In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.P.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.P.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0060
FILED 04-01-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD38311
The Honorable Joshua D. Rogers, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Czop Law Form PLLC, Higley
By Steven Czop
Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Appellee Child
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.P.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Danielle B. (who identifies as male and goes by “Daniel”) and
Brendan P. (“Brendan”) appeal the juvenile court’s order terminating their
parental rights as to J.P. (“Child”). Daniel argues there was insufficient
evidence that he abandoned Child and the Department of Child Safety
(”Department”) did not provide adequate reunification services. Both
Daniel and Brendan argue the juvenile court erred in concluding that
termination is in Child’s best interests. Because there was sufficient
evidence supporting the court’s findings and it properly conducted the best
interests analysis, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Child was born in 2021. At birth, Child was substance
exposed to THC and had a misshapen skull. The Department contacted
Daniel and Brendan multiple times to verify they had scheduled necessary
medical appointments for Child, but they had not done so. Brendan
threatened violence against the Department and reported being diagnosed
with schizophrenia and oppositional defiant disorder. During a meeting
with a counselor, Daniel admitted to being under the influence of marijuana
and stumbled when he went to pick up Child. Brendan was present at the
time and made no effort to protect Child by stopping Daniel from picking
her up while impaired. A few days later, Daniel stated that caring for Child
was too difficult and that he no longer wanted to be involved. Daniel then
moved to Tucson.

¶3 In August 2021, the Department petitioned the juvenile court
to find Child dependent. When neither Daniel nor Brendan appeared for a
hearing, the juvenile court found Child dependent as to both. The
Department initially placed Child with a family friend. In January 2022,
that kinship placement indicated she was no longer able to financially
support and care for Child, so the Department moved Child to foster care.

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Decision of the Court

¶4 A psychologist diagnosed Brendan with, among other things,
cannabis dependence, unspecified mood disorder, and adjustment
disorder. Brendan was discharged from psychological services due to non-
engagement, but he re-engaged nearly eleven months later. Brendan
completed parenting classes, and the Department documented an
improvement in his parenting abilities. While Brendan eventually
increased his time spent with Child, the Department documented that he
made suicidal comments and expressed a desire not to be around Child. He
also used violent imagery during visits—stating, for example, that he used
marijuana earlier that day because he would “rather be dipped in a vat of
acid than be awake right now.”

¶5 Around March 2023, after approximately a year and a half
without contacting Child, Daniel reached out to the Department from
Tucson and resumed visitation. But shortly thereafter, Daniel claimed
health issues prevented him from traveling, so he asked the Department to
bring Child to Tucson for visits. The Department arranged visits in Tucson
but observed that Daniel did not engage much with Child. When Child’s
foster parent expressed concern about frequently traveling to Tucson with
a toddler, the Department requested that Daniel obtain a doctor’s note
confirming his inability to travel. Daniel failed to provide such a note and
missed four visits in one month.

¶6 In July 2023, the Department petitioned to terminate Daniel
and Brendan’s parental rights. At the termination hearing, Daniel admitted
to moving to Tucson and being away from Child for approximately a year
and a half. He testified that, during that time, he was homeless and did not
have a phone. Daniel also testified that he began having seizures after a car
accident, and he claimed he was still trying to obtain a doctor’s note to have
visitations in Tucson.

¶7 Brendan claimed he did not remember making suicidal
comments. He described other violent comments he made as “minor
stupid, joking comments I make with my friends around me.” Brendan
acknowledged that Child’s foster parent texted him updates and photos.
But, when his phone broke, Brendan did not provide Child’s foster parent
with his new number because “[i]t kept slipping [his] mind.” Finally,
Brendan preferred that Child be returned to the kinship placement rather
than Child’s foster parent.

¶8 The foster parent testified that Child calls her “mom” and that
“she loves [her]” and “gives hugs and kisses.” The foster parent said she
was willing to adopt Child. A Department case manager recommended

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Decision of the Court

against moving Child out of foster care and back to the kinship placement
given Child’s age and concerns about instability.

¶9 The juvenile court found multiple grounds for terminating
both parents’ rights. For Daniel, the court found that he abandoned Child
by moving to Tucson and not attempting to maintain a relationship with
Child for approximately a year and a half. For Brendan, the court
terminated based on mental illness due to “continued lack of impulse
control” and inappropriate statements he made to Child. The court found
termination was in Child’s best interests because her foster placement
intended to adopt her, which would give her stability and permanency.
The court acknowledged that the kinship placement was willing to take
Child back, but determined that placement was not in Child’s best interest
because she was “very bonded” with the foster parent, who was willing to
adopt her and with whom she “has thrived[.]”

