS”) took custody of Child because the Parents lived in a
tent and Mother exposed Child to marijuana while pregnant. In May 2022,
the Parents pled no contest to DCS’s dependency petition. The juvenile
court found Child dependent because the Parents had neglected Child’s
basic needs and their own mental health.

¶3 A psychologist evaluated Mother and diagnosed her with
post-traumatic stress disorder, unspecified personality disorder with
borderline and anti-social traits, stimulant-use disorder
(methamphetamine type substance), and an unspecified cannabis-related
disorder. The psychologist expressed concern about Mother’s “attitudes
and behaviors, including failure to conform to social norms with respect to
lawful behaviors and a history of consistent irresponsibility.” The
psychologist acknowledged Mother had “a number of personal strengths,”
but he was “very guarded” that she could safely parent in the future. The
psychologist recommended Mother receive mental health services, therapy,
drug and alcohol testing, parenting services, and other support, including
transportation and housing resources.

¶4 The same psychologist evaluated Father and diagnosed him
with unspecified neurocognitive disorder, unspecified bipolar and related
disorder, stimulant-use disorder (methamphetamine), unspecified
personality disorder with mixed traits, and unspecified cannabis-related
disorder. The psychologist warned that Father’s traits “can lead to acute
harm” and/or “impairment over longer periods of time[.]” The

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psychologist recommended that Father receive drug and alcohol testing,
mental health services, therapy, substance abuse treatment, anger
management services, parenting classes, and other support, including
transportation and community resources.

¶5 DCS provided the Parents with psychological evaluations,
mental health services, drug testing, parenting services, therapy, and anger
management services. On five occasions during the dependency
proceedings, DCS requested that the juvenile court find that DCS was
making reasonable efforts to finalize permanency. Neither of the Parents
objected to DCS’s requests, although on one occasion, Father sought
clarification about obtaining transportation. The juvenile court repeatedly
found that DCS was making reasonable efforts.

¶6 The Parents provided DCS and the court with updates on
their housing situation. When they started doing so, the Parents lived in a
recreational vehicle. In August 2022, they informed DCS they had obtained
a generator and a transmission-rebuild kit. In September 2022, they
informed the court they may have found a place to park their vehicle where
they would have water and electricity. However, in January 2023, they
informed the court they no longer had a place to park. In May 2023, the
Parents claimed that the vehicle was connected to utilities and the court, in
a minute entry, documented that housing was “stable.” The court ordered
DCS to conduct a walkthrough within two weeks of being informed the
Parents were ready for an inspection. The Parents never provided that
notification.

¶7 During visitations, the case aid reported that the Parents
smelled of marijuana or cigarettes. DCS initially described Child as healthy,
but Child was later diagnosed with pneumonia and eventually had to be
placed on a feeding tube.

¶8 In June 2023, Mother self-reported to her therapist that she
had bipolar symptoms and mania, and that she loses track of time when
one of her other personalities “takes over,” although she felt “a little better”
than the previous year. In July 2023, Father pled guilty to aggravated
driving while under the influence of methamphetamine. In August 2023,
DCS petitioned to terminate the Parents’ rights.

¶9 At the termination hearing, DCS described the Parents’
participation in services as inconsistent. DCS stated Mother completed
parenting classes and substance abuse treatment but did not complete all
drug testing and routinely tested positive for THC. Despite participating

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in anger management counseling, Mother continued to escalate problems.
DCS also informed the court that a service intended to help teach Mother
adult skills was initially closed because she “misus[ed] the time and
resources for the provider.”

¶10 DCS stated Father did not complete substance abuse
treatment or maintain sobriety. In addition to missing some tests, he tested
positive for THC and methamphetamine. DCS testified that he did not
consistently participate in therapy, which prevented him from participating
in anger management services, and he did not engage in parenting classes
until after the termination petition, when he was in prison.

¶11 DCS testified to having “many discussions” with the Parents
about housing. The Parents were unemployed and each received
approximately $900 a month in social security benefits. Father admitted to
having conversations with DCS about housing options but did not follow
up after initially being told all spots were full. Father also admitted that it
was difficult to get into certain housing programs because he was on
probation for disorderly conduct with a weapon.

