In Re Delinquency of J.U.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE DELINQUENCY OF J.U.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0125
FILED 04-22-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JV607276
The Honorable Keelan J. Bodow, Commissioner

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Phoenix
By Olivia Porter
Counsel for Appellant

Stromfors Law Office PC, Chandler
By Stephanie A. Stromfors
Counsel for Appellant Guardian

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
By Philip D. Garrow and Brittany Rummel
Counsel for Appellee
 IN RE DELINQUENCY OF J.U.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Daniel J. Kiley and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 J.U. appeals the juvenile court’s order dismissing without
prejudice the State’s delinquency petition. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In November 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition
charging J.U. with three counts of criminal trespass and one count of
dangerous drug possession. At an advisory hearing, J.U.’s counsel
requested a mental competency evaluation. The court appointed Dr. Kelly
Rodriguez and Dr. Mark Treegoob to examine J.U. Dr. Rodriguez
concluded J.U. was competent to stand trial, but Dr. Treegoob concluded
J.U. was not competent but was restorable.

¶3 After receiving those conflicting reports, the court appointed
a third “tie-breaker” doctor, Dr. Heather de Soler, who determined J.U. was
not competent but was restorable. The parties stipulated to the two reports
finding J.U. not competent but restorable. In March 2024, the court ordered
J.U. to participate in restoration services with Dr. Huddleston, a mental
health expert, who would provide status reports on J.U.’s progress and
ultimately opine on J.U.’s competency.

¶4 In May 2024, the court held a restoration review hearing.
Considering Dr. Huddleston’s most recent status report that J.U. remained
incompetent but restorable, the court ordered J.U. to continue with
restoration services. The State subsequently filed a notice of intent to retain
jurisdiction and an amended petition, dropping one criminal trespass
charge and adding two burglary charges.

¶5 In June 2024, at the advisory hearing on the amended petition,
the court ordered J.U. to continue with the restoration process. The court
also noted that the restoration process could not continue once J.U. turned
eighteen, and, upon the State’s request, ordered Dr. Huddleston to explain

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 IN RE DELINQUENCY OF J.U.
Decision of the Court

in his next status report whether he believed J.U. could be restored prior to
his eighteenth birthday in September.

¶6 In July 2024, Dr. Huddleston filed a status report in which he
determined J.U. remained incompetent but could be restored within forty-
five days. At the subsequent restoration review hearing, the court stated it
had reviewed Dr. Huddleston’s report and asked the parties how they
wished to proceed. The State immediately moved to dismiss the case
without prejudice. The court granted the State’s motion over J.U.’s
objection and dismissed the delinquency petition without prejudice.

¶7 J.U. timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. See A.R.S. §§ 8-
235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 J.U. argues the juvenile court failed to apply A.R.S. § 8-
291.10(H), thereby abusing its discretion and violating his due process
rights. Although we review the dismissal of a juvenile delinquency petition
for an abuse of discretion, we interpret the juvenile competency statutes de
novo. In re Eric W., 229 Ariz. 107, 112 ¶ 18 (App. 2012); In re Eddie O., 227
Ariz. 99, 101 ¶ 4 (App. 2011). “Clear and unequivocal language determines
a statute’s meaning, reading each word, phrase, clause, and sentence in
such a way to ensure no part of the statute is void or trivial.” Planned
Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, 257 Ariz. 137, 142 ¶ 15 (2024).

¶9 “The juvenile competency statutes reflect the legislature’s
careful attempt to balance the right of the State to attempt to restore an
incompetent juvenile to competency with the right of the individual
juvenile to due process.” In re Eric W., 229 Ariz. at 112 ¶ 19. At any time
after the State files a delinquency petition, a party may request that the
juvenile be examined for competency. A.R.S. § 8-291.01(B). If the court
finds that the juvenile is incompetent but may be restored to competency,
it shall order the juvenile to participate in restoration services—as the court
did here. A.R.S. § 8-291.08(C).

