In Re Term of Parental Rights as to K.P.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.P.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0026
FILED 10-30-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS22469
The Honorable Suzanne E. Cohen, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jessica C., Scottsdale
Appellant

Law Office of Ed Johnson PLLC, Peoria
By Edward D. Johnson
Advisory Counsel for Appellant Jessica C.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in
which Judge Anni Hill Foster and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.P.
Decision of the Court

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Jessica C. ("Mother") appeals the juvenile court's order
terminating her parental rights as to K.P. ("Child"). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Child, ten, has lived exclusively with Logan P. ("Father") for
the last six years. Mother had custody but asked Father to take care of Child
because she was unable. Over the years, Mother communicated and spent
time with Child but also went long periods of time without doing so.
Mother and Father blamed each other for poor communication impeding
Mother's relationship with Child.

¶3 In September 2024, Father claimed Mother had not seen or
spoken with Child for ten months and filed a Petition for Termination of
Parental Rights alleging abandonment under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) and
neglect under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). The juvenile court held a termination
hearing in February 2025. At the hearing, Mother admitted Father's claim
about contact with Child but insisted this was the first time ever she had
gone more than six months without seeing Child. Father testified that
Mother did not have a relationship with Child, and that Child wanted to be
adopted by Father's fiancé because she was the only active mother figure in
Child's life. Mother testified to the contrary. Mother offered some text
messages to support her claims—some from one month in 2021 and some
from 2024, right after Father filed the petition. A few days after the hearing,
the juvenile court granted the petition solely on abandonment grounds.

¶4 Court-appointed counsel filed a Notice and Avowal in Lieu
of an Opening Brief under Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 607(e)(1)(B), stating that a
diligent inspection of the record found no non-frivolous grounds for
appeal. Counsel so informed Mother, who timely filed the pro se opening
brief permitted under the rule. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. §§ 12-2101(A)(1), 12-120.21(A)(1), and 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Father did not file a response. When appellant raises
debatable issues on appeal, we may treat appellee's failure to answer as a
confession of reversible error. See Bugh v. Bugh, 125 Ariz. 190, 191 (App.
1980). But in cases involving the best interests of a child we do not do so—
those interests are paramount. See In re G.I., --- Ariz. ---, ---, ¶ 13, 567 P.3d

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO K.P.
Decision of the Court

764, 767 (App. 2025) (stating that the best-interests analysis is "paramount"
in termination cases).

¶6 We hold self-represented litigants to the same standard as
attorneys. Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 83, ¶ 24 (2017). Mother failed to
raise and preserve any of her purported grievances before the juvenile
court. And Mother's opening brief fails to articulate issues for appeal.
Arizona does not require Anders appeals in parental termination
proceedings, so we do not scour the record in search of grounds for appeal.
In re C.J., --- Ariz. ---, --- ¶ 19, 572 P.3d 597, 601 (App. 2025). Moreover,
Mother's brief fails to cite the record or legal authorities as required by
ARCAP 13(a)(7)(A) and Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 607(b). In our discretion, we
may treat such procedural errors as waiver of the claims. Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009). But because waiver is a discretionary
doctrine, and a child's best interests are paramount, In re G.I., --- Ariz. at ---,
¶ 13, we exercise our discretion and attempt to address Mother's brief.

¶7 Parents have a fundamental, but not absolute, liberty interest
in the care, custody, and management of their children. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24 (2005). The juvenile court may terminate parental
rights if it finds (1) at least one statutory ground for termination under
A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence, and (2) that the
termination is in the best interests of the child by a preponderance of the
evidence. Brionna J. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 477, ¶ 20 (2023).

¶8 We review termination orders for abuse of discretion. Mary
Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).
Abandonment is a question of fact for the juvenile court to resolve. Michael
J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250, ¶ 20 (2000). We review the
order in the light most favorable to sustaining the decision, so we will affirm
the court's factual findings supported by "reasonable evidence and
inference." Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478, ¶ 30 (quoting Jessie D. v. Dep't of Child
Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 580, ¶ 10 (2021)). We will affirm the court's legal
finding that abandonment warrants termination unless no reasonable
person could have found the evidence clear and convincing as a matter of
law. Id. at 478–79, ¶ 31.

