In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.R.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.R.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0080

FILED 10-22-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS520569
The Honorable Adele G. Ponce, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Appellant Father

Stuart & Blackwell, PLLC, Chandler
By Cory A. Stuart
Counsel for Appellee Mother and Stepfather

Canizales Law, PLLC, Phoenix
By Carrie Shew Canizales
Counsel for Appellee Child
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.R.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Jennifer M. Perkins and Vice Chief Judge Randall M. Howe
joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 John R. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of
his parental rights as to J.R. (“Child”), arguing the court did not consider
the totality of the circumstances in its best interests analysis. Because the
record sufficiently supports the court’s findings, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In 2012, Father and Cristina W. (“Mother”) met online and
started a romantic relationship after meeting face-to-face. The next year,
Mother gave birth to Child. Father and Mother never married but lived and
raised Child together. In 2014, Mother and Father separated.

¶3 Following their separation, Father and Mother followed an
informal parenting schedule—Mother was the primary caregiver and
Father took care of Child every other weekend. This arrangement
continued through 2015, but then Father’s visits with Child significantly
decreased. In 2016, Father took care of Child twice and his last in-person
visit was in February of that year.

¶4 In 2018, Father moved to Missouri and Mother married
Christopher W. (“Stepfather”). That year, Father had two video calls with
Child and maintained contact with Mother through Facebook Messenger.
Father requested several more video calls between 2018 and 2019, but
Mother did not facilitate any calls. In June 2019, they scheduled a video call
for that month and Child was excited to see Father. Father, however,
missed the call because he forgot about it and fell asleep. Child was
“devastated.” Father subsequently asked to talk to Child a few more times,
but Mother believed further communication could emotionally or
psychologically harm Child.

¶5 After 2019, communication between Father and Mother
became more infrequent. Then, in July 2023, Father accused Mother of

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Decision of the Court

preventing him from seeing Child and, by doing so, abusing child. Father
threatened legal action if Mother did not agree to his demands.

¶6 Mother agreed to work on establishing a relationship between
Father and Child. But she demanded that a therapist be involved because
several years had passed with no communication between Father and
Child. Father agreed a therapist should be involved but insisted upon
immediate communication with Child and asked for Child to visit him in
Missouri before school started. Mother refused. Father said he would
initiate court proceedings to establish contact with Child. In August 2023,
Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights.

¶7 At the termination hearing, Mother testified that, in addition
to the lack of communication from Father, he sent no cards and only a few
gifts to Child, and the only financial assistance he sent to Mother and Child
was $100 in 2015. She also explained that Child has a father-son
relationship with Stepfather—they play baseball and do various other
father-son activities, including teaching Child how to swim and ride a bike.
Stepfather wants to adopt Child, and Child refers to him as “daddy,” uses
his last name, and hopes to be adopted.

¶8 Father responded that it would not be in Child’s best interests
to cut him out of Child’s life even though there were periods of time with
no communication. He testified that he has stable housing with his wife
and two stepchildren and Child will benefit from having a relationship with
his family. He also argued termination would harm Child because Child
might believe that his biological father abandoned him, and Father blamed
Mother for cutting him out of Child’s life. Father also said he is willing and
able to provide child support.

¶9 Following the hearing, the juvenile court terminated Father’s
parental rights. The court concluded that Mother proved abandonment by
clear and convincing evidence. The court also found termination would be
in Child’s best interests because Stepfather has cared for him since 2016, is
his father figure, and intends to adopt him. The court also concluded that
termination would not be detrimental to Child because he has not had
Father in his life for more than five years. Rather, the court determined that
failing to terminate Father’s parental rights would be detrimental because
Stepfather would be precluded from adopting Child and from thereby
providing permanency and stability in Child’s life.

¶10 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 8-
235(A).

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DISCUSSION

¶11 Father concedes abandonment and argues only that the court
did not properly consider the totality of circumstances when making its
best interests finding.