¶10 As part of the restoration process, the court periodically holds
hearings to review the juvenile’s progress toward competency. See A.R.S.
§ 8-291.10. In relevant part, § 8-291.10 provides:

(C) The court may hold a hearing regarding a juvenile’s
progress toward competency on the request of the prosecutor,
the defense attorney or the guardian ad litem.

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(D) . . . [T]he court shall hold a hearing to determine the
juvenile’s progress towards regaining competency as follows:

(1) On the court’s own motion.

(2) On receipt of a report that is submitted by the restoration
program[.]

(3) Not less than three months before the juvenile’s eighteenth
birthday.

...

(H) If at a hearing that is held pursuant to subsection C or
subsection D, paragraph 1 or 2 of this section the court finds
that the juvenile is incompetent to proceed and that there is
not a substantial probability that the juvenile will regain
competency within two hundred forty days after the date of
the original finding of incompetency, the court shall dismiss
the charges with prejudice[.]

¶11 J.U. argues § 8-291.10(H) mandated dismissal with prejudice
because, at the time of the last restoration review hearing, J.U. remained
incompetent and was less than three months away from his eighteenth
birthday. J.U. further insists that because the restoration review hearing
was held on the court’s own motion and in response to the filing of a
restoration report, § 8-291.10(H) applied regardless of whether the court
made findings as to his progress towards competency.

¶12 J.U.’s reading of § 8-291.10(H) is contrary to its plain
language. Subsection (H) begins with the word “if,” indicating a condition
that must be met before a certain consequence—dismissal with prejudice—
is triggered. Specifically, for dismissal with prejudice to be mandated
under subsection (H), the court must find (1) that the juvenile remains
incompetent, and (2) that there is not a substantial probability that the
juvenile will regain competency within 240 days of the original finding of
incompetency. A.R.S. § 8-291.10(H).

¶13 The court made neither finding here. At the restoration
review hearing, the court simply stated it had “review[ed] the report from
Dr. Huddleston,” which concluded J.U. remained incompetent but
restorable. The court did not discuss whether it accepted Dr. Huddleston’s
conclusion or the probability that J.U. would become competent.

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¶14 But even if we assume the court accepted Dr. Huddleston’s
conclusion that J.U. remained incompetent but restorable, that finding
alone is insufficient to necessitate a dismissal with prejudice. See In re
Charles B., 194 Ariz. 174, 176–77 ¶ 5 (App. 1998) (“If the trial judge believes
that the juvenile is incompetent but is making ‘progress toward restoration
of competency’ . . . the judge can order more treatment or dismiss with or
without prejudice.”). The court was also required to find that there was not
a substantial likelihood that J.U. could be restored within a certain
timeframe. See A.R.S. § 8-291.10(H). The court did not make that finding.

¶15 And the court did not abuse its discretion in not making that
finding. The superior court originally found J.U. incompetent on March 21,
2024. For § 8-291.10(H) to apply, the court needed to find that there was not
a substantial probability that J.U. would regain competency by November
16, 2025 (240 days after March 21, 2024). But J.U. would turn eighteen in
September 2024. Even using September as the cutoff for competency under
§ 8-291.10(H), Dr. Huddleston opined on July 7, 2024, that “[t]here is a
substantial likelihood that [J.U.] can be restored within the statutory
period” and that J.U. “will require another 45 days in restoration.” So, in
Dr. Huddleston’s view, J.U. could be restored by August 21, 2024 (45 days
after July 7, 2024), which was less than two weeks before J.U.’s eighteenth
birthday. J.U. did not contest Dr. Huddleston’s report. That report was
sufficient evidence for the court to refuse to find that J.U. could not be
restored prior to his eighteenth birthday. Cf. In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424,
426 ¶ 7 (App. 2001) (“[W]e will only reverse on the grounds of insufficient
evidence if there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the
judgment or if the judgment is contrary to any substantial evidence.”).

¶16 Put simply, the court did not make findings that would
trigger § 8-291.10(H) and mandate dismissal with prejudice, and it did not
abuse its discretion in not making those findings. The court did not err in
dismissing the petition without prejudice.

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CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm juvenile court’s order dismissing the State’s
delinquency petition without prejudice.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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