In Re Term of Parental Rights as to R.M. and B.M.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.M. and B.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0055
FILED 11-28-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD532070
The Honorable Jay M. Polk, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley
By David W. Bell
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Autumn Spritzer
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.M. and B.M.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Liza W. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court order
terminating her parental rights. She argues that insufficient evidence
supported the statutory termination grounds and that the court did not
consider the totality of the circumstances in its best-interests finding.
Because reasonable evidence supported at least one of the statutory
grounds and the best-interests finding, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother is the parent of Ruby (a pseudonym), born in 2018,
and Bryce (also a pseudonym), born in 2023.

¶3 In 2018, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) filed a
dependency alleging Ruby was dependent because of Mother’s substance
abuse and her history of domestic violence with the children’s father
(“Father”).1 In August 2021, the court dismissed the dependency at DCS’s
request after the reunification of Mother and Ruby.

¶4 One and a half years later, Mother gave birth to Bryce. Bryce
was born substance exposed. The next month, Mother tested positive for
fentanyl and THC. In May 2023, DCS filed a dependency alleging that Ruby
and Bryce were dependent due to neglect, substance abuse, and domestic
violence.

¶5 Mother did not keep DCS advised of her whereabouts during
much of the dependency, and by August 2024, Mother had not completed
any of the reunification services DCS provided and was still using fentanyl.
DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights, and the juvenile court
held a contested severance hearing in February and March 2025. Mother

1 Father’s rights were also terminated, but he is not a party to this
appeal.

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testified that, as of the hearing, she was four months sober from fentanyl,
recently employed, and had a protective order against Father.

¶6 Despite Mother’s recent efforts, the juvenile court found that
DCS had proven, by clear and convincing evidence, two statutory grounds
for termination under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533:
substance abuse under subsection (B)(3) and fifteen months of time-in-care
under subsection (B)(8)(c). The court also found that termination was in the
children’s best interests. Mother appealed. We have jurisdiction under
Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A),
12-120.21(A)(1), and 12-2101(A)(1).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 “The juvenile court, as the trier of fact in a termination
proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the
parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.”
Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 376, ¶ 13 (App. 2010)
(quotation omitted). On appeal, we review the juvenile court’s factual
findings for clear error. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence or redetermine
the credibility of witnesses, Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146,
151-52, ¶¶ 18-19 (2018), and we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to affirming the juvenile court’s decision, Raymond F., 245 Ariz. at
376, ¶ 13. To terminate a parent’s rights, DCS must prove one of the
statutory grounds found under A.R.S. § 8-533 and that termination is in the
child’s best interests. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 149-50, ¶ 8. Proof of the
statutory ground must be by clear and convincing evidence, but the court
needs only to find termination in the child’s best interests by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id.

¶8 Mother challenges the court’s ruling on the statutory findings
on factual and legal grounds. Because we conclude that the court did not
err by terminating Mother’s parental rights under A.R.S. § 8-533(8)(c), we
do not address the other statutory ground for termination. See Raymond F.,
224 Ariz. at 376, ¶ 14 (“[W]e will affirm the termination if any one of the
statutory grounds is proven and if the termination is in the best interest of
the children.”).

DISCUSSION

¶9 “Parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care,
custody, and management of their children.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz.
279, 284, ¶ 24 (2005); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (A
parent’s fundamental rights in the care, custody, and management of their

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child do not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents
or have lost temporary custody.). But while fundamental, these rights are
not absolute, Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 24, and may be terminated in
extraordinary circumstances, when all other efforts to preserve the
relationship fail, see In re Cochise County Juv. No. 566-J, 133 Ariz. 157, 159
(1982).

A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err by Finding 15 Months of
Time-in-Placement as Grounds for Termination.

¶10 The 15-month ground for termination serves as a proxy for
parental unfitness, as it shows a parent’s inability to care for his or her child
properly. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 10. Section 8-533(B)(8)(c) requires clear
and convincing evidence that “(1) [the children] had been in court-ordered
out-of-home placement for at least fifteen months; (2) DCS made a ‘diligent
effort to provide appropriate reunification services’; but despite that effort,
(3) [the parent] had been unable to remedy the circumstance causing . . .
court-ordered out-of-home care; and (4) there was ‘a substantial likelihood
that [the parent would] not be capable of exercising proper and effective
parental care and control in the near future.’” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 247 Ariz. 9, 17, ¶ 25 (App. 2019) (quoting A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c)).

