In RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.L.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO
N.L., A.L., F.L., M.S., and D.L.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0048
FILED 12-10-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD28652
JS22606
The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Ingeet P. Pandya
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

John L. Popilek, PC., Scottsdale
By John L. Popilek
Counsel for Appellant Tiffany O.

Maricopa County Legal Advocate’s Office, Phoenix
By Amanda L. Adams
Counsel for Child
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David B. Gass delivered the decision of the court, in which
Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

G A S S, Judge:

¶1 Mother appeals the superior court’s order terminating her
parental rights to her 5 children. Both fathers are not parties to this appeal.
Because reasonable evidence supports the order, the court affirms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The court views the evidence and draws all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to sustaining the superior court’s
decision. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 282 ¶ 13 (App.
2002).

¶3 In 2015, the Department of Child Safety filed the first
dependency against mother. On the Department’s motion, the superior
court dismissed that dependency after mother had shown an ability to
maintain a safe environment for her children and avoided engaging in
domestic violence. Over the next 9 years, the Department received several
reports of domestic violence and physical discipline in the home. The
record does not show what action the Department took on those reports
before this case.

¶4 In 2024—9 years later—this case began. At that point, mother
had 5 children, ranging in age from 2 to 11. Two of the middle children told
a neighbor about mother physically disciplining them and leaving red, J-
shaped marks. The neighbor filed a report with the Department. The
Department forensically interviewed the children. Phoenix Children’s
Hospital’s Child Protection Team physically examined the children and
confirmed the marks resulted from physical discipline.

¶5 Based on the above, the Department removed all 5 children
from mother’s care. The Department placed the 2 oldest children in a
licensed foster care and placed the 3 youngest children in a Division of
Developmental Disabilities-licensed foster home. The Department filed a
dependency petition alleging neglect and domestic violence. Following an

2
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

adjudication, the superior court found the children dependent and entered
a case plan of termination and adoption.

¶6 Though the case began because 2 children had “bruising,
welts[,] and cuts” on their bodies, the evidence of neglect and willful abuse
grew. The children corroborated mother’s mistreatment. Mother hit the
children. Mother grabbed at least 1 child by the hair and repeatedly hit that
child’s head against the wall. Mother physically disciplined the children
using cords and other instruments. She would have them lay down with
their face in a pillow, sit on top of them, and hit them with various
instruments in a punishment the children called drowning. Mother also
neglected the children’s medical, educational, and basic needs, including
access to food. For example, the youngest child was found wearing a urine-
soaked diaper while sitting in a urine-soaked playpen. As another example,
mother disregarded the oldest child’s education. The oldest was 11 when
the Department took the children into care, but that child had not attended
school since mother removed him from kindergarten. All the children
expressed fear of even being in mother’s presence because of the long
history of abuse and willful neglect.

¶7 To mother’s credit, she participated in all services the
Department offered her, including random drug testing, drug
rehabilitation, a psychological evaluation, and individualized counseling
with a domestic violence component. Because of the history of neglect and
willful abuse and because of the children’s resistance, the Department did
not set up visits at first. The Department later moved to have the superior
court enter an order suspending all visits, including clinical visits. The
superior court granted the motion and suspended all visits. During that
same timeframe, the Department moved to terminate mother’s rights,
alleging neglect and willful abuse.

¶8 Seven months into the case, the superior court held the
termination adjudication and granted the Department’s motion on neglect
and willful abuse grounds. The superior court found mother and one of the
fathers each neglected and willfully abused the children, each parent knew
“the other parent was abusing and neglecting the children[,] and each
parent failed to take action to protect the children from the other parent.”

¶9 The court has jurisdiction over mother’s timely appeal under
Article VI, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A,
12-120.21, and 12-2101.A.1.

3
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶10 Parental rights are fundamental, but not absolute. Dominique
M. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 97 ¶ 7 (App. 2016). The superior court
may terminate a parent’s right to the care, custody and management of their
children “if it finds clear and convincing evidence of one of the statutory
grounds for severance, and also finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that severance is in the best interests of the children.” Id. at 98 ¶ 7. In making
its decision, the superior court “must consider the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether the Department has made
diligent efforts.” In re J.C., 259 Ariz. 60, 69 ¶ 39 (App. 2024), review denied
(Apr. 1, 2025) (cleaned up).

¶11 The court conducts a clear-error review of the superior
“court’s legal conclusion that a statutory ground for termination has been
proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 68 ¶ 34 (quoting Brionna J.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 481 ¶ 46 (2023)). Under that approach,
the court must affirm the superior court’s ruling unless the “court
determines as ‘a matter of law that no one could reasonably find the
evidence to be clear and convincing.’” Id. (quoting Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at
481 ¶ 46 (2023)). “Because the superior court is in the best position to
evaluate the testimony, this court will not reweigh the evidence.” Id. (citing
Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 2009)).

