1 CA-JV 24-0103 Nonprecedential Processed

In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.S.

Arizona Court of Appeals · Filed November 26, 2024

Opinion text

Highlighting matches for “termination of parental rights” · clear

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S., W.S., and
G.S.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0103

FILED 11-26-2024

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS21995
The Honorable Christopher Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Katie S., Buckeye
Appellant

Robert D. Rosanelli Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S., et al.
Decision of the Court

¶1 Katie S. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
denying termination of the parental rights of Tyler S. (“Father”) to L.S.,
W.S., and G.S., born in 2010, 2011, and 2013, respectively. Because Mother
has shown no error, we affirm the order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We review the facts in the light most favorable to upholding
the superior court’s order. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz.
547, 549
, ¶ 7 (App. 2010).

¶3 Mother and Father met in 2009 and lived together as an
unmarried couple in Washington State. As L.S., W.S., and G.S. were born
and grew older, Mother grew increasingly concerned about the children’s
health and safety under Father’s care. These concerns intensified after L.S.
was diagnosed with Type I diabetes in 2014, as Father failed to monitor
L.S.’s blood sugar, refused to give L.S. insulin, and threatened to remove
L.S.’s insulin pump.

¶4 By 2015, Mother established a separate residence. After
Mother moved out, she initially shared parenting time and decision making
with Father, but later was granted sole legal decision making.

¶5 In 2016, G.S. was also diagnosed with Type I diabetes. In
2018, the Washington superior court granted Mother’s petition for
modification and relocation to Arizona.

¶6 In a 2019 parenting plan, the Washington superior court
granted Mother’s petition to limit Father’s contact with the children. In its
findings, the court noted that when the diabetic children were with Father,
there were “far too many” instances when their blood sugar levels
significantly exceeded acceptable levels. The plan limited Father to non-
overnight parenting time for two weekends per month, with visits taking
place in Arizona, and allowed Father to make two 30-minute video calls per
week.

¶7 After Mother and the children relocated to Arizona, Father
consistently called the children twice a week, with each call lasting about
five minutes. Father came to Arizona to visit the children several times a
year until October 2022, and he visited once more in March 2024. Between
2019 and 2021, Father occasionally sent gifts to the children. Father made
several child support payments after the relocation, but he continued to
owe an outstanding balance that reached over $34,000 by mid-2023, causing
the Washington superior court to issue a civil bench warrant for his arrest.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S., et al.
Decision of the Court

¶8 In January 2024, Mother filed a private petition to terminate
Father’s parental relationship with the children on the grounds of
abandonment and neglect. In a status conference, the Washington superior
court relinquished jurisdiction to Arizona to consider the petition. The
Arizona superior court held a contested termination hearing, and at the
conclusion of Mother’s case, Father moved for judgment as a matter of law
as to both termination grounds. The superior court granted Father’s
motion, and Mother timely appealed.

¶9 Mother also filed a supplemental designation of record,
requesting the superior court include certain exhibits in the record
transmitted on appeal.1 Mother asserted that these exhibits had been
marked and offered but not admitted into evidence at the termination
hearing. In fact, while these exhibits had appeared in the superior court’s
exhibit worksheet, Mother had not offered any exhibits into evidence at the
hearing. After receiving Father’s objection, this court stayed Mother’s
appeal and revested jurisdiction in the superior court to consider Mother’s
request to supplement the record. The superior court denied Mother’s
request, and this court lifted the stay of her appeal.

¶10 We have jurisdiction over Mother’s appeal under Article 6,
Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”)
sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1), and Rule 601 of the
Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.

DISCUSSION

¶11 On appeal, Mother raises several arguments challenging the
superior court’s conclusion that she failed to prove Father abandoned the
children. Mother also argues termination would be in the best interests of
the children. Mother makes no argument in her opening brief as to the

1 Mother also requested the superior court exclude certain exhibits from the

presumptive record on appeal. As Father pointed out in his objection,
however, these exhibits were neither offered nor admitted into evidence at
the termination hearing, and therefore they were not part of the
presumptive record on appeal.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S., et al.
Decision of the Court

neglect ground; accordingly, we do not address it.2 See Marco C. v. Sean C., 218 Ariz. 216, 219, ¶ 8 n.1 (App. 2008).

