Term of Parental Rights as to K.D.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.D.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0006
FILED 10-02-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS22371
The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of H. Clark Jones, LLC, Mesa
By H. Clark Jones
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Marika J. Hodge
Counsel for Appellee Arizona Department of Child Safety
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.D.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in
which Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating
her parental rights. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Child was born in 2014. While pregnant, and again shortly
after child’s birth, mother tested positive for various illegal drugs. The
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) petitioned the juvenile court for a
dependency finding, alleging mother’s inability to parent due to substance-
abuse and mental-health concerns. The court found child dependent, but
dismissed the dependency at DCS’s request after mother completed drug
treatment.

¶3 Within months, DCS again petitioned the juvenile court for a
dependency finding after mother was seen “visibly impaired” while
pushing child in a stroller. Mother tested positive for multiple illegal drugs,
which were also found in her home. Again, the court found child dependent
and ordered her removed from mother’s care, but dismissed the
dependency a year-and-a-half later at DCS’s request after mother
completed more drug treatment.

¶4 In 2022, father died at home from a drug overdose. Mother
was home at the time but did not call 911 for several hours. She too tested
positive for drugs in her system and told police she threw all evidence of
drugs in the dryer. Police found between fifty and one hundred syringes
(some used and some unused) in the dryer, as well as other drug
paraphernalia in the home. Later, DCS interviewed child (then eight years
old), who described with accuracy the type of syringes found in the home
for drug usage. DCS also reported “the apartment was not in good living
condition[],” there was nowhere for child to sleep, and “it was difficult to
navigate due to all the items on the floor.” Though mother admitted to DCS
she had a drug problem since age sixteen, she “declined” help for her
substance abuse, claiming she only needed “counseling.”

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¶5 DCS removed child from mother’s care for a third time,
placed her with paternal grandparents, and again petitioned the juvenile
court for a dependency finding. The court again found child dependent.

¶6 Over the next year-and-a-half, to her credit, mother
participated in many DCS-offered services, including undergoing a
psychological evaluation. But the evaluator felt mother minimized the
issues that led to DCS involvement and presented “attitudes [that] are likely
barriers to treatment,” including reporting that therapy services were
“useless.” The evaluator recommended mother complete eighteen months
of outpatient treatment and drug testing “with no missed, positive or
diluted drug screens.” Mother resisted drug treatment but did participate
in drug testing.

¶7 Initially, mother refused substance-abuse treatment because
she did not like the group therapy it included. Instead, she attended
individual counseling at a methadone clinic she had already been
attending, and later at another methadone clinic. Mother’s provider from
the second methadone clinic later testified mother met with her regularly
and made therapeutic progress. But the provider also said there were issues
she was unable to address because she was not a licensed provider, mother
did not disclose all of her substance-abuse history, and mother’s substance
abuse issues required more than just methadone treatment.

¶8 At the end of 2023, mother completed an intake with the
substance abuse treatment program DCS had initially recommended. The
program recommended standard outpatient treatment, but mother refused,
and the program changed its recommendation to an eight-hour substance-
abuse class based on mother’s self-reporting. DCS attempted to reassess
mother for services, but she refused. By May 2024, mother completed one
eight-hour course and group therapy sessions through the program. And
though she had several clean drug tests, between March and May 2024,
mother had diluted test screens and tested positive for alcohol after being
told she must abstain from drinking. Mother responded by stating that
consuming alcohol to manage her anxiety is not a concern.

¶9 As for therapy, mother’s therapist later testified that though
mother met with him regularly, she did not delve into the root of her
substance-abuse issues and that he had to redirect her from discussing her
issues with grandparents back toward her therapeutic goals.

¶10 In late 2023, visits between mother and child changed from
supervised to unsupervised. But after just a few months, the child’s

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therapist wrote to the juvenile court expressing “deep[] concern” and
recommending that visits be suspended or modified because the child
“exhibited signs of emotional dysregulation and behavioral regression
following [] overnight stays” with mother. For her part, child reported that
mother “talks bad” about grandparents during visits. After the court
ordered visits reverted to supervised, things improved with child. DCS
reported that there had been “no negative talk about family” during the
visits, there had been “a difference in [child]’s behavior since returning to
supervised visits,” and child was “engaging more with her grandfather.”

¶11 In June 2024, grandparents petitioned to terminate mother’s
parental rights (which DCS ultimately supported) alleging two statutory
grounds justifying termination—(1) fifteen months in an out-of-home
placement and (2) Mother’s substance abuse—and that termination was in
child’s best interests.

¶12 At the November 2024 termination adjudication hearing,
grandparents presented evidence as outlined, supra ¶¶ 2-10. For her part,
mother testified she was sober (with the exception of her positive alcohol
tests), did not consider herself to be in active addiction, and was committed
to sobriety. She also testified therapy had not been useful to her and that
she had not addressed with her therapist the issues underlying her
addiction.

