In Re Term of Parental Rights as to J.B. and N.N.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO J.B. and N.N.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0009
FILED 07-15-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD503914
The Honorable Marvin L. Davis, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Ingeet P. Pandya
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Daniel J. Kiley delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

K I L E Y, Judge:
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Decision of the Court

¶1 Lillian M. (“Mother”) challenges the order terminating her
parental rights to her two children. She argues that the court abdicated its
decision-making authority by accepting, verbatim, the proposed findings
of fact and conclusions of law lodged by the Department of Child Safety
(“DCS”) and that, in any event, the findings were insufficient to support the
court’s determination that DCS made reasonable and diligent reunification
efforts. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to affirming
the juvenile court’s ruling. See Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227
Ariz. 231, 234, ¶ 13 (App. 2011) (citation omitted).

¶3 Mother and Joshua B. (“Father”) are the parents of J.B., born
in 2022, and N.N., born in 2023.

¶4 When J.B. was born, hospital personnel contacted DCS to
report that the baby was substance-exposed and Mother tested positive for
methamphetamine, oxycodone, and tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”).
During an interview with DCS, Mother admitted using methamphetamine
“on and off” for “the last twenty years.” She further reported that, after a
period of non-use, she resumed using methamphetamine “daily” in 2021
until she discovered she was pregnant, at which point she decreased her
methamphetamine use to “every other day.” Mother likewise admitted
using marijuana during her pregnancy, explaining that she did not consider
marijuana use to be “a problem” because “marijuana is legal.” Mother
denied using oxycodone and could not explain why she tested positive for
it.

¶5 J.B. remained in the neonatal intensive care unit for over two
weeks “due to withdrawal symptoms.” While there, he required a feeding
tube and a nasal cannula “due to having low oxygen levels.”

¶6 Meanwhile, DCS filed a dependency petition. The juvenile
court adjudicated J.B. dependent, and he was placed in a licensed foster
home.

¶7 During its investigation, DCS learned that Mother had a 20-
year history with DCS, including prior dependencies based on her
substance abuse and neglect of her other children.

¶8 DCS offered Mother reunification services that included
supervised visitation, substance abuse treatment through Terros, random

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Decision of the Court

urinalysis testing, the Nurturing Parenting Program (“NPP”), and a referral
for a case aide. Additionally, the court appointed a community resource
coordinator to assist Mother and Father in securing housing and finding
treatment services that they could “participate in as a family.”

¶9 From the outset, Mother failed to consistently engage in
services. Although Mother initially attended most supervised visits with
J.B., she missed some scheduled visits, failing to show up with no advance
notice or explanation. Mother attended some NPP sessions, but her
inconsistent attendance led to the NPP referral being unsuccessfully closed
out.

¶10 Mother failed to attend her scheduled intake session with
Terros in October 2022, purportedly due to lack of transportation. DCS
arranged for her transportation to a rescheduled intake session. Mother did
not attend. A third intake session was scheduled and, again, Mother failed
to attend. Her substance abuse treatment referral was then closed out.

¶11 When Mother began undergoing regular drug testing in
November 2022, her test results were “often positive” for
“methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC.” After she failed to appear
for seven scheduled tests in March 2023, her referral was “suspended.”

¶12 In late 2023, DCS learned that Mother was pregnant again and
appeared to be homeless. A DCS specialist had difficulty reaching Mother
and Father because they lacked reliable phone service. When the DCS
specialist was able to reach Mother by phone in September 2023, she refused
to disclose her location because she feared being taken into custody on
outstanding arrest warrants.

