In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.P.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO
M.P., M.P., A.P., and H.P.

No. 1 CA-JV 24-0189
FILED 04-15-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS22071
The Honorable Adele Ponce, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC, Peoria
By Edward D. Johnson
Counsel for Mother Jessica P.

David W. Bell Attorney at Law, Higley
David W. Bell
Counsel for Children

John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellee Kelly P.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.P., et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Cynthia J. Bailey joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 In this private termination proceeding, Jessica P. (“Mother”)
and her minor children, M.P., M.B.P., A.P., and H.P. (collectively
“Children”), appeal the juvenile court’s order denying Mother’s petition to
terminate the parental rights of Kelly P. (“Father”) as to the Children. For
the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father began dating at the age of 13 and were
married in 2010. They are the biological parents of the Children, who were
born between 2011 and 2019.

¶3 From 2011 until late 2021, Father had a good relationship with
the Children. Then, in September 2021, Father slapped M.P. with his open
hand. The couple separated at that time and Mother ultimately filed for
divorce in June 2022.

¶4 During Mother and Father’s separation and while their
divorce was pending, Father continued to interact with Mother and the
Children. In March 2023, Father sexually abused Mother in a bedroom
closet while the Children were in the home. Father was arrested following
this attack and later pled guilty to charges of sexual abuse, kidnapping, and
aggravated assault in connection with it. Father was sentenced to six
months in jail and was placed on lifetime probation.

¶5 Father continued to visit and interact with the Children until
he was incarcerated to serve his sentence. He also was able to have
telephone calls with the Children during approximately the first six weeks
of his sentence, until Mother changed her telephone number, making
further contact impossible.

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
juvenile court’s order. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 2 (2016).

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Decision of the Court

¶6 Mother filed a petition with the juvenile court to terminate
Father’s parental rights to the Children in March 2024, later amending it in
June 2024. She alleged termination was proper under felony conviction and
willful abuse grounds. See Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-
533(B)(4), (2). After trial, the court found that Mother had proven by clear
and convincing evidence that Father had “willfully abused a child” and
“the abuse include[d] serious . . . emotional injury” because the Children
were present in the home when Father assaulted Mother in March 2023.
Thus, it concluded that Mother had established statutory grounds for
termination of Father’s parental rights per A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). However,
the court concluded that Mother had failed to prove by a preponderance of
evidence that termination would be in the Children’s best interests, and
therefore, denied Mother’s petition.

¶7 We have jurisdiction over Mother’s and the Children’s timely
appeals under Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§
8-235 and 12-120.21(A), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶8 “The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody
. . . .” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). “Even when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life.” Id. Thus, to terminate a
parent’s rights, the court must find clear and convincing evidence to
support at least one statutory ground for termination. A.R.S. § 8-533(B);
Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(C). But the inquiry does not end there. It must also
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the child’s
best interests. Id.

¶9 In this case, the court found that Mother sufficiently
established grounds for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2) but
determined that termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the
Children’s best interests. On appeal, Mother and the Children challenge
only the court’s best-interests finding and Father did not cross-appeal the
court’s finding under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). Thus, we address only the best-
interests finding.

¶10 “A reviewing court should affirm a termination order unless
the juvenile court abuses its discretion or the court’s findings are not
supported by reasonable evidence.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255

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Decision of the Court

Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 29 (2023) (cleaned up). In conducting our review, we will
“review the factual findings made by the juvenile court, and its factual
findings will be accepted ‘if reasonable evidence and inferences support
them.’” Id. at ¶ 30 (citing Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 580
¶ 10 (2021)). “This deferential standard is warranted because the juvenile
court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness
credibility.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶11 Here, in support of its best-interests finding, the court
acknowledged the bond between Father and the Children and that the
Children’s relationship with Father did not consist solely of abuse. The
court stated that a future relationship with him would be beneficial to them.
The court recognized that Father has taken classes to address his abusive
tendencies, though it also acknowledged that he had much further to go. It
observed that the Children are young and they could have a relationship
with Father in the future. It also noted that the Children spent time with
Father after his offense against Mother and spoke with him while he was
incarcerated, all without impropriety. It further found that Father may
improve his accountability and reconciliation with the Children and the
harm he caused them in the future. Finally, it found that depriving the
Children of a possible future relationship with Father would be detrimental
to them. The evidence adduced at trial and reasonable inferences therefrom
support these findings.

¶12 Mother contends that the court’s best-interests finding is
inconsistent with the evidence presented. She highlights the court’s
decision to give little weight to her recent remarriage and the plan for her
new husband to adopt the Children. In particular, while Mother correctly
observes that a stepparent who marries a biological parent may petition to
adopt that parent’s child at any time, see A.R.S. § 8-103 (stating eligibility
requirements to adopt), it does not support granting relief in this case. We
do not place more or less weight on the benefits of adoption depending on
the identity of the petitioning party. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1,
4 ¶ 13 (2016). “Rather, juvenile courts must assess the relevant facts in
determining on a case-by-case basis whether a preponderance of the
evidence supports a best-interests finding.” Id. And we defer to the superior
court’s decision to weigh those factors in the exercise of its discretion.
Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 29.

¶13 Mother also recites a litany of evidence she argues supports a
finding that termination is in the Children’s best interests. But Mother has
not shown that the court ignored her evidence. To the contrary, the court
stated that it “considered the totality of the circumstances,” indicating a

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Decision of the Court

complete and thorough review of all evidence, including that presented by
Mother. Nor has Mother shown that the court has otherwise misapplied the
law or that there was a complete absence of substantial evidence to support
the best-interests finding the court did make. In essence, Mother’s
argument invites us to reweigh the evidence, but this we cannot do. Id. at
478 ¶ 28 (noting that it is error for a reviewing court to reweigh evidence
presented to the juvenile court).

¶14 Because sufficient evidence and inferences adduced through
trial support the court’s best-interests finding, the court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was not in
the Children’s best interests. Thus, we discern no error.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm the court’s denial of Mother’s petition to terminate
Father’s parental rights to the Children.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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