¶13 The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights based
upon both alleged statutory grounds and in child’s best interests. The court
acknowledged mother’s participation in services but ultimately concluded
Mother had not fully engaged in treatment such that any substance-abuse
related parenting concerns were eradicated.

¶14 Mother timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article
6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1),
-2101(A)(1), and the Arizona Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court
601(a).

DISCUSSION

¶15 Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support
either statutory ground the juvenile court found justifying termination of
her parental rights, or that termination was in child’s best interests.

¶16 To terminate parental rights, a court must find at least one
statutory ground enumerated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing
evidence, Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000),

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and that termination is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of
the evidence, Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). On appeal,
we “look only to determine if there is evidence to sustain the [juvenile]
court’s ruling” and do not reweigh the evidence. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). We will affirm “unless the
juvenile court abuses its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported
by reasonable evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470,
474, ¶ 14 (2022).

I. Clear and Convincing Evidence Supports the Out-of-Home
Placement Ground

¶17 To terminate parental rights based upon fifteen months in an
out-of-home placement requires clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the
child has been in out-of-home placement for fifteen months, (2) DCS has
“made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services,” (3)
“the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that cause[d] the
child to be in out-of-home placement,” and (4) “there is a substantial
likelihood that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and
effective parental care and control in the near future.” A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(8)(c).

¶18 Mother does not dispute the child has been in out-of-home
placement for fifteen months or that DCS provided adequate reunification
services. Rather, she argues she remedied the circumstances that caused the
out-of-home placement by the time of the termination adjudication hearing
and there was no evidence that the circumstances would continue in the
future.

¶19 Child’s out-of-home placement was caused by mother’s
substance abuse. And there is record evidence to support Mother’s position
she made progress towards sobriety, including several clean drug tests, her
participation in group therapy and individual counseling, and her
participation in other services offered. But there is also record evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that a “significant challenge with
[mother’s] participation in services has been her lack of honesty regarding
her substance use and her need for [] treatment.” Indeed, mother has a
history of relapsing, showed a lack of understanding of the gravity of her
substance abuse, and maintained an attitude that therapy was “useless”
and any substance-abuse treatment unneeded.

¶20 Moreover, mother’s therapist testified mother was not getting
to the root of her substance-abuse issues and had not yet demonstrated a

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complete understanding of how those issues affected her parenting. And
while mother contends she would have been able to address the root of her
substance abuse issues if given more time in therapy (something her
therapist opined), the juvenile court heard this testimony and weighed it
with mother’s history of relapse and general attitude towards her substance
abuse and treatment for it. Mother’s argument effectively asks us to
reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 47,
¶ 8.

¶21 Because record evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding
that mother had not remedied her substance-abuse issues and that there
was a substantial likelihood she would be incapable of exercising proper
and effective parental care and control in the near future, A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B)(8)(c), mother has failed to show error. Because only one statutory
ground is required to terminate parental rights, we need not address
mother’s argument regarding the substance-abuse ground. Jesus M. v. Ariz.
Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002).

II. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Best-Interests Finding

¶22 Mother also argues the juvenile court’s best-interests finding
is not supported by reasonable evidence.

¶23 The termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests
if the child would either “benefit from a severance or be harmed by the
continuation of the [parent-child] relationship.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action
No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). “[C]ourts must consider the totality of
the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination.”
Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 148, ¶ 1 (2018). On appeal, we
will affirm the juvenile court’s best-interests finding “if reasonable evidence
and inferences support [it.]” Id. at 151, ¶ 18.

¶24 The juvenile court found that child “would be harmed by the
continuation of the existing parental relationship because the child would
linger in foster care, uncertain about her stability and future, while [mother]
continues her prolonged journey toward sobriety.” Further, child “is caught
between the emotional division between [grandparents] and [mother].” A
review of the record supports the court’s findings.

¶25 Child had been removed from mother’s care two times before
this case arose and had been out-of-home for a year-and-a-half by the time
of the termination adjudication hearing. Further, when mother’s visitation
changed from supervised visits to unsupervised, child regressed
emotionally and behaviorally when spending longer periods of time with

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mother (overnight). The tension between mother and grandparents was
also detrimental to child’s mental and emotional health. And despite the
substance-abuse treatment offered to mother, she had not been able to
overcome her substance-abuse addictions.

¶26 The juvenile court also found that termination of parental
rights would benefit child. Record evidence shows that child is adoptable
and that grandparents are willing to adopt. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 13
(“[A] child’s prospective adoption is a benefit that can support a best-
interests finding.”) (citation omitted). Further still, evidence showed
grandparents were providing for child’s emotional and physical needs and
would continue to do so. For these reasons, mother’s arguments against the
court’s best interests finding fail.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We affirm the termination of mother’s parental rights.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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