In Re Term of Parental Rights as to V.M. and P.M.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO
V.M. and P.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0053
FILED 11-21-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JS520550
The Honorable Thomas Marquoit, Judge, Pro Tempore

REVERSED

COUNSEL

Tiffany & Bosco PA, Phoenix
By Kelly Mendoza
Counsel for Appellant
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO V.M. and P.M.
Opinion of the Court

OPINION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 This case calls upon us to clarify the analysis for terminating
parental rights. Olivia K. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s denial of
her petition to terminate the parental rights of Keith M. (“Father”) for their
two children in common.

¶2 The juvenile court erred by failing to make a definitive finding
that grounds for termination existed before analyzing whether termination
was in the best interests of the children, but we conclude that this record
nevertheless establishes Father’s abandonment. We also conclude that
under circumstances such as these, a respondent parent’s consent to the
other parent’s petition for termination is evidence that termination is in the
child’s best interests.

¶3 Because the record establishes that Father presumptively
abandoned the children and because the court erred in finding that
termination was not in the best interests of the children, we reverse the
court’s denial and order Father’s parental rights terminated.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶4 Mother and Father have two children in common, born in
2015 and 2016. The children have lived exclusively with Mother since the
parties separated in 2020. When the parties divorced in 2021, they agreed
Mother would be the primary residential parent with sole legal decision-
making authority and Father would pay no child support. Father had
limited contact with the children after August 2020, and no contact or
attempts to contact since April 2022.

¶5 Mother filed the petition to terminate Father’s parental rights
in January 2025. After Mother filed the petition, the court appointed counsel
for the children and set a date for the Initial Severance Hearing. Soon after,
Father was served with the petition, the notice of appointment of counsel
for the children, the notice of hearing on Mother’s petition, and the court’s
order setting the initial hearing on Mother’s petition. Two days later, Father
signed a notarized consent to terminate his parental rights, stating he

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Opinion of the Court

agreed to “relinquish and give up all [his] rights to the care, custody and
control” of his children, and “will no longer have any legal rights,
privileges, duties and obligations, including the right to custody[.]” Father
further acknowledged “[he] will no longer be the children’s parent” and he
waived any “notices and appearances to any and all future hearings or
proceedings” regarding the termination action. Mother filed Father’s
consent with the court over a month before the hearing. Father failed to
appear at the initial termination hearing, despite receiving notice, which
was consistent with his waiver and consent to termination.

¶6 Mother testified at the hearing. She established paternity
using the children’s birth certificates. She testified that she had sufficient
means with which to support the children without contribution from Father
and was not seeking any child support. She also testified about Father’s
abandonment, the children’s wellbeing, and Father’s consent to
termination.

¶7 The children’s counsel avowed to the court that the children
understood the situation, have not had contact with Father, are doing well,
and “would really like to change their last name to reflect that of Mother’s.”
Counsel noted the children supported termination of Father’s parental
rights. Father did not have counsel at the hearing but previously
acknowledged he was unrepresented and understood he “ha[d] the
opportunity to review [his] rights with counsel” before signing the consent
to terminate his parental rights.

¶8 After considering the petition, testimony presented at the
hearing, and the record, the court denied Mother’s petition, finding she had
not satisfied the best-interests requirement of Arizona Revised Statutes
(“A.R.S.”) Section 8-533(B). Mother appealed, and we have jurisdiction
under A.R.S. Sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

¶9 We will “affirm a termination order unless the juvenile court
abuses its discretion or the court’s findings are not supported by reasonable
evidence.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022).
In conducting that review, the juvenile court’s factual findings “will be
accepted ‘if reasonable evidence and inferences support them.’” Brionna J.
v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023) (quoting Jessie D. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 580 ¶ 10 (2021)). The court abuses its
discretion when it commits an error of law or when the record is “devoid

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Opinion of the Court

of competent evidence to support” its decision. Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz.
529, 531 ¶ 5 (App. 2019) (quoting Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518, 520 ¶ 5 (1999)).

II. Definitive Findings

¶10 To terminate parental rights, the court must follow a two-
step, sequential process. See In re B.W., ___ Ariz. ___, ___, 572 P.3d 88, 94
¶ 13 (2025) (explaining the “two-step analysis in determining whether to
terminate a parent-child relationship” consists of “[f]irst,” deciding
whether sufficient evidence supports at least one ground for termination
and then “[s]econd,” determining whether termination is in the child’s best
interests); In re E.C., ___, Ariz. ___, ___, 1 CA-JV 24-0203, 2025 WL 2810785,
at *3 ¶¶ 18–19 (Ariz. App. Oct. 3, 2025) (“[T]he test is a sequential one,
requiring the superior court find a statutory ground before it addresses best
interests, even when declining to terminate parental rights.”). In this two-
step process, the juvenile court must first find at least one ground for
termination under A.R.S. Section 8-533(B) by clear and convincing
evidence, and must then find that termination would be in the child’s best
interests by a preponderance of the evidence. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 477
¶ 20.

¶11 To satisfy the first step, the court must make an express,
written finding as to whether grounds for termination have been
established by clear and convincing evidence. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 539 ¶ 20 (App. 2018) (holding juvenile court must make
written findings as to ultimate facts supporting its legal conclusion
regarding termination). The words “presumably” and “arguably” are
equivocal and do not meet that burden of proof; either the court finds
grounds for termination exist by clear and convincing evidence or it does
not. We clarify that failure to make a definitive finding constitutes error.

