In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.V.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.V.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0145
FILED 08-12-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD23144, JS22063
The Honorable Michael C. Blair, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson
By Laura J. Huff
Counsel for Appellee
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.V.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Sonia Q. ("Mother") challenges the superior court's order
terminating her parental rights as to "L.V." For the following reasons, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother has four children and has struggled with substance
abuse for approximately eight years. The superior court previously
terminated Mother's rights to two of her children on substance-abuse
grounds in 2014 and 2023. In March 2023, Mother gave birth to L.V., who
tested positive for exposure to illegal substances. The Department of Child
Safety ("DCS") took custody of L.V. the following month.

¶3 Before seeking termination, DCS offered Mother several
rehabilitation and reunification services, including random urine testing,
substance-abuse treatment, the Nurturing Parenting Program, and
supervised visitation. But Mother did not use or participate in these
services. Because L.V. was born substance-exposed, he requires additional
medical care. DCS informed Mother she needed training from L.V.'s
primary care physician to meet his needs, but Mother declined to attend.
As a result, Mother was unable to have unsupervised visits with L.V.

¶4 In an unrelated criminal case, the superior court placed
Mother on probation following her guilty plea to felony and shoplifting
charges. In June 2023, Mother violated the terms of that probation and
spent approximately one year in prison. While incarcerated, Mother did
not participate in parenting classes or substance-abuse treatment plans
offered by the Department of Corrections. Moreover, because Mother
refused the training with L.V.'s physician, DCS continued to restrict her
visits with L.V. Mother had infrequent virtual visits with L.V. while
incarcerated.

¶5 In March 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental
rights to L.V., alleging abandonment, chronic substance abuse, nine-

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Decision of the Court

months' out-of-home placement, and prior termination due to substance
abuse. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(1), (3), (8)(a), and (10).

¶6 After Mother's release from prison in June 2024, DCS re-
referred her for rehabilitation and reunification services. DCS also allowed
Mother supervised, in-person visitation with L.V. upon her release.

¶7 The superior court conducted a termination adjudication
hearing in July 2024, at which Mother and a DCS child-safety specialist
testified. Following the hearing, the superior court terminated Mother's
parental rights on three grounds: (1) chronic substance abuse; (2) nine
months in out-of-home placement; and (3) prior termination of parental
rights due to the same cause.

¶8 Mother timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights. She
argues the superior court erred in finding: (1) that DCS made diligent
reunification efforts; and (2) that Mother's substance abuse would continue.
Mother does not challenge the superior court's best-interests finding. We
address these arguments below.

I. DCS Reunification Efforts.

¶10 Mother argues DCS failed to make sufficient reunification
efforts before the superior court terminated her parental rights.

¶11 Before terminating parental rights, DCS must make
reasonable efforts to provide reunification services. Jessie D. v. Dep't of Child
Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 581, ¶ 18 (2021). DCS's reunification efforts must offer
parents "the time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to
help [them] become [] effective parent[s]." Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-
501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). However, DCS "is not required to
provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in
each service it offers." Id. "[B]ecause the juvenile court is in the best position
to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility," Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child
Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023), we will not reweigh the evidence or
reevaluate witness credibility, Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146,
151, ¶ 18 (2018). We will affirm the superior "court's legal conclusions
regarding the statutory ground for termination . . . unless they are clearly
erroneous." Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478–79, ¶ 31. And we affirm unless "'as

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a matter of law [] no one could reasonably find the evidence to be clear and
convincing.'" Id. (quoting Murillo v. Hernandez, 79 Ariz. 1, 9 (1955)).

¶12 Here, the evidence supports the superior court's finding that
DCS made sufficient reunification efforts. The record shows DCS offered
Mother access to substance-abuse treatment, parenting classes, facilitated
meetings with L.V.'s primary care physician, and allowed Mother to visit
L.V. Mother failed to complete or meaningfully engage in any of these
services. Although Mother requested multiple in-person visits with L.V.
while incarcerated and went to an initial intake assessment for substance-
abuse treatment, she ultimately failed to show up for any additional
rehabilitative treatments.

¶13 DCS presented evidence that Mother did not participate in
substance-abuse treatment offered by DCS or subject herself to drug testing.
She refused to complete the required training with L.V.'s physician to allow
in-person visitation during her time in prison. And Mother similarly failed
to take advantage of the treatment programs or parenting classes while
incarcerated.

¶14 DCS "is not required to provide every conceivable service or
to ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers." JS-501904, 180
Ariz. at 353. Thus, adequate evidence supports the superior court's finding
that DCS made sufficient reunification efforts. See id. at 352–53 (finding
DCS's offer of parenting classes, substance-abuse programs, and
coordinating visitation were sufficient even though parent did not use them
and other services could have been offered).

II. Substance Abuse.

¶15 Mother next argues the superior court erred in terminating
her parental rights under the chronic substance-abuse ground. See A.R.S. §
8-533(B)(3).

¶16 The superior court may terminate a parent's rights if it finds
clear and convincing evidence of a history of chronic substance abuse, and
that severance is in the child's best interests. A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(3), -537(B).
A parent's "temporary abstinence from drugs . . . does not outweigh [her]
significant history of abuse." Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz.
373, 379, ¶ 29 (App. 2010).

¶17 Although Mother tested negative for substances upon her
release from prison, reasonable evidence supports the superior court's
finding that she suffers from chronic substance abuse. At the termination

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hearing, Mother testified she struggled with substance abuse for the past
eight years and never completed treatment. She refused to engage in
treatment, including during her incarceration. And while Mother made
some efforts towards sobriety, her brief period of abstinence "does not
outweigh h[er] significant history of abuse or h[er] consistent inability to
abstain during this case." Id. The superior court did not err in terminating
her parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). See Jennifer S. v. Dep't of Child
Safety, 240 Ariz. 282, 287–88, ¶¶ 21, 25 (App. 2016) (affirming termination
under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) because child and mother tested positive for
methamphetamine at child's birth, mother failed to engage in treatment,
and mother failed to maintain her sobriety before termination).

III. Additional Statutory Grounds for Termination.

¶18 Mother also challenges the superior court's findings related to
the two other statutory termination grounds. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(8)(b),
(B)(10). Because we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the superior
court's chronic substance-abuse finding under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), we do
not address these arguments. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203
Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002) ("If clear and convincing evidence supports
any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court ordered
severance, we need not address claims pertaining to the other grounds.").

CONCLUSION

¶19 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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