¶12 Mother testified she was paying for three storage facilities, in
a monthly amount approximately the same as it would cost for a shared
living space. But she refused to live in a shared space with another woman
because Father was not permitted. Mother testified that, at the time of the
hearing, the Parents’ recreational vehicle had water leaks, potentially had
black mold but had not been checked, and was not connected to water,
power, or sewer services. Father testified he thought he could get housing
within two months because he would have more opportunities after being
released from prison.

¶13 Mother did not know all of Child’s medical needs, stating she
had been “asking since the beginning of this case.” She was unaware of the
frequency or general timeframe of Child’s medical appointments. She did
not know how many times a day Child needed to be fed. But Mother
acknowledged she had a notebook the Child’s foster placement provided
that included updates and details about Child’s medical providers. Despite
knowing Child’s breathing was impacted, Mother admitted that she
continued to smoke because of stress, but said she would quit smoking if
Child was returned to her custody. In addition to smoking cigarettes, she
vaped marijuana.

¶14 The psychologist who originally diagnosed Mother testified
that he downgraded his view of her mental health from “very guarded to

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poor” based on the passage of time and lack of progress. He explained that
the difficulty the Parents had in providing for their own needs would apply
to parenting and create additional concerns about managing Child’s
medical needs. The psychologist testified there were no additional services
that would prevent termination.

¶15 DCS stated that Child’s foster home was an adoptive
placement and termination would allow Child to remain with those who
understand his medical needs.

¶16 The court found that DCS proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the Parents’ rights should be terminated due to an inability to
discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness and because
Child had been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen months. See A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(3) and (B)(8). The court commented that “these cases are not
about whether or not the parents love their children . . . . It comes down to
. . . the grounds for termination . . . and then . . . [C]hild’s best interest.”

¶17 The court found Mother was “unable to meet the basic
parenting standards for [Child]” or demonstrate an ability to “meet her
own needs.” The court found there were “reasonable grounds to believe
that [the Parents’ mental illness] will continue for a prolonged
indeterminate period.” The court concluded that DCS provided the Parents
with a “multitude of services” but, after fifteen months, they were unable
to find suitable housing. The court determined DCS demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination would be in Child’s best
interests because it would further the plan of adoption and provide
permanency and stability.

¶18 Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction.
See A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶19 The Parents argue they were not provided sufficient
reunification services. Mother also argues there was insufficient evidence
to terminate her rights on either of the statutory grounds the court relied on
and that termination was not in Child’s best interests. Father does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory grounds
for termination or the court’s best interests finding.

¶20 “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children as
they see fit, but that right is not without limitation.” Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79 ¶ 14 (App. 2001). Before terminating a parent’s

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rights, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
at least one of the grounds in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) exists and must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best
interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). We will “affirm a
termination order unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the
court’s findings are not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022). We will accept the
juvenile court’s factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence and
inferences. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, ___ ¶ 30 (2023).
We will not disturb the juvenile court’s conclusions for insufficient
evidence unless no one could reasonably find the evidence to be sufficient.
Id. at ___ ¶ 31.

I. Reunification Services

¶21 The Parents argue that DCS did not provide sufficient
reunification services because they were not provided with a housing
subsidy. A parent who does not contemporaneously object to reunification
services cannot later challenge that finding on appeal. See Shawanee S. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178–79 ¶ 16 (App. 2014); Bennigno R.
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 349 ¶ 19 (App. 2013). Here, the
juvenile court considered five motions requesting confirmation that DCS
was making reasonable efforts to finalize permanency. The court found on
each of those five occasions that DCS had made reasonable efforts. See
Shawanee S., 234 Ariz. at 179 ¶ 17. Neither of the Parents objected to any of
the five motions nor requested a housing subsidy in response. See id.;
Bennigno R., 233 Ariz. at 349 ¶ 19. Thus, the Parents waived their deficient
services argument.

¶22 Notwithstanding waiver, the record contains sufficient
evidence that DCS made reasonable and diligent efforts to address the
Parents’ housing situation. See Bennigno R., 233 Ariz. at 350 ¶ 20. The
juvenile court must “consider the totality of the circumstances when
determining whether DCS has made diligent efforts.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 23 ¶ 49 (App. 2019). DCS is required to provide a
parent with “the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed
to help her become an effective parent.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-
501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). But DCS is not “required to provide
every conceivable service[.]” Id.