¶12 Here, the court ruled that “[Mother] has arguably proven that
father has abandoned the child . . . .” (Emphasis added). Use of the word
“arguably” does not constitute a finding that Mother established the
ground of abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the court
erred by failing to make a definitive finding as to a statutory ground for
termination before moving to its best-interests analysis. See In re E.C., ___
Ariz. ___, ___, 1 CA-JV 24-0203, at *3 ¶¶ 18–19 (“Only after fully
understanding the [statutory] ground [for termination] can the superior
court accurately assess and consider the negative effect on a child of the
continued presence of a statutory ground in a totality of the
circumstances.”) (emphasis added) (citation modified).

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Opinion of the Court

III. Termination Grounds Established

¶13 Despite the court’s ambiguous finding, it went on to conduct
a best-interests analysis and concluded terminating Father’s parental rights
was not in the children’s best interests. And yet, this record shows Father’s
abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. Arizona law provides that
abandonment of one’s child constitutes sufficient grounds on which to
grant a petition for termination of parental rights. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1).
Abandonment is defined as:

the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to
maintain regular contact with the child, including providing
normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding
that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and
communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal
parental relationship with the child without just cause for a
period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of
abandonment.

A.R.S. § 8-531(1); see also In re B.W., 572 P.3d at 94–95 ¶¶ 17–18 (clarifying
that the phrase “prima facie evidence,” as used in A.R.S. § 8-531(1), equates
to a presumption of abandonment). This presumption may be rebutted by
a showing of just cause or presenting otherwise contradicting evidence of a
normal parental relationship. In re B.W., 572 P.3d at 95 ¶ 19.

¶14 At the termination hearing, Mother testified that Father has
not contacted or attempted to contact the children for over two years. That
absence triggers a presumption of Father’s abandonment. And the court
received no contradictory evidence to rebut the presumption. Thus, with
the presumption standing, Mother has conclusively established grounds to
terminate Father’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence.

IV. Best-Interests Finding

¶15 Along with a statutory ground proven by clear and
convincing evidence, to terminate a party’s parental rights, the court must
also find that the party seeking termination has shown by a preponderance
of the evidence that termination would be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S.
§ 8-533(B); In re C.R., 256 Ariz. 170, 175 ¶¶ 23–24 (App. 2023). This analysis
centers on the child, and “[t]o this end, we have held that termination is in
the child’s best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance;
or (2) the child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018).

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Opinion of the Court

¶16 Here, the court found that Mother did not show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that termination would be in the children’s
best interests. We disagree. Mother introduced competent, non-speculative,
and uncontroverted evidence that termination is in the best interests of the
children. Further, the record is devoid of any competent evidence to
support the court’s finding to the contrary. Woyton, 247 Ariz. at 531 ¶ 5.

¶17 The court found “there was no evidence to indicate why the
children would suffer a detriment if the petition at bar were denied[,]” but
that finding overlooks Mother’s testimony. Specifically, Mother testified
that the children have been adversely impacted by Father’s abandonment,
they are participating in therapy to cope with and process their feelings
over Father’s rejection, and if the parent-child relationship were terminated
with Father, the children would be relieved of ongoing uncertainty that
Father may step back into their lives. Mother also testified that the children
are not equipped to handle any sudden reappearance by Father in their
lives, and the children feared that if Mother became ill or died, the children
would be placed with Father. The court characterized this fear as
speculative, citing the absence of evidence that Mother was ill or soon to
die. But the testimony shows that the uncertainty created by Father’s
continued parental rights is presently traumatizing the children. Though
Father’s reappearance in the children’s lives was not imminent or certain,
the children’s fear of that possibility was not speculative or distant. Indeed,
Mother’s testimony was that the children remain in therapy to address that
very trauma, at least in part. The record contains no evidence to the
contrary.

¶18 Moreover, in his consent, Father agreed to give up all parental
rights to the children and indicated his unwillingness to be a parent or to
provide support for them. Mother initiated termination because of Father’s
abandonment. Father’s intent to perpetuate that abandonment is manifest
through his consent to termination. Compelling continuation of the
undesired parent-child relationship under such circumstances must
necessarily have an adverse and detrimental impact on the children. Thus,
we hold that where grounds for termination have been established and a
respondent parent has voluntarily signed a consent to terminate his
parental rights, such a consent is itself evidence that termination is in the
children’s best interests.

¶19 Given both Father’s consent and Mother’s testimony, neither
of which were rebutted or otherwise contradicted, a preponderance of the
evidence establishes that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the
children’s best interests. Moreover, no reasonable evidence supports the

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Opinion of the Court

court’s conclusion that it is in the children’s best interests to preserve
Father’s parental rights. Woyton, 247 Ariz. at 531 ¶ 5.

¶20 In view of our holdings, Mother has established both: (1)
grounds for termination; and (2) that failing to terminate Father’s parental
rights would be detrimental to the children’s best interests. Thus, there are
no contested facts at issue, no further evidence to be heard, and nothing
further to consider. In re C.E., ___ Ariz. ___, ____, 573 P.3d 101, 106 ¶ 25
(App. 2025). Accordingly, we reverse and order Father’s parental rights
terminated. See A.R.S. § 12-2103(A) (An appellate court “may . . . reverse
or modify a judgment or order appealed from, and may render such
judgment or order as the court below should have rendered . . . .”); see also
Acuna v. Kroack, 212 Ariz. 104, 115 ¶ 42 n.15 (App. 2006) (noting that even
though A.R.S. § 12-2103(A) pertains to the supreme court, the statute
“presumably applies as well to the court of appeals inasmuch as the statute
was enacted long before the creation of this court.”).

CONCLUSION

¶21 We reverse and terminate Father’s parental rights to the
children.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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