In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.C.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0030
FILED 02-18-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS22201
The Honorable Thomas Marquoit, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Aaron Cortez, Buckeye
Appellant

The Sifferman Law Firm, P.L.L.C, Phoenix
By Mark S. Sifferman
Co-Counsel for Appellee

Simpson Law Firm, P.L.L.C, Glendale
By Lisa M. Simpson
Co-Counsel for Appellee
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.C.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Angela K. Paton joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Aaron C. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to Sadie (a pseudonym) and a prior order
precluding him from participating in the termination proceedings. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 While pregnant with Sadie, Troi L. (“Mother”) decided to put
her up for adoption and contacted Agape Adoption Agency of Arizona
(“Agape”). Mother signed an affidavit identifying Father as her unborn
baby’s potential father. On January 23, 2024, Father was served with a
notice informing him that he was a potential father, pursuant to Arizona
Revised Statutes Section 8-106(G) (“potential father notice”), that an
adoption was planned, and if he wanted to withhold consent to the
adoption, he had to serve Mother with a paternity petition within 30 days.
Father was incarcerated at the time for kidnapping and firearm convictions.

¶3 Sadie was born on April 1, 2024. A few days later, Mother
consented to Sadie’s adoption. On April 9, Agape moved to terminate
Father’s parental rights, alleging that Father failed to file a paternity petition
within 30 days of being served with the Section 8-106(G) notice, a ground
for termination pursuant to Section 8-533(B)(5). On May 7, Father filed a
paternity petition.

¶4 Agape moved to dismiss Father as a party to the termination
proceeding. In response, Father argued that dismissing him would violate
his due process and equal protection rights, claiming it was difficult to file
the paternity petition in time because he was incarcerated. He argued that
he was entitled to a trial on the substantive ground for termination and best
interests. The court granted Agape’s motion, dismissing Father as a party
and precluding him from any further participation in the termination
proceedings.

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.C.
Decision of the Court

¶5 The court held a termination hearing after which it terminated
Father’s parental rights. Father appealed the order dismissing him from the
proceedings and the final termination order. We have jurisdiction. See
A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-2101(A)(1), 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Father argues that the court erred by terminating his parental
rights on the Section 8-533(B)(5) ground and precluding him from
participating in the termination hearing.

¶7 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the juvenile court
must find by clear and convincing evidence that a statutory ground for
termination exists, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B), and by a preponderance of the
evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. Brionna J. v. Dep’t
of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 477, ¶ 20 (2023). We will accept the court’s
factual findings if supported by reasonable evidence and inferences, and
we will affirm the court’s legal conclusions on the statutory ground for
termination unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 479–80, ¶¶ 31–32. We review
questions of law and statutory interpretation de novo. In re M.N., 259 Ariz.
120, 139, ¶ 15 (2025).

¶8 A potential father’s parental rights may be terminated if he
fails to file a paternity action within 30 days of being served with the
potential father notice. A.R.S § 8-533(B)(5). Once a potential father misses
that deadline, his consent to the termination is no longer required, and he
has waived his right to receive notice of any judicial hearing regarding the
termination. A.R.S. § 8-106(J).

¶9 Father does not dispute that he failed to file a paternity action
within 30 days of receiving notice that he was a potential father. Rather, he
contends that it was “impossible” for him to file the paternity action within
30 days because he was incarcerated and inmate legal services did not assist
him. He relies on Section 8-106.01(E), which excuses a putative father’s
failure to comply with the putative father requirements if doing so “was not
possible.”

¶10 Because Father received proper notice, he was a potential
father, not a putative father. See In re M.N., 259 Ariz. at 141, ¶ 23 (a putative
father has not been notified that he is a potential father and must self-
identify to receive that notice). The impossibility exception in Section 8-
106.01(E) does not apply to Section 8-106(J)’s 30-day deadline for potential
fathers. Indeed, our supreme court has held that Section 8-106(J)’s 30-day
deadline “is not subject to [any] equitable exceptions.” Cox v. Ponce, 251

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.C.
Decision of the Court

Ariz. 302, 307, ¶ 20 (2021). The court properly precluded Father from
participating in the termination proceedings despite his alleged difficulties
in meeting the 30-day deadline.

¶11 Father also argues the court violated his due process rights by
precluding him from participating in the termination hearing. A potential
father has “the right to receive notice of the adoption proceedings and to
establish his paternity.” Richard M. v. Patrick M., 248 Ariz. 492, 498, ¶ 20
(App. 2020). But a potential father only has “the right to . . . participate in
the termination” proceedings if he initiates a paternity action within 30 days
of receiving the potential father notice. Id. at ¶ 21. By failing to timely file a
paternity petition, Father waived his right to participate in the termination
hearing. The court did not deny Father due process.

¶12 Regarding the termination order, the court properly found
the Section 8-533(B)(5) ground existed because the record conclusively
established that Father failed to file a paternity action within 30 days of
being served with the potential father notice. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(5). We accept
the court’s finding that termination was in Sadie’s best interests because
Father does not challenge it on appeal. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,
196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 13 (2000). The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in terminating Father’s parental rights.

CONCLUSION

¶13 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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