¶12 The superior court may terminate parental rights if “the
parent has neglected or willfully abused a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533.B.2. Neglect
means “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent, guardian or custodian
of a child to provide that child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter or
medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes substantial risk of
harm to the child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201.25(a); E.R. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 59 ¶ 13 (App. 2015). Abuse includes “serious
physical or emotional injury or situations in which the parent knew or
reasonably should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting a
child.” A.R.S § 8-533.B.2; E.R., 237 Ariz. at 59 ¶ 11 (App. 2015). Abuse is not
limited to serious physical or emotional injury. See E.R., 237 Ariz. at 59 ¶ 12.
It also can include inflicting or allowing another to inflict physical injury.
Id. at 59 ¶ 12–15 (citing A.R.S. § 8-533.B.2); see also A.R.S. § 8-201.2(b)
(interpreting subsection 8-533.B.2’s language of the term “includes” to
mean an enlargement, so abuse can be other conduct than serious physical
or emotional injury).

4
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

I. The superior court did not clearly err when it suspended mother’s
parental visits with children.

¶13 Mother argues the Department did not provide sufficient
reunification services because she had no visits with the children during the
7 months the case was pending. The Department argues it need not provide
services because it sought to terminate mother’s rights based on neglect and
willful abuse. The court need not address the Department’s argument
because the Department provided services and the superior court
considered mother’s participation. See Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245
Ariz. 146, 151 ¶ 18 (2018); see also In re M.P., __ Ariz. __, __ ¶ 29 573 P.3d
564, 573 (App. 2025), review granted (Nov. 4, 2025) (holding superior court
erred because it did not consider the parent’s participation in services when
it terminated the parent’s rights under the neglect and willful abuse
ground). Mother challenges the weight the superior court gave that
evidence, but her challenge does not support reversal.

¶14 The superior court “may properly restrict or terminate a
parent’s visitation rights . . . if visitation endangers the child.” Michael M. v.
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 198, 201 ¶ 11 (App. 2002). But the superior
court should deny a parent “the right of visitation only under extraordinary
circumstances.” In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JD-5312, 178 Ariz. 372,
375 (App. 1994).

¶15 Three months into the case and based on the Department’s
motion to suspend visits, the superior court found visits would significantly
endanger the children’s mental, physical, and emotional health. Beyond the
evidence of neglect and willful abuse as discussed in paragraph 6, all the
children expressed fear of even being in mother’s presence because of the
long history of neglect and willful abuse. The superior court then
suspended all visits between mother and the children.

¶16 Based on the nature of mother’s neglect and willful abuse, the
superior court did not clearly err when it found extraordinary
circumstances warranted suspending mother’s visits. Even assuming the
Department had to provide services, the superior court’s decision to deny
mother visits comports with Arizona precedent.

II. The superior court did not clearly err when it terminated mother’s
rights just as she was about to start more reunification services.

¶17 Mother argues the Department and the superior court should
have given her more time before seeking to terminate her rights because
“critical services were on the horizon,” implying she was on the path of

5
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

improvement. Mother points to the Department psychologist’s evaluation
to determine what services mother needed and made recommendations to
the Department as evidence of her next steps to improvement.

¶18 Even if the court assumes the superior court must consider
that evidence, just because a parent shows some improvement, the superior
court need not find the parent will be effective in the near future. In re
Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994)
(“[l]eaving the window open indefinitely is not necessary, nor do we think
that it is in the child’s or the parent’s best interests.”) (citation omitted). The
superior court thus need not leave the reunification window open
indefinitely. Id.

¶19 The superior court is not bound to follow the Department
psychologist’s recommendations. See Matter of Pima Cnty. Juv. Action No.
53358-6, 126 Ariz. 417, 417–18 (App. 1980). And the superior court did not
find mother credible when she said she would stop using physical
discipline and would meet the children’s needs so they would grow and
develop. After the superior court weighed the psychologist’s report and
mother’s testimony, it rejected mother’s pleas for more time. The superior
court found the Department made adequate efforts, but mother continued
to lack insight and awareness of the severity of her neglect and willful
abuse, which has affected the children.

¶20 Mother also makes a cursory argument asking the court to
reverse because as a child, mother was the victim of neglect and willful
abuse. In 2 paragraphs of the opening brief, mother highlights the
psychologist’s recommendations about addressing her own childhood
trauma. But the psychologist also said mother had to address that trauma
to understand how it affects her parenting. Even though mother had not
even begun dealing with her own trauma, mother asked the superior court
to give her more time. The superior court did not clearly err when it rejected
mother’s request and terminated her rights despite her difficult childhood.

¶21 The court declines mother’s invitation to reweigh that
evidence. Though mother’s efforts are commendable, they are not enough
for purposes of this termination action.

6
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO N.L., et al.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶22 The court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

7