¶10 Daniel and Brendan timely appealed. We have jurisdiction.
See A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

I. Abandonment

¶11 Although Brendan challenges only the juvenile court’s best
interests finding, Daniel argues the evidence did not adequately support
termination based on abandonment. “Parents have a fundamental right to
raise their children as they see fit, but that right is not without limitation.”
Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79 ¶ 14 (App. 2001) (citing
Graville v. Dodge, 195 Ariz. 119, 124 ¶ 20 (App. 1999)). Before terminating a
parent’s rights, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that at least one of the grounds in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) exists and must
find by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s
best interests. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J.
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). We will “affirm a
termination order unless the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the
court’s findings are not supported by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022) (citation omitted). We
will accept the juvenile court’s factual findings if supported by reasonable
evidence and inferences. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478
¶ 30 (2023) (citation omitted). We will not disturb the juvenile court’s
conclusions for insufficient evidence unless no one could reasonably find
the evidence to be sufficient. Id. at 479 ¶ 31 (citation omitted).

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Decision of the Court

¶12 One ground for terminating a parent’s rights is abandonment.
A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1). Abandonment occurs when a parent fails to “provide
reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child,” making
“only minimal efforts to support and communicate with the child.” A.R.S.
§ 8-531(1). Failing “to maintain a normal parental relationship with the
child without just cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie
evidence of abandonment.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1).

¶13 In challenging abandonment, Daniel primarily emphasizes
certain steps he took to care for Child—attending court hearings and
contacting the Department a couple times. Daniel’s examples are
insufficient to avoid abandonment. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249 ¶ 18
(“[A]bandonment is measured not by a parent’s subjective intent, but by
the parent’s conduct[.]”). Daniel did not dispute that he had no contact
with Child for a year and a half—three times longer than the six months
needed for a prima facie showing of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1).
Although Daniel briefly resumed visits with Child before the Department
moved for termination, the visits ceased after only a couple months, and he
did not provide a doctor’s note supporting that he could not travel from
Tucson. Daniel does not argue or suggest that he provided “reasonable
support” or made “regular contact” with Child. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1). The
record contains sufficient evidence that Daniel did not provide reasonable
support or maintain regular contact with Child for more than six months,
which constitutes abandonment under Arizona law. See A.R.S. § 8-531(1);
Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–79 ¶¶ 30–31.

¶14 Daniel also argues that the Department did not provide
sufficient reunification services. But reunification services are not required
before finding abandonment, so we need not address Daniel’s argument.
See Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, 510 ¶ 11 (App. 2008)
(“[N]either § 8-533 nor federal law requires that a parent be provided
reunification services before the court may terminate the parent’s rights on
ground of abandonment.”); Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz.
373, 376–77 ¶ 14 (App. 2010).

II. Best Interests

¶15 Both Daniel and Brendan argue that the court erred by not
considering the totality of circumstances when making its best interests
finding. In pressing their arguments, Daniel and Brendan focus primarily
on their own interests, not Child’s. Brendan argues that “[t]he best interest
analysis must go beyond focusing only on [Child’s] interest.” At most,

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Decision of the Court

Daniel and Brandon argue that there is some evidence that does not support
the court’s best interests finding.

¶16 Once a parent is found unfit, “the interests of the parent and
child diverge because the court has already found the existence of one of
the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.”
Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 15 (2016) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 35). At the best interests
stage, “it is a given that the child’s best interests predominate.” Timothy B.,
252 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 31. For best interests, “[t]he juvenile court should
consider [a parent’s] past and ongoing efforts to parent . . . and the impact
of those effort’s on [Child’s] best interest in a safe and stable home life[.]”
Id. Termination is in a child’s best interests if the Department proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) the child will benefit from
termination, or (2) the child will be harmed without termination. Alma S. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018); Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 288
¶ 41. The juvenile court must consider the totality of circumstances at the
time of termination. Alma S., at 150–51 ¶ 13.

¶17 The record contains sufficient evidence that termination is in
Child’s best interests. The court heard testimony that Daniel had little or
no contact with Child for approximately a year and a half, he was not
engaged when visitations resumed, and he did not provide a doctor’s note
to justify transporting Child to Tucson for visits. The court heard testimony
that Brendan did not provide Child’s foster parent his new phone number
because “[i]t kept slipping [his] mind.” Daniel and Brendan’s past and
ongoing efforts to parent Child do not establish that the court erred in
finding that termination is in Child’s best interests. See Jesus M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282 ¶ 12 (App. 2002) (“[W]e do not re-
weigh the evidence on review.”).

¶18 The court also heard testimony that Child calls foster parent
“mom,” tells her “she loves her,” and gives her “hugs and kisses.” The
foster parent also testified she was willing to adopt Child. “It is well
established in state-initiated cases that the child’s prospective adoption is a
benefit that can support a best-interests finding.” Demetrius L., 239 Ariz at
4 ¶ 16 (citation omitted).

¶19 The court also considered whether moving Child back to a
kinship placement was in Child’s best interests. The Department case
manager testified that moving Child out of her foster parent’s home was
not in her best interests given Child’s age and concerns about instability.
The court acknowledged Child’s former kinship placement was willing to

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Decision of the Court

return to that role, but concluded that was not in Child’s best interests
because she was “very bonded” and “has thrived” with the foster parent,
who was willing to adopt her. Finally, Child, through counsel, has stated
to us that it is in her best interests to terminate her parents’ rights. The
juvenile court properly evaluated Child’s best interests.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of Daniel and
Brendan’s parental rights as to Child.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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