In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to S.M.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0056
FILED 11-14-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD41336
The Honorable Michael Rassas, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Che’Neal W., Buckeye
Appellant Pro Se

Law Office of Ed Johnson, PLLC, Phoenix
By Edward D. Johnson
Advisory Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
By Veronica F. Rios
Counsel for Appellee DCS

Roland Arroyo Attorney at Law, Waddell
By Roland Arroyo
Co-Counsel for Appellee Child

Pamela Saint Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Pamela G. Saint
Co-Counsel for Appellee Child
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Che’Neal W. (“Mother”) challenges the juvenile court’s
termination of parental rights as to S.M. For the following reasons, this
Court affirms.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 This Court views the facts “in a light most favorable to
sustaining the juvenile court’s findings.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239
Ariz. 1, 2, ¶ 2 (2016).

¶3 Mother is the parent of S.M., born in May 2020. In September
2021, Mother was unemployed and living with Marlo B. (“Boyfriend”), who
stabbed her thirteen times in front of S.M. After the stabbing, Mother fled
Boyfriend’s apartment to a hospital and a neighbor found S.M. crying at the
scene. Based on these events, the Department of Child Safety
(“Department”) took emergency custody of S.M. and placed him with his
maternal grandmother. After identifying safety concerns with the maternal
grandparents, the Department moved S.M. to an out-of-home placement.

¶4 The Department filed a dependency petition based on neglect
in October 2021 alleging S.M. was dependent due to Mother’s mental health
issues, domestic violence and unstable housing. The court held a
dependency hearing on the petition where all parties, except for Mother,
appeared. In April 2022, the court found S.M. dependent as to Mother,
granted custody of S.M. to the Department and adopted a reunification
plan.

¶5 As part of the reunification plan, the Department referred
Mother to several services. The services included individual counseling,
domestic violence counseling and supervised visitation, among other
services. Mother also moved to a domestic violence shelter. Not long after,
Mother’s counseling services terminated their involvement due to Mother's
lack of participation, and the shelter expelled her.

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¶6 Mother continued to have issues with stable housing.
Between February 2022 and July 2024, Mother moved six times between
Indiana and Georgia. During that time, Mother was at times unhoused,
unemployed or both. But even while away from Arizona, the Department
offered Mother services. The Department informed Mother that as part of
the reunification plan, she needed to substantially engage in trauma
therapy, go to therapy with S.M. to address their relational post-traumatic
stress disorder and attend in-person visitation with S.M. to build their
relationship. Though Mother reported attending therapy sessions, she did
not engage in the sessions to a significant degree.

¶7 The Department retained custody of S.M. for two years.
Mother made no significant improvements to reunite with S.M. during this
time and the Department moved to terminate her parental rights in August
2024. The court held a hearing on the termination in September. Mother
appeared virtually and waived any defects to service.

¶8 On March 6, 2025, the court held a status conference at which
Mother appeared. Mother moved to continue the termination hearing and
have new counsel appointed. The court granted Mother’s motion and
“advised [Mother] of the consequences of her failure to . . . appear for
future hearings[.]” The court continued the status conference until March
11, 2025. On March 11, all parties were present (including Mother’s newly
appointed counsel) except Mother. Accordingly, the court converted the
hearing to an accelerated termination hearing and proceeded without her.
After hearing testimony from the case manager for Mother and S.M., the
court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of neglect and
fifteen-months’ out-of-home placement.

¶9 Mother timely appealed and this Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶10 As a preliminary matter, the Department argues Mother has
waived any error by failing to develop any meaningful argument
supported by record citations. An opening brief must contain an argument
“with supporting reasons” and relevant citations to the record and law.
Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A). If an appellant’s opening brief presents
issues “not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or
authority,” those issues may be considered waived. Ramos v. Nichols, 252
Ariz. 519, 522, ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (quotation omitted). Self-represented
litigants are not afforded leniency to this standard. Id. (citation omitted).