¶13 In October 2023, Mother gave birth to N.N. at her home,
which was described as “a shed” in “a yard” behind “a house.” After the
baby was born, Mother waited twelve days to seek medical care for her.
After N.N.’s initial medical examination, the physician told Mother to bring
her back for a follow-up appointment in three weeks. Based on N.N.’s
condition at the follow-up — including “poor weight gain” and “pale gray
skin” — the physician told Mother and Father to take her to an emergency
room. The parents waited ten hours to bring N.N. to the emergency room.
Upon admission, N.N. tested positive for methamphetamine and “was
diagnosed with Failure to Thrive.” Mother and Father told representatives
from the Office of Child Welfare Investigations (“OCWI”) that they had
“given guardianship of their baby” to friends but admitted that they did
not seek or obtain any guardianship orders. After obtaining court

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authorization to remove N.N., OCWI, accompanied by officers with the
Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”), went to the location where
Mother had given birth to notify the parents of an upcoming DCS team
decision-making (“TDM”) meeting. When they arrived, Mother attempted
to flee but was detained and arrested on two felony warrants.

¶14 DCS filed a dependency petition and the court adjudicated
N.N. dependent as to both parents. She was placed in the same foster home
in which her brother, J.B., had been placed.

¶15 DCS had some phone contact with Mother in 2023 and early
2024 regarding the children and kept her apprised of the dates and times of
upcoming medical appointments and court hearings. Further, DCS invited
the parents to attend “[f]amily [t]eam meetings.”

¶16 Mother exercised visitation for the last time on May 3, 2024.
After that, DCS lost contact with her, even after conducting public records
searches to try to locate her.

¶17 In August 2024, DCS determined that the parents’ lack of
engagement in services over the course of the lengthy proceedings
warranted changing the case plan to termination and adoption. The court
granted DCS’s request. DCS soon thereafter moved to terminate the
parents’ rights as to both children on substance-abuse and out-of-home
placement grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(b), (8)(c).

¶18 A termination trial was set in November 2024. The parents did
not appear, nor did they contact the court or their counsel to explain their
non-appearance. The court found that they had been served and failed to
appear without good cause, and so proceeded in their absence.

¶19 A DCS specialist testified about the history of the case,
including the reasons the children were taken into care, the parents’
longstanding and ongoing substance abuse, their failure to engage in
services, and the fact that both children are well cared-for in a loving home
with a foster parent who intends to adopt them.

¶20 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court took the
matter under advisement and ordered DCS to lodge proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law. DCS did so. The court adopted and entered the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law (the “FOF/COL”). Noting
that it “heard, considered and weighed all of the testimony, admitted
exhibits . . . [and] arguments of counsel,” the court found, in the FOF/COL,
that DCS had established statutory grounds for termination of the rights of

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both Mother and Father and that termination would be in the children’s
best interests.

¶21 Mother timely appealed.1 This Court has jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-
120.21, and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶22 The right to “the control and custody of one’s children,”
though fundamental, is “not absolute.” Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
196 Ariz. 246, 248, ¶¶ 11-12 (2000) (citation omitted). The parental
relationship may be terminated if the juvenile court finds at least one
statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) proven by clear
and convincing evidence and further finds, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interests. Timothy B. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474, ¶ 13 (2022) (citations omitted).

¶23 To establish grounds for termination under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(3), DCS must prove that a history of chronic substance abuse has
rendered “the parent ‘unable to discharge parental responsibilities’ and
‘reasonable grounds’ exist ‘to believe that the condition will continue for a
prolonged indeterminate period.’” Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240
Ariz. 282, 287, ¶ 17 (App. 2016) (citing A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3)). Additionally,
DCS must show that it “made reasonable efforts to reunify the family or
that such efforts would have been futile.” Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005) (citations omitted).

¶24 To establish grounds for termination under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(8)(c), DCS must prove that (1) the child has been in an out-of-home
placement for a cumulative total period of at least fifteen months; (2) DCS
made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services; (3) the
parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that caused the child
to be in an out-of-home placement; and (4) there is a substantial likelihood
that the parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effective
parental care and control in the near future. See In re Z.L., 256 Ariz. 138, 143,
¶ 19 (App. 2023) (citations omitted). To establish grounds for termination
of a parent’s rights to a child under the age of three who has been in an out-
of-home placement for longer than six months, DCS must prove both that
it made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services and
that “the parent has substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy

1 Father is not a party to this appeal.

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the circumstances” causing the out-of-home placement. A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(8)(b).

