In Re Delinquency of B.B.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE DELINQUENCY OF B.B.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0142
FILED 02-11-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015JV202400083
The Honorable Megan A. McCoy, Judge

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART

COUNSEL

Janelle A. McEachern, Attorney at Law, Chandler
By Janelle A. McEachern
Counsel for Appellant

Mohave County Public Defender’s Office, Kingman
By Jacobo Chavez
Counsel for Appellee
 IN RE DELINQUENCY OF B.B.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 B.B. (“Child”) appeals the superior court’s order adjudicating
him (1) delinquent for disorderly conduct and (2) incorrigible for running
away. We reverse the delinquency finding but affirm the incorrigibility
finding.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Child and his mother (“Mother”) verbally sparred on three
occasions about Child doing his chores, during which Child yelled and
cussed at Mother. Mother heard “loud punching noises” coming from
Child’s room after the first argument, so she called the police to calm him
down. Mother told Child to stop and leave her alone during the third
argument, but he continued yelling at her, so she called 911. The operator
told her to wait outside for the police.

¶3 After the second and third arguments, Child ran away from
home, but police found Child and returned him to Mother.

¶4 The State filed a delinquency petition, charging Child with
two counts of disorderly conduct (class 1 misdemeanors) and two counts of
runaway (an incorrigible offense). See A.R.S. §§ 13-2904(A)(1), 8-201(19)(c).
Child did not appear for his trial, called an adjudication hearing. The
juvenile court found for the State on all counts after hearing testimony from
Mother and two police officers who had responded to Mother’s calls. The
court placed Child on probation for twelve months.

¶5 Child timely appeals and we have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§
8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Child claims there was insufficient evidence to sustain his
adjudications. We will reverse for insufficient evidence only when the
record, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the adjudication,

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 IN RE DELINQUENCY OF B.B.
Decision of the Court

would not allow the court to find the essential elements of an offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Dayvid S., 199 Ariz. 169, 170, ¶ 4 (App.
2000).

I. Disorderly Conduct.

¶7 Child was charged with disorderly conduct under A.R.S. § 13-
2904(A)(1), which states:

A. A person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to
disturb the peace or quiet of a neighborhood, family or
person, or with knowledge of doing so, such person:

1. Engages in fighting, violent or seriously disruptive
behavior[.]

¶8 Under the statute, the State needs to show two elements: (1)
the defendant engaged in “seriously disruptive behavior . . . of the same
general nature as fighting or violence or conduct liable to provoke that
response in others and thus to threaten the continuation of some event,
function, or activity,” causing (2) the victim’s peace to be “indeed
disturbed.” In re Julio L., 197 Ariz. 1, 3–4, ¶¶ 8, 11 (2000). The State
established neither element here.

¶9 First, Child’s conduct did not rise to the level of “seriously
disruptive behavior.” See id. at 2, 4–5, ¶¶ 3, 14 (holding that student did not
engage in seriously disruptive behavior by repeatedly ignoring
instructions, cussing at school principal and kicking a plastic chair “which
tipped over but did not strike anyone”); In re Louise C., 197 Ariz. 84, 85–88,
¶¶ 2–3, 9, 11 (App. 1999) (concluding that student’s “outburst” involving
swearing and slamming a door was not seriously disruptive behavior).

¶10 Second, the record does not prove Mother’s peace was
“indeed disturbed.” See Julio, 197 Ariz. at 3, ¶ 8. The State emphasizes that
Mother exited the home during the third fight and asks us to infer that she
left because the 911 operator feared for her safety. But Mother testified
under oath that she never feared for her own safety and was concerned only
that Child might hurt himself or damage property. See id. at 4, ¶ 13 (holding
the alleged victim who “was not assaulted, did not feel threatened, was not
provoked to physically retaliate, and did not feel the need to protect
herself” was not disturbed).

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 IN RE DELINQUENCY OF B.B.
Decision of the Court

II. Runaway.

¶11 Child next argues the record contains no substantial evidence
to support the runaway charges.

¶12 An “incorrigible offense” is defined as “an offense that can
only be committed by a child under the age of 18, and which would not be
a crime if committed by an adult; for example . . . running away.” Ariz.
Code of Jud. Admin. § 6-304(A). An “incorrigible child” is defined as a
child who is “a runaway from the child’s home or parent, guardian or
custodian.” A.R.S. § 8-201(19)(c). A peace officer may take a child into
temporary custody if “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child
has run away from the child’s parents[.]” A.R.S. § 8-303(C)(2).

¶13 The record has ample evidence to support the runaway
findings. Mother testified that Child left the house twice after fights
without her permission, and a police officer brought Child back each time.
Child claims there was insufficient evidence to find him a runaway because
“[he] has always been located, apprehended and returned either to his
mother or to detention.” But that argument concedes that he ran away.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication on two counts of
runaway, reverse the adjudication on two counts of disorderly conduct, and
remand for further proceedings.

AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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