¶12 The right to custody of one’s children is fundamental. See
Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶ 11 (2000). This
fundamental right “does not evaporate simply because” the parent has not
been a “model” parent. Id. (citation omitted). To terminate a relationship
between a parent and his or her children, the superior court must find at
least one statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. at 249, ¶ 12 (citing A.R.S. § 8-533(B)). The court must also find
by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the children’s best
interests. Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 7 (App.
2016).

¶13 We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal; rather, we defer
to the juvenile court with respect to its factual findings because it “is in the
best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the
credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.
v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334
, 336, ¶¶ 4, 14 (App. 2004). We will not disturb
the court’s ruling absent an abuse of discretion or unless there is no
reasonable evidence to support the court’s findings. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).

¶14 Abandonment is defined as:

the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing
normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial
finding that a parent has made only minimal efforts to
support and communicate with the child. Failure to maintain
a normal parental relationship with the child without just
cause for a period of six months constitutes prima facie
evidence of abandonment.

2 Mother suggests in her reply brief that she voluntarily waived her
arguments as to the neglect ground at the termination hearing, stating: “The
Appellant understood they did not have medical experts to testify . . . at
trial and when Appellee objected to the medical neglect, Appellant did not
address the medical neglect further during trial.” She adds that she is “not
asking the Juvenile or Appellate courts to address if medical neglect
occurred.”

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S., et al.
Decision of the Court

A.R.S. § 8-531(1). Whether a parent has abandoned his or her child requires
an objective analysis of the parent’s conduct, not the parent’s subjective
intent. Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 18. “What constitutes reasonable
support, regular contact, and normal supervision varies from case to case,”
and thus “questions of abandonment . . . are questions of fact for resolution
by the [superior] court.” Id. at 250, ¶ 20 (citations omitted).

¶15 Mother argues the superior court “imprudently judge[d] the
whole five years of previous contact,” pointing out that in the fifteen
months leading up to her petition, Father’s contact with the children
consisted only of five-minute phone calls twice a week, devoid of any in-
person visits, gifts, or meaningful child support.3 We interpret this as
Mother arguing the court erred in concluding that Father had not
abandoned the children. Reasonable evidence, however, supports finding
that Father made a continuous effort to stay in touch with the children and
remain involved in their lives. We do not reweigh evidence, and Mother
has not established that the record before us, viewed in the light most
favorable to upholding the court’s ruling, compels a finding of
abandonment.

¶16 Mother also argues Father failed to provide normal
supervision, stating Father “makes a meager effort to have normal
supervision of the three minor children and, more often than not, chooses
to forgo any normal supervision of the three minor children.” In assessing
whether Father exercised normal supervision, the superior court was
permitted to consider all the circumstances of the case, including Father’s
physical distance from the children. Considering Father lived in
Washington and the children lived in Arizona, the court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that Father, despite his lack of in-person contact, had
not abandoned the children.

¶17 As the superior court acknowledged at the hearing, “Father
didn’t have great contact. Didn’t—wasn’t—honestly, wasn’t a great Father,
wasn’t barely [sic] a good Father.” But the court acted within its
considerable discretion in declining to terminate Father’s fundamental right
to parent, and the sparse record transmitted on appeal gives us no basis to
disturb the court’s ruling.

3 In her opening brief, Mother claims Father paid no child support after

2021. She acknowledges in her reply brief, however, that Father made a
$250 payment in December 2022.

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IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.S., et al.
Decision of the Court

¶18 Because reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s
determination as to the abandonment ground, we need not address
Mother’s arguments concerning whether termination would be in the best
interests of the children.

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: AGFV

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