¶25 We will affirm a termination order absent an abuse of
discretion. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App.
2004) (quotation omitted). We do not re-weigh the evidence, id., but view it
in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s decision,
Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 2 (App. 2008)
(citation omitted).

¶26 Mother challenges the court’s termination order, asserting
that the court abused its discretion by adopting, without modification, the
FOF/COL lodged by DCS. According to Mother, by accepting DCS’s
FOF/COL and entering them as its own, the court essentially “delegate[d]”
its decision-making authority to DCS. Citing her constitutional right to have
“factual and legal findings” made by “the trial court” and not the opposing
party, Mother argues the court violated due process by “deferr[ing] its
factual and legal finding power and responsibility to” DCS.

¶27 In response, DCS does not dispute that the court adopted its
proposed findings and conclusions verbatim, but asserts that nothing in
Arizona law “mandates that the court independently compose all of its
findings or prohibits the court from asking one or more parties to lodge
proposed findings.” We agree with DCS.

¶28 A court may not, of course, abdicate its judicial responsibility
by deferring to the views of a litigant or an expert witness. See Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz. 270, 273-74, ¶¶ 13-14 (App. 2013) (quotation omitted) (vacating
and remanding parenting time order because family court “abdicated its
responsibility” to decide contested issues by adopting custody evaluator’s
recommendation as the presumptive outcome). But the mere fact that a
court adopted proposed findings lodged by a party does not establish that
the court abdicated its judicial role. On the contrary, case law has long
recognized that a court may adopt a party’s proposed findings as long as
“those findings are consistent with the ones the court reaches
independently after properly considering the facts.” Elliott v. Elliott, 165
Ariz. 128, 134 (App. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Andrea F. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 20-0074, 2021 WL 162020, at *4, ¶ 22 (Ariz. App. Jan.
19, 2021) (mem. decision) (rejecting argument that court abdicated its fact-
finding responsibility and noting that “the court was free to direct the
parties to submit proposed findings and conclusions and was free to adopt
any of those findings and conclusions it determined were appropriate”).

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¶29 We presume that a court “fully considered” the relevant
evidence before issuing its decision. Fuentes v. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. 51, 55-56,
¶ 18 (App. 2004) (citation omitted); see also In re Marriage of Gibbs, 227 Ariz.
403, 410, ¶ 21 (App. 2011) (citation omitted) (holding that although the court
did not discuss the evidence in detail, “we presume it fully considered the
relevant evidence”). Mother, therefore, bears the burden of establishing that
the court abdicated its judicial responsibility when it adopted DCS’s
proposed FOF/COL. Cf. Fuentes, 209 Ariz. at 55, ¶ 18.

¶30 In support of her position that the court improperly delegated
its fact-finding authority, Mother notes that the court’s FOF/COL was
“nearly identical” to the allegations in DCS’s termination motion. But by
failing to appear at trial, Mother admitted the factual allegations set forth
in DCS’s termination motion. See Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(f); Brenda D. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 440, ¶ 1 (2018) (“[I]f a parent fails to appear at
a termination adjudication hearing without good cause, Arizona law vests
the juvenile court with discretion to find that the parent has waived his or
her legal rights and admitted the motion’s allegations.” (citation omitted)).
There is certainly nothing improper (or even unusual) about a court’s
accepting, verbatim, factual allegations by one party that the opposing
party has admitted.

¶31 A court’s adoption of proposed findings that lack a factual
basis in the record may indicate an abdication of judicial responsibility. Cf.
Matter of Hamilton, 637 P.2d 542, 545 (N.M. 1981) (“[T]he adoption of
verbatim findings is not in error if they are supported by the record.”
(citation omitted)). Invoking this principle, Mother asserts that the court’s
FOF/COL include factual findings and conclusions about reunification
services that lack support in the record. According to Mother, these
purported “factual mistakes and baseless conclusions” indicate that the
court abdicated its fact-finding role by uncritically accepting DCS’s
unsupported assertions.

