In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.H.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0156
FILED 04-22-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD42703
The Honorable Melody Harmon, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Veronica F. Rios, Jennifer R. Blum
Counsel for Appellee

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

P A T O N, Judge:
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.
Decision of the Court

¶1 Jayvon M. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his parental
rights as to K.H. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the
superior court’s termination order. See Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 20 (2000). Father and Stephanie C. (“Mother”) are the
biological parents of K.H., born in August 2022. In January 2023, Mother
left K.H. with his maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). Shortly
thereafter, Grandmother filed a private dependency petition alleging that
K.H. was dependent as to Mother. Grandmother did not list Father in the
petition. Mother is not a party to this appeal.

¶3 After receiving notice of the dependency, the Department of
Child Safety (“DCS”) identified Father as K.H.’s potential father and spoke
with him three days before the initial dependency hearing. Father told DCS
that he preferred K.H. remain with Grandmother because he did not believe
he could parent K.H. at the time. DCS substituted in as petitioner at the
initial hearing and filed an amended dependency petition alleging neglect
as to Father.

¶4 DCS referred Father for services, including supervised
visitation, paternity testing, the Nurturing Parenting Program (“NPP”), and
a rule-out drug test. Father began participating in the NPP in February 2023
and visited with K.H. through Grandmother and a DCS case aide. During
his first visit with K.H., Father refused to debrief because he “did not want
to come to the visitation.” He also declined to complete homework from
the NPP and did not work to find a job, reliable transportation, or a phone.

¶5 In April 2023, Father established paternity as to K.H. In May
2023, the court found K.H. dependent as to Father, when he failed to attend
a scheduled hearing, and adopted a case plan of family reunification.
Father completed a drug test in which he tested positive for marijuana. A
month later, Father voluntarily closed out of the NPP because he lacked the
mental and emotional readiness to participate. He also chose to stop
visitation with K.H.

¶6 In September 2023, Father informed DCS he wanted to
reengage in the case. DCS referred Father to the NPP and for visitation.
Father reengaged in visitation with K.H., participating in 62 of 74 scheduled
visits.

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.
Decision of the Court

¶7 In December 2023, the court changed the case plan to
severance and adoption. DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental rights
to K.H. on the six-month out-of-home placement ground. See A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(8)(b). In April 2024, Father began the NPP for the third time.

¶8 The superior court held a termination trial over two days in
May and July 2024. In between the trial dates, DCS moved to amend its
termination petition to add nine and fifteen months’ out-of-home
placement grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(a), (c). The superior court
granted DCS’s motion over Father’s objection, and heard testimony from
the DCS case manager, Father, and the case aide who oversaw Father’s
visits with K.H.

¶9 The superior court found DCS proved all three out-of-home
placement grounds by clear and convincing evidence. The court also found
DCS proved by a preponderance of the evidence that K.H. would benefit
from termination because “it would free him for adoption and would allow
him the permanency he deserves.” As a result, the court terminated
Father’s parental rights to K.H.

¶10 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21, and 12-
2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶11 Father only challenges the superior court’s finding that
termination was in K.H.’s best interests, specifically arguing the court failed
to consider the totality of the circumstances in the case, including Father’s
young age, his consistent engagement in supervised visits since November
2023, the bond between him and K.H., his family support, and that he had
stopped using marijuana.

¶12 Termination is in a child’s best interests if the child will
benefit from termination or if the child will be harmed if termination is
denied. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018).
Courts “must consider the totality of the circumstances existing at the time
of the severance determination, including the child’s adoptability and the
parent’s rehabilitation.” Id. at 148, ¶ 1. “When a current placement meets
the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is otherwise legally
possible and likely, a [superior] court may find that termination of parental
rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best interests.” Demetrius
L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016). Finally, “[t]he existence and effect
of a bonded relationship between a biological parent and a child, although

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.H.
Decision of the Court

a factor to consider, is not dispositive in addressing best interests.”
Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 98, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). We
will affirm the superior court’s best interests findings if supported by
reasonable evidence. Id. at 97, ¶ 7.

¶13 The superior court found DCS proved by a preponderance of
the evidence that terminating Father’s parental rights was in K.H.’s best
interests because K.H.’s needs were being met by his current placement,
Grandmother, who intended to adopt him, and he was “thriving” in
Grandmother’s care. Father does not challenge these findings. Instead, he
contends that the court did not consider the totality of the circumstances
because it ignored the specific factors Father identified—including the
parent-child bond and Father’s young age—in its termination decision. But
the superior court is not required to explicitly list every fact upon which
best interests findings are based. Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214
Ariz. 445, 451-52, ¶ 19 (App. 2007). Rather, the superior court is only
obligated to make findings of ultimate facts. See Elliot v. Elliot, 165 Ariz.
128, 132 (App. 1990) (Findings must include “all of the ‘ultimate’ facts—that
is, those necessary to resolve the disputed issues.”). And while the factors
Father identified, such as the parent-child bond, are relevant, none are
dispositive. See Dominique M., 240 Ariz. at 98, ¶ 12. Here, the court made
express findings that K.H. would benefit from being adopted by
Grandmother and that Grandmother intended to adopt the child. These
findings are supported by the evidence and are sufficient to support the
court’s best interests determination. See, e.g., Aleise H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
245 Ariz. 569, 572, ¶ 10 (App. 2018); Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 16. (“It is
well established in state-initiated cases that [a] child’s prospective adoption
is a benefit that can support a best-interests finding.”). Thus, the superior
court’s findings as to best interests were sufficient to support termination.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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