¶11 Here, the circumstances causing the court-ordered
out-of-home care were neglect (inability to provide for the children’s basic
needs), substance abuse, and domestic violence. The dependency petition
stated, “Mother is unable and/or unwilling and/or has failed to provide
for the children’s basic necessities, such as supervision, food, clothing,
shelter, financial support, and/or medical care, which places and/or has
placed the children at an unreasonable risk of harm. Mother has not
maintained consistent contact with the newborn [Bryce]. Mother has not
had contact with DCS since May 9, 2023.” As to substance abuse, the
dependency petition noted that Bryce was born substance-exposed and that
Mother had recently tested positive for fentanyl and THC.

¶12 As for domestic violence, the court wrote that Mother could
not safely parent because Father had a history of perpetrating domestic
violence against Mother, at times in front of the children, and that while she
had a protective order against Father, she had not served it on him. The
evidence supports each of the court’s conclusions.

1. 15 Months

¶13 The dependency was filed on May 18, 2023, three days after
the children were taken into custody, and DCS moved for termination

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almost exactly 15 months later, on August 20, 2024. The child was in a
court-ordered out-of-care placement for the requisite period.

2. Diligent Efforts to Provide Reunification Services

¶14 Mother argues DCS never provided her with domestic
violence therapy. DCS must make diligent efforts to provide appropriate
reunification services before terminating parental rights after 15 months in
care. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). In offering reunification services, DCS must
consider the conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement and
provide services that have a “reasonable prospect of success” in remedying
those circumstances. Donald W., 247 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 50. Additionally, DCS
must maintain consistent contact with the parent and make reasonable
efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult. Id.
The court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining
whether DCS has made diligent efforts to provide the services. In re J.C., 259
Ariz. 60, 69, ¶ 39 (App. 2024). Here, the court found “over the course of the
. . . dependency . . . DCS has made reasonable and diligent efforts to
effectuate reunification of the Children with . . . [Mother].”

¶15 DCS offered Mother services related to each circumstance that
led to the out-of-home placement. To address her substance abuse issues,
DCS offered Mother drug testing and substance abuse treatment. DCS also
offered parenting education and support through the Nurturing Parent
Program, a skills-based program.

¶16 Mother argues that the DCS caseworker never referred
Mother for domestic violence therapy. While DCS needs to make diligent
efforts to provide reunification services, it “is not required to provide every
conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it
offers.” Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App.
1994). Mother never objected to the lack of domestic violence therapy, so
she waived the right to argue for the first time on appeal that DCS failed to
offer appropriate reunification services. Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 18 (App. 2014). In any event, while Mother may
not have received domestic violence therapy, she was referred to Family
Connections, which offered domestic violence services.

¶17 DCS also made diligent efforts to maintain consistent
communication with Mother. At various points during the dependency,
Mother’s whereabouts were unknown, and DCS made several efforts to
locate and contact her to continue its reunification efforts. Finally,

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throughout the dependency, Mother was offered supervised visitation with
the children, though her attendance was inconsistent.

¶18 By the termination hearing, Mother had completed none of
the services offered. The juvenile court discussed these services and
Mother’s failure to complete them and found that DCS had made diligent
reunification efforts. The juvenile court’s finding that DCS made diligent
efforts is supported by reasonable evidence.

3. Unable to Remedy the Circumstances

¶19 DCS must provide the parent with the time and opportunity
to participate in services designed to improve the parent’s ability to care for
the child. Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192, ¶¶ 34,
37 (App. 1999). Such services provide DCS with a means to evaluate a
parent’s progress in remedying the circumstances that caused the child to
be in DCS’s care. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 96, ¶ 31,
(App. 2009). Mother argues that she remedied the circumstances that led to
the out-of-home placement by the time of the termination hearing, and
therefore, the court lacked an adequate legal basis to terminate her rights.
We disagree.

¶20 The court must base its fact-finding on “those circumstances
existing at the time of the severance that prevent a parent from being able
to appropriately provide for his or her children.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 326, 330, ¶ 22 (App. 2007) (quotation omitted). But DCS
need not keep the remediation opportunity open indefinitely, and efforts
made too late may still result in severance. In re Maricopa County Juv. Action
No. JS-501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 577 (App. 1994). The record supports the
court’s finding that the concerns causing the out-of-home placement
persisted at the time of the termination.

¶21 The juvenile court determined that Mother “still does not
have the ability to provide for the Children’s basic needs.” Throughout the
dependency, Mother was out of communication with DCS and missed
several of her scheduled supervised visits. She testified that she did not
obtain gainful employment for at least one and a half years of the
dependency and only secured steady employment a month before the
termination hearing. Mother argues that the law does not consider her
ineligible to meet her children’s needs just because she receives State
benefits. But her argument here is misplaced, because she also testified that
her food stamps were cut off in January 2025, and thus such assistance
could not support the children’s needs.