¶32 Mother identifies, as one example of the FOF/COL’s
purportedly unsupported findings, the finding that she was “referred to
community resources.” According to Mother, evidence to support this
finding “do[es] not appear in the record.” Mother’s assertion is incorrect;
the record shows that, in December 2022, the court appointed a community
coordinator to help the parents secure housing and assistance in family
treatment services.

¶33 As another example of the FOF/COL’s purportedly
unsupported findings, Mother cites the finding that she had been “offered

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case plan staffings.” But the record shows that a DCS specialist made efforts
to maintain contact with Mother by phone and email to keep her apprised
of the times and dates of scheduled medical appointments and court
hearings. Further, DCS scheduled in-person meetings with Mother to
discuss the case plan. And the parents were invited to TDM meetings so
they could participate in discussions about the children.

¶34 Mother does not dispute that these “phone conversations,
emails, . . . in-person meetings and [TDM] meetings” took place. She insists,
however, that the court had no basis on which to conclude that these
communications and meetings “qualify as case plan staffings” because
“[c]ase plan staffings is not a legal term.”

¶35 Mother does not identify any type of meeting that should
have been held but wasn’t, nor does she identify any particular
communication that should have been made but wasn’t. Because Mother
does not dispute that DCS personnel held numerous meetings about this
case to which Mother was invited, nor does she dispute that DCS attempted
to maintain contact with her by phone and email, her complaint about the
FOF/COL’s use of the label “case plan staffings” when referring to these
meetings and communications raises nothing more than an issue of
semantics that entitles her to no relief.

¶36 Mother also alleges that the record does not support the
FOF/COL’s findings about the circumstances of her arrest shortly after
N.N. was born in October 2023. Specifically, Mother asserts the record does
not support the FOF/COL’s statement that when N.N. was removed from
her parents’ care, Mother “was taken into custody” on outstanding
warrants for a “probation violation and a drug possession charge from
November 2022.” Mother admits that she was arrested on outstanding
warrants, but maintains that the record contains no evidence that the
warrants were issued for a “probation violation” or “a drug possession
charge.”

¶37 Again, the record refutes this assertion. The verified petition
that DCS filed in support of its request that the court adjudicate N.N.
dependent includes an allegation that after N.N.’s removal, Mother was
“taken into custody” on “active warrants for her arrest for [a] probation
violation and a drug possession charge from November 2022.” This sworn
allegation constitutes evidence to support the court’s finding.

¶38 We reject, as contrary to the record, Mother’s claim that the
FOF/COL contains unsupported factual findings that give rise to an

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inference that the juvenile court delegated its judicial responsibility to DCS.
We further hold that Mother has failed to meet her burden of showing that
the court improperly deferred to DCS by adopting the proposed findings
and conclusions that DCS lodged after trial.

¶39 Mother argues, in the alternative, that the court’s termination
order should be set aside because no evidence supports the determination
that DCS provided reasonable reunification services.

¶40 DCS has “an affirmative duty to make all reasonable efforts
to preserve the family relationship” before it seeks “to terminate parental
rights.” Christina G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 234-35, ¶ 14
(App. 2011) (quotation omitted). To fulfill this obligation, DCS must
provide the parent “with the time and opportunity to participate in
programs designed to help her to become an effective parent.” Id. at 235,
¶ 14 (quotation omitted). DCS is not, however, required “to provide every
conceivable service,” id. at ¶ 15 (citation omitted), nor is it required “to
ensure that a parent participates in each service it offers,” Maricopa Cnty.
Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994) (citation omitted).

¶41 Citing case law recognizing DCS’s “duty” to “provide
reunification services,” Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 581,
¶ 18 (2021), Mother argues that the court erred in finding that DCS satisfied
this duty. According to Mother, the court erred, for example, in considering
the services of the community resource coordinator in determining whether
DCS made appropriate reunification efforts. The coordinator does not
“qualif[y] as a community resource provided by DCS,” Mother argues,
because “the community [resource] coordinator was appointed” directly
“by the trial court” (emphasis added).