¶9 In her brief, Mother claims the termination decision "infringes
upon [her] rights" and that she did not deliver a closing statement, while
Father did. As far as these claims allege failure to provide due process, they
fail. Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(b) requires termination hearings to give parents
a meaningful opportunity to present their case. In re C.J., --- Ariz. at ---,
¶ 21, (citing Royce C. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 129, 136, ¶ 16 (App.

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Decision of the Court

2021)). Court-appointed counsel represented Mother. Another represented
Child. Father represented himself. Mother's counsel cross-examined
Father, moved for directed verdict, submitted exhibits, examined Mother
directly, and delivered a closing statement on Mother's behalf. We see no
lack of opportunity to present the case and no due process violations.

¶10 Next, Mother raises multiple grievances that appear to
challenge the sufficiency of evidence. First, Mother claims Father offered
testimony full of "unchecked errors." Second, Mother alleges the evidence
did not reflect all of her attempts to maintain the relationship with Child.
Third, Mother questions whether Father pressured Child to agree to be
adopted by Father's fiancé, rendering adoption unviable.

¶11 Because we must defer to the juvenile court's factual findings,
Mother fails to establish any error. It is uniquely the province of the
juvenile court to resolve conflicting testimony because it is best positioned
to weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. Jesus M. v.
Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282, ¶ 12 (App. 2002). We will not
reweigh the evidence. Id. Mother and Father offered contradictory
testimony about her relationship with Child. But Mother also
acknowledged failing to communicate with Child for extended periods of
time. And Mother offered little other evidence to support her claims. The
determination of abandonment under A.R.S. § 8-531(1) considers the
parent's objective conduct, rather than subjective intent. Michael J., 196 Ariz.
at 249, ¶ 18. The evidence presented reasonably supported the juvenile
court's finding of abandonment. Thus, we cannot conclude the termination
order was clearly erroneous.

¶12 Lastly, Mother appears to challenge the best-interest
determination by claiming that the decision infringes on Child's rights and
well-being.

¶13 Finding statutory grounds for abandonment is not enough to
assume termination is in the child's best interests. Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action
No. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5–6 (1990). The analysis focuses on whether the
termination or continuation of the parental relationship benefits or harms
the child. Jessie D., 251 Ariz. at 583, ¶ 27 (citing Alma S. v. Dep't of Child
Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149–50 ¶¶ 8, 12 (2018)). A party may establish best
interests by showing that a current placement meets the child's needs,
adoption is immediately available, or that the child is adoptable. Demetrius
L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 16 (2016) (citing Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep't of
Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379, ¶ 30 (App. 2010)). But determining that the
child is adoptable does not require finding termination is in the child's best

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Decision of the Court

interests. Lawrence R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, 587, ¶ 8 (App.
2008).

¶14 Here, Father testified that his fiancé had been acting as a
mother to Child for the past six years. They both take care of Child, take
him to school, and to sports practice. Father also testified that Child acted
out in school after calls or visits from Mother. Mother expressed concern
that the lack of a full-time relationship may have a negative impact on
Child. She also questioned Father's purported engagement and the
viability of a potential adoption by the fiancé. The court found that the
current placement provided Child with stability. The court also
acknowledged that adoption was not guaranteed but likely enough to make
Child adoptable. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4–6, ¶¶ 12, 20–21. With fiancé
having been in Child's life for six years, the court reasonably concluded it
was a "certain probability" she would adopt Child once legally able to do
so. Cf. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. at 7 (finding too speculative a mother's "just in
case" contention that she might get married, and her future husband might
wish to adopt her child). We do not reweigh the evidence. Jesus M., 203
Ariz. 282, ¶ 12. The juvenile court made reasonable findings, and Mother
has not demonstrated any abuse of its discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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