In Re Term of Parental Rights as to L.H.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.H.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0032
FILED 07-24-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. S1300JD202380002
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer PC, Anthem
By Florence M. Bruemmer
Counsel for Appellant Haylie H.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Yu-Shan “Sunny” Kuo
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Riddle Law Firm, PLLC, Cave Creek
By Joy L. Riddle
Counsel for Appellee L.H.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO L.H.
Decision of the Court

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Haylie H. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s
termination of her parental rights as to L.H. (“Child”).1 For reasons that
follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In January 2023, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took
Child (born in June 2021) into care based on safety concerns stemming from
Mother’s ongoing methamphetamine abuse. The superior court found
Child dependent as to Mother, adopted a family-reunification case plan,
and placed Child with Mother’s mother (“Grandmother”). Mother’s older
daughter (“Sibling”) was also in Grandmother’s care under a permanent
guardianship that had been in place since 2020.

¶3 DCS offered Mother an array of reunification services,
including visitation and substance abuse testing and treatment, and Mother
engaged consistently and successfully in most of the services offered.
Mother participated in supervised visitation with Child throughout the
dependency, and DCS records reflect that she was prepared, attentive, and
appropriate during visits. By late 2024, Mother had three scheduled weekly
overnight visits with Child, supervised by Grandmother, plus additional
supervised time two or three other days each week when feasible. DCS
noted that Mother was “very much prepared and attentive to [Child’s]
needs and wants” during these overnight visits, and according to
Grandmother, Mother “does an incredible job . . . when she is there.”

¶4 Mother continued to struggle, however, with substance
abuse. She had a years-long history of methamphetamine use before DCS
involvement. And during the first year of the dependency, Mother missed
well over half of her required urinalysis tests and on multiple occasions
tested positive for methamphetamine.

¶5 Mother completed a three-month inpatient substance-abuse
treatment program in March 2024 and continued with follow-up outpatient
treatment. But she then relapsed, testing positive for methamphetamine
several times from July through September 2024. A few weeks later,
Mother’s outpatient treatment provider closed her case and recommended
a “higher level of care,” noting that Mother had not shown the behavioral

1 Child’s father’s parental rights were also terminated, but he is not a
party to this appeal.

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changes necessary to achieve and maintain sobriety despite months of
treatment. Around that time, Mother also expressed unwillingness to
return to residential treatment.

¶6 After Mother’s relapse, the court granted DCS’s request to
change the case plan to severance and adoption, and DCS moved to
terminate her parental rights to Child on the grounds of chronic abuse of
dangerous drugs and 15 months’ time-in-care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3),
(8)(c). Mother then filed a motion requesting that the court instead appoint
Grandmother as Child’s permanent guardian. See A.R.S. § 8-871(A).

¶7 The court held a single trial on the termination and
guardianship motions at which the DCS case manager, Mother, and
Grandmother testified. Although the court had encouraged DCS to
consider viability of a permanent guardianship, the case manager testified
that guardianship in this case would leave an element of uncertainty and
unpredictability undermining Child’s long-term stability, including a
higher risk of reentering foster care in the future. She noted that Mother
had previously stated that she wanted to dissolve Grandmother’s existing
guardianship over Sibling, but acknowledged that Mother had taken no
legal action to do so. The case manager testified that Child was in an
adoptive placement that provided a stable, drug-free home and met all
Child’s needs, and that Child was otherwise adoptable.

¶8 For her part, Mother acknowledged ongoing struggles with
methamphetamine use but highlighted the progress she had made in
treatment and her dedication to overcoming her addiction. She noted that
she had not tested positive for methamphetamine for three months
preceding the trial. But she did not deny missing several scheduled drug
tests the previous month, including one just a week before the trial. Mother
described her role in “co-parent[ing]” with Grandmother during her
frequent visits with Child and Sibling, and she emphasized her bond with
Child. She explained that establishing a guardianship would give her more
time—“a chance to be better and to show [Child that she] can be better”—
and assured the court that she would “try [her] very best” to be ready to
care for Child in the next year.

¶9 Grandmother testified as well, praising Mother’s interactions
with Child during visits and highlighting the strong bond between Mother
and Child. Grandmother agreed that she would be willing to serve as
Child’s guardian if the court opted to establish a guardianship, and that she
would likewise be willing to adopt Child if the court instead terminated
Mother’s parental rights. She clarified, however, that she contemplated the

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Decision of the Court

guardianship continuing for only one year—“at some point it needs to
end”—after which, if Mother was not yet ready to care for Child, she would
pursue an adoption. Grandmother emphasized that she would want
Mother to remain a part of Child’s life regardless of the court’s decision.