¶12 “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children as
they see fit, but that right is not without limitation.” Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79 ¶ 14 (App. 2001). Consequently, parental rights
may be terminated based only on the grounds in A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Michael
J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248–49 ¶ 12 (2000). A party
seeking termination must first prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that
one of those grounds exists. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146,
149 ¶ 8 (2018); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 22 (2005). The party
must also prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in
the child’s best interests. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 149–50 ¶ 8; Kent K., 210 Ariz.
at 284 ¶ 22. We review a termination order for an abuse of discretion.
Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022). We affirm
the juvenile court’s factual findings unless no reasonable fact finder could
find the evidence to be sufficient. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz
471, 478–78 ¶ 30–31 (2023).

¶13 Father argues the juvenile court erred by not considering
Mother’s alleged interference in his efforts to establish a relationship with
Child. For support, Father relies on Calvin B. v. Britanny B., which explained
that one parent’s interference with the other’s opportunity to develop a
normal parental relationship with their child cannot be used to terminate
based on abandonment. 232 Ariz. 292, 297 ¶ 21 (App. 2013). But, in Calvin
B., the parent challenged only the juvenile court’s abandonment finding,
and did so on grounds that the other parent restricted interactions. Id. The
parent did not challenge the juvenile court’s best interests finding, and so
this court did not undertake a best interests analysis. Id. at 298 ¶ 31 n.5. We
have the opposite situation here—Father concedes abandonment but
challenges the best interests finding. Calvin B. is, thus, inapposite.

¶14 The juvenile court applied the proper legal standard for best
interests. Once a court finds grounds for termination, it must consider
whether the child will benefit from termination or will be harmed without
it. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13. “Framed in the disjunctive, this standard
permits a finding of best interests based on either a benefit to the child from
severance or some harm to the child if severance is denied.” Demetrius L. v.
Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 16. The juvenile court must consider the totality

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of the circumstances at the time of termination. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150–
51 ¶ 13.

¶15 In deciding best interests, the juvenile court must analyze the
“child’s interest in stability and security.” Id. at 150 ¶ 12. And courts
should not subordinate the interests of the child to those of the parent. Id.
at 151 ¶ 15. This is especially true when termination is based on a statutory
ground that demonstrates parental unfitness—like abandonment. See id. at
150 ¶ 10 (abandonment is a “prox[y] for parental unfitness because [it]
demonstrate[s] a parent’s inability to ‘properly parent his/her child.’”).
Once a court finds clear and convincing evidence of abandonment, it
presumes the “interests of the parent and child diverge.” Id. at ¶ 12.

¶16 The factors a court may consider when determining whether
termination is in the best interests of the child are whether: 1) an adoptive
placement is immediately available, 2) the existing placement meets the
child’s needs, and 3) the child is adoptable. Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379 ¶ 30 (App. 2010); Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 2 ¶ 1
(holding that a juvenile court may conclude adoption is in the child’s best
interests in proceedings initiated by the state or a private party).

¶17 Here, the juvenile court determined Mother credibly testified
that she and Stepfather “have been caring [for] the child continuously since
around 2016” and “[S]tepfather intends to adopt the child.” It also found
Stepfather credibly testified he is Child’s father figure and has a parental
relationship with Child. The court also found Child wishes to be adopted
and uses Stepfather’s last name. The court concluded Child will benefit
from adoption and the associated stability and permanency, and Child
would be harmed if Father’s parental rights were not terminated, making
adoption impossible. Based on the record evidence, the court did not err in
concluding that termination is in Child’s best interests and it applied the
correct standard in doing so.

¶18 Father also takes issue with what he terms as the court’s
failure to recognize the “retaliatory nature of the termination petition.”
Even if, however, we assume the petition was retaliatory, Father cites no
statute or caselaw requiring courts to consider a petitioner’s subjective
motives during the best interests inquiry. Nor does he explain how
Mother’s subjective motives are relevant to whether termination is in
Child’s best interests. Put differently, Father’s argument focuses on his own
interest in avoiding retaliatory filings rather than Child’s interest in stability
and security—the latter is the proper focus under Arizona law. See Alma S.,
245 Ariz. at 151 ¶ 12. The juvenile court did not err in declining, as part of

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its best interests analysis, to consider Mother’s subject motives in seeking
termination.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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