¶23 DCS testified that it had “many discussions” with the Parents
about housing, and the Parents implied during their testimony that they

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Decision of the Court

had such conversations. The Parents made choices that impacted their
ability to afford housing or limited available housing options. For example,
Mother admitted that she rented multiple storage units costing $400 per
month and spent $200 per month on marijuana, which reduced the amount
of funds available to obtain stable housing. She also testified that she
refused to move into a shared living space because she would have to share
the room with another woman, where Father was not permitted. The
Parents were asked to leave a recreational vehicle park due to noise
complaints about their arguing. And Father admitted that certain housing
programs would not accept the Parents because he was on probation for
disorderly conduct with a weapon.

¶24 Prior to the termination hearing, the Parents told DCS and the
court that their recreational vehicle would be ready to meet Child’s needs.
They informed the court that they had (1) a place to park that would
provide water and electricity, (2) obtained a generator and a transmission
rebuild kit, and (3) connected their recreational vehicle to utilities. The
Parents informed the court that the recreational vehicle was “stable” and
would soon be ready for an inspection. In response, the court ordered DCS
to inspect the vehicle when the Parents were ready. The Parents never
requested an inspection.

¶25 The court found that DCS provided Mother and Father with
a “multitude of services.” DCS provided the Parents with psychological
evaluations, mental health services, drug testing, parenting services,
therapy, and anger management. A psychologist confirmed, however, that
there were no additional services to offer either of the Parents to prevent
termination. Reasonable evidence supports the court’s conclusion that DCS
provided the Parents with diligent reunification services. See Brionna J., 255
Ariz. at ___ ¶ 30.

II. Mental Illness

¶26 Mother argues the court erred in terminating her parental
rights under the mental illness ground because she claims the hearing
testimony focused on her drug use, finances, and hygiene. To terminate a
parent’s rights due to mental illness, DCS is required to prove a parent was
“unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness . . .
and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue
for a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).

¶27 Mother downplays the evidence about her mental health
struggles. A psychologist diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress

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Decision of the Court

disorder, unspecified personality disorder with borderline and anti-social
traits, stimulant-use disorder (methamphetamine type substance), and
unspecified cannabis-related disorder. The record also reflects that she
reported having bipolar symptoms and mania and losing track of time
when one of her other personalities “takes over.” The psychologist was
concerned about her “attitudes and behaviors, including failure to conform
to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors and a history of consistent
irresponsibility.” By the time of the termination hearing, the psychologist
had downgraded Mother’s mental health status from “very guarded to
poor” based on her lack of progress.

¶28 The psychologist explained that Mother’s difficulty in
managing her needs would result in an inability to manage Child’s needs.
Mother’s testimony supports that concern—she was unaware of Child’s
medical needs, his medical appointments, and his feeding schedule.
Mother admitted that she continued to smoke because of stress, even after
Child had severe breathing complications.

¶29 The record contains reasonable evidence supporting the
mental illness ground for termination. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at ___ ¶ 30.
We therefore need not address the other statutory ground for termination
the juvenile court found. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz.
373, 376–77 ¶ 14 (App. 2010).

III. Best Interests

¶30 Finally, Mother argues the court erred in making a best
interests finding by not considering the “type of parenting bond” she has
with Child. Termination is in a child’s best interests if DCS proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the child will benefit from, or be
harmed without, termination. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146,
150 ¶ 13 (2018). The juvenile court must consider the totality of
circumstances at the time of termination. Id. at 150–51 ¶ 13.

¶31 “It is well established in state-initiated cases that the child’s
prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding.”
Id. (quoting Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz 1, 4 ¶ 16 (2016)). DCS
testified that Child had an adoptive placement who would support his
medical needs. The court determined termination would be in Child’s best
interests because it would further the plan of adoption and provide
“permanency and stability.” Reasonable evidence supports the court’s
finding that termination was in Child’s best interests.

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Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶32 We affirm the termination of Mother and Father’s parental
rights as to Child.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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