¶10 The superior court terminated Mother’s parental rights,
finding a statutory basis for termination on both grounds alleged and that
termination rather than guardianship would be in Child’s best interests.
The court noted that Child had lived with Grandmother for two years, more
than half his life, and that Mother had not made much progress in
overcoming her substance abuse issues over that time. Grandmother met
all Child’s needs and was willing to adopt him. The court concluded that
adoption would ensure Child had a stable caregiver “without the
disruption of additional litigation,” reasoning that a permanent
guardianship “is not as permanent as adoption.”

¶11 Mother timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 8-235(A). See also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 601(a), (b)(2)(F).

DISCUSSION

¶12 The superior court may terminate a parent–child relationship
if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory ground
for termination and a preponderance of the evidence shows termination to
be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210
Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). On review, we accept the court’s factual findings
if supported by reasonable evidence, giving due regard to that court’s
unique ability to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility. Brionna
J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023). We uphold the
court’s legal conclusions unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 478–79, ¶ 31.

¶13 Mother does not challenge the statutory grounds for
severance, and the record supports them. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (8)(c).
Rather, Mother asserts that the superior court erred by finding termination
to be in Child’s best interests given the availability, as an option, of a
permanent guardian.

¶14 The superior court may find termination to be in a child’s best
interests if the child would benefit from severance or be harmed by a denial
of severance. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150, ¶ 13 (2018).
The court considers the totality of the circumstances, including prospects
for adoption, whether the placement is meeting the child’s needs, and the
parent’s rehabilitative efforts. Id. at 148, 150–51, ¶¶ 1, 13; Demetrius L. v.
Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3–4, ¶ 12 (2016). Stability and security for the child

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are primary considerations. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15. In assessing
the viability of a permanent guardianship, the court considers both whether
the prospective guardianship is in the child’s best interests and the inverse
of the § 8-533(B) best-interests inquiry: whether “termination of parental
rights would not be in the child’s best interests.” A.R.S. § 8-871(A)(4)
(emphasis added); cf. Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 478, ¶
34 (2022) (noting the interplay of termination considerations with the
guardianship-focused best-interests inquiry).

¶15 Here, although Mother views the evidence differently, the
record supports the superior court’s best-interests findings and assessment.
The court found, and the record supports, that Child, then less than four
years old, had been living more than half his life in a familial placement that
met all his needs, that Grandmother was willing to adopt him, and that
Child was otherwise adoptable, all facts showing a potential benefit from
termination. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 12.

¶16 The court also considered Mother’s rehabilitative track record
over the two-year dependency. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 15. Although
Mother characterizes this as “significant progress, even though it was not
perfect,” the superior court could reasonably find her progress to be
insufficient to defeat a best-interests finding for termination given she
relapsed, using methamphetamine, about 18 months into a two-year
dependency. We do not reweigh the evidence on appeal. See id. at ¶ 18.

¶17 Mother further asserts that the court failed to consider her
bond with Child and her positive parenting interactions with him during
her frequent visits. But there is no indication that the superior court failed
to consider Mother’s relationship with Child, just that it gave more weight
to other factors. See also Dominique M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96,
98–99, ¶ 12 (App. 2016) (existence of bond not alone dispositive of best
interests).

¶18 Finally, Mother argues that a prospective permanent
guardianship means Child would derive no benefit from termination.
Potential for a permanent guardianship as an alternative to termination is
certainly a relevant consideration—one that the superior court here
addressed directly. But availability of a potential guardian, while relevant,
is not dispositive; instead, the court must assess which path, guardianship
or termination, would be in the child’s best interests under the unique
circumstances of each case. See A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B), -871(A), (A)(4).

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Decision of the Court

¶19 Although Mother faults the court’s characterization of
guardianship as “not as permanent” as adoption, the record here supports
that characterization. Grandmother expressed willingness to serve as
Child’s guardian—but only for another year. Child would then face the
disruption and uncertainty of renewed litigation seeking severance if
Mother was not then able to parent, rather than the security and stability of
an adoption by Grandmother. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15. Even if
the superior court could reasonably have come to a different conclusion, as
in the unpublished decision on which Mother relies, see Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec. v. William T., 1 CA-JV 06-0204, 2007 WL 5494598, at *5–6, ¶¶ 25–30 (Ariz.
App. Sept. 4, 2007) (mem. decision), the record nevertheless supports the
court’s ruling that termination (with Grandmother ready to adopt) and not
guardianship was in Child’s best interests. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶
18 (appellate court does not reweigh superior court’s resolution of even
“sharply disputed” facts).

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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