¶42 The obligation to provide reunification services stems from
the fundamental right of parents to the care and custody of their children,
which, in turn, imposes an obligation on the State to attempt to preserve the
family relationship. See Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 581, ¶ 18 (“Arizona courts have
. . . recognized a requirement to engage in reunification efforts on
constitutional grounds as a necessary element of any state attempt to
overcome the fundamental liberty interest of the natural parents in the care,
custody and management of their child.” (citation modified)); Mary Ellen C.
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 186, ¶ 1 (App. 1999) (“It is well
established that the State, before acting to terminate parental rights, has an
affirmative duty to make all reasonable efforts to preserve the family
relationship.” (citations omitted)). These constitutional requirements are
satisfied if appropriate reunification services are provided, regardless of

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how or by whom they are provided. See A.R.S. § 8-846(B) (“If the court
determines that services supplemental to those provided through the
department are available from another source at no cost to this state, the
court may order the services on agreement of the provider.”). Because
Mother does not dispute that a community resource coordinator was
appointed, she is entitled to no relief on her complaint that the appointment
was made by the court rather than DCS.

¶43 In her reply brief, Mother contends that the record is devoid
of evidence that the community resource coordinator ever “provided
[Mother] with any services,” or even “spoke with [her].” For a number of
reasons, we find Mother is not entitled to relief.

¶44 First, Mother waived this argument by raising it for the first
time in her reply brief. Marco C. v. Sean C., 218 Ariz. 216, 219, ¶ 8 n.1 (App.
2008) (citation omitted). Second, if Mother was of the view that the
coordinator was not providing appropriate assistance, she should have
raised that issue with the juvenile court. Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 178-79, ¶ 16 (App. 2014) (holding that the dependency
process “demands that parents voice their concerns about services to the
juvenile court in a timely manner” because “a parent’s failure to assert
legitimate complaints in the juvenile court about the adequacy of services
needlessly injects uncertainty and potential delay into the proceedings”).
Nothing in the record indicates that Mother ever voiced such concerns.
Because she failed to do so, her belated complaint on appeal does not entitle
her to relief. See id. at 179, ¶ 18 (holding that parent waived challenge to
adequacy of reunification services by raising it for the first time on appeal).

¶45 In a final challenge to the FOF/COL, Mother complains that
the FOF/COL uses the phrase “including but not limited to” when listing
the exhibits that the trial court considered.2 Mother does not dispute that
all of the exhibits that are identified in the FOF/COL were properly
admitted at trial. She asserts, however, that the phrase “including but not
limited to” indicates that the trial court considered additional, unidentified
documents or evidence that are not part of the record.

¶46 In our view, Mother reads too much into the phrase
“including but not limited to.” All the findings in the FOF/COL are

2 Specifically, the FOF/COL recites that “[t]he Court heard, considered and

weighed all of the testimony, admitted exhibits including, but not limited
to, [Exhibits 1 through 7], arguments of counsel and written submission of
the parties.”

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supported by evidence in the record; none of those findings appear to be
based on information gathered from an extrajudicial source. Mother has not
shown that the phrase “including but not limited to” is anything other than
stylistic surplusage. Cf. State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 442, 447-48, ¶ 17 (2003)
(stating that a defendant bears the burden of establishing that jurors
“received and considered extrinsic evidence”). The appearance of this
phrase in the FOF/COL entitles Mother to no relief.

¶47 The court found that DCS had established grounds for
termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) and (8). Mother only challenges the
court’s finding that Mother was provided with appropriate reunification
services. For the reasons set forth above, we reject this assertion. We further
affirm, as unchallenged, the court’s remaining findings under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(3) and (8). See Crystal E. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 241 Ariz. 576, 577-78,
¶ 5 (App. 2017) (citations omitted) (affirming court’s finding of statutory
ground for termination that parent failed to challenge on appeal).

¶48 Before terminating parental rights, the court must also find
that termination would be in the children’s best interests. The court made
such a finding here, and Mother does not challenge it on appeal. We
therefore affirm this finding. See id.

CONCLUSION

¶49 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order
terminating Mother’s parental rights as to J.B. and N.N.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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