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¶22 As for domestic violence, the juvenile court found that
Mother had not participated in any domestic violence services and
therefore had not remedied the concerns causing out-of-home care. Mother
argues that the caseworker testified that Mother was never offered
domestic violence counseling. But the caseworker addressed domestic
violence with Mother’s Family Connections coordinator, a program that
Mother failed to complete. And while Mother eventually served her
protective order against Father, this did not resolve DCS’s concerns,
because parents may (and often do) reconcile, given their history.

¶23 As for Mother’s substance abuse, at the termination hearing,
she was five months sober from fentanyl but not THC. The juvenile court
found, when weighed against her extensive substance abuse history and
multiple failed attempts at sobriety, her current sobriety was “insufficient
to show that she ha[d] remedied concerns regarding her substance abuse.”
Mother argues that the court’s concerns were not an adequate legal basis
when the record showed current sobriety. But the court made its finding
after weighing her history of drug use against her current sobriety. See JS-
501568, 177 Ariz. at 577 (Successful efforts at recovery made too late may
still result in severance.). As commendable as Mother’s sobriety may be,
this court does not reweigh the evidence, as that is the exclusive domain of
the juvenile court. See Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Matthew L., 223 Ariz. 547,
549, ¶ 7 (App. 2010) (We will not disturb the juvenile court’s orders if they
are supported by reasonable evidence.).

¶24 Finally, while Mother argues that she has remedied the
circumstances that led to the children being taken into care, she does not
address her failure to complete any of the services offered to her during the
15 months her children were in DCS’s care. Mother’s efforts from the fall of
2024 to the 2025 hearing are not enough to overcome her lack of
engagement over the previous 15 months. See In re Z.L., 256 Ariz. 138, 144,
¶ 24 (App. 2023) (Failure to attend visits or participate consistently in
services makes the chances of rehabilitation low.). The evidence supports
the juvenile court’s findings.

4. Likelihood the Parent Will Not Be Able to Parent in the
Near Future

¶25 Mother argues that the record supports her ability to
“immediately parent her children.” Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), DCS must
prove “there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable
of exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near
future.” The juvenile court found it was “substantially likely that . . .

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[Mother] will [not] be capable of exercising proper and effective care in the
near future.” The record supports this finding, as the caseworker testified
that she estimated the earliest Mother could reunify with the children
would be a year. The caseworker based this estimate on how long it would
take Mother to complete services, followed by an implementation period
supervised by DCS. We find no error.

¶26 The juvenile court’s finding of 15 months’ out-of-home
placement as a ground for termination was supported by reasonable
evidence and Mother has shown no error.

B. The Court’s Best-Interests Inquiry Properly Considered the
Totality of the Circumstances.

¶27 Mother also challenges the juvenile court’s best-interests
findings. After the court finds a parent unfit, “the focus shifts to the interests
of the child as distinct from those of the parent.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150,
¶ 12 (quotation omitted). The child’s stability and security must be the
court’s primary concern. Id. “[T]ermination is in the child’s best interests if
either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) the child will be
harmed if severance is denied.” Id. at ¶ 13. And it is well-established in
State-initiated cases that the child’s prospective adoption may serve a
benefit supporting a best-interests determination, Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn
F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4, ¶ 12 (2016), so long as the court considers the totality of
the circumstances existing at the time of the severance, Alma S., 245 Ariz. at
150-51, ¶ 13.

¶28 Mother argues the court’s best-interests findings were flawed
because it “mistakenly believed that Mother was required to independently
meet all the financial and housing obligations needed to care for her
children.” Mother mischaracterizes the court’s findings. The court did not
find that Mother could not meet the children’s needs because she received
aid from her parents and government-assisted care to provide for them.
Instead, it found that, even accounting for these forms of support, Mother
could not reliably meet her children’s needs. The court determined that
Mother only had gainful employment for less than a month before the
hearing and noted “she had been receiving food stamps, but they were ‘cut
off’ in January 2025.”

¶29 As to assistance from her parents, the court wrote that Mother
had lived with them “on and off forever,” and that she did not pay rent.
The court must consider the totality of the circumstances, and Mother’s

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reliance on outside aid may factor into that analysis. See Alma S., 245 Ariz.
at 150-51, ¶ 13.

¶30 The court also found Bryce had been in out-of-home care for
all but the first month-and-a-half of his life, and that his bond with the
placement was an “equally strong bond, if not a stronger one.” As for Ruby,
the court noted that she had lived in the placement for more than half her
life and called it home. Because the placement was meeting the children’s
needs and adoption was legally possible and likely, the court found that
termination was in the children’s best interests. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz.
at 4, ¶ 12; see also Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 350,
¶ 23 (App. 2013). The record contains reasonable evidence supporting the
court’s best-interests finding. See Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 6, ¶ 21.

CONCLUSION

¶31 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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