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But in cases involving a child’s best interests, the child’s interests are
paramount and this Court will not exercise its discretion to strictly enforce
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 13. See Nold v. Nold, 232 Ariz.
270, 273, ¶ 10 (App. 2013) (“[I]f the best interests of the child trump the
consequences ordinarily imposed for violations of the rules, then they
should not be ignored under the discretionary doctrine of waiver.”). This
Court, in its discretion, considers Mother’s arguments, although
imperfectly presented.

I. Mother received notice of the termination hearing.

¶11 Mother argues the court erred in terminating her parental
rights by: (1) proceeding without proper notice; (2) relying on an
incomplete and biased record; (3) discounting her progress toward
reunification; (4) having ineffective assistance of counsel; and (5) failing to
address the true paternity of S.M., which resulted in violations of statutory
kinship placement preferences. Parents enjoy “a fundamental liberty
interest in the care” and custody of their children and are entitled to
fundamental due process when the State seeks to terminate those rights.
Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24 (2005). But that right is not
absolute. Id.

¶12 If a parent does not appear at the initial termination hearing
and lacks good cause, the court may address termination in the parent’s
absence. A.R.S. § 8-863(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 352(f)(1). Before doing so, a
court must first determine whether: the parent has notice of the initial
termination hearing; notice was received or waived; and the parent
received an advisement of the consequences of failing to appear. A.R.S. § 8-
863(C); Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 352(f)(1)(A)—(C).

¶13 Here, Mother received proper notice. The termination
petition and notice of the initial hearing were served on Mother’s counsel.
That notice provided:

You have a right to appear as a party in this proceeding. You
are advised that your failure to personally appear in court at
the initial hearing, pretrial conference, status conference, or
termination adjudication, without good cause shown, may
result in a finding that you have waived your legal rights and
have admitted the allegations in the Motion. In addition, if
you fail to appear without good cause, the hearing may go
forward in your absence and may result in termination of

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your parental rights based upon the record and the evidence
presented to the Court.

Mother then appeared at the initial termination hearing on September 16,
2024. At that hearing, Mother waived any defects regarding service. Mother
also appeared at the March 6 status conference. On the record at that
proceeding, the court “advised [Mother] of the consequences of her failure
to participate in services and/or to appear for future hearings[.]” The court
reset the status conference for March 11 and provided Mother notice of the
hearing in open court.

¶14 Though Mother’s counsel was present at the March 11 status
conference, Mother did not appear and the Department moved to proceed
in her absence. The court noted on the record that “the [c]ourt did advise
Mother and remind[ed] Mother at that status conference that if she fails to
appear without good cause, the [c]ourt can find she waives her right to
contest the allegations in the Department’s motion and proceed in her
absence.” Based on this record, Mother received notice.

II. Sufficient evidence supports termination of Mother’s rights.

¶15 Mother asserts several other arguments to suggest that the
court erred in terminating her rights. Though Mother failed to raise these
concerns with the court, this Court addresses the grounds of termination
because it involves the child’s best interests. Nold, 232 Ariz. at 273, ¶ 10.

¶16 This Court “accept[s] the juvenile court’s findings of fact if
reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will affirm a
[termination] order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child
Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151, ¶ 18 (2018). A court may terminate a parent’s
rights if it finds (1) sufficient grounds for termination under A.R.S. § 8-
533(B) by clear and convincing evidence and (2) the termination would be
in the best interests of the child by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at
149—50, ¶ 8; A.R.S. § 8-533(B).

a. Termination on grounds of neglect

¶17 Here, clear and convincing evidence supports the court’s
findings of neglect. Neglect is defined in relevant part as “[t]he inability . .
. of a parent . . . to provide [a] child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter
or medical care if that inability . . . causes substantial risk of harm to the
child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). The record shows that for a
period of two years during which S.M. was in the Department’s custody,
Mother did not maintain consistent housing, employment or attend therapy

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Decision of the Court

mandated by the reunification plan. Even though Mother was out of state
during most of this period, the Department provided referrals for services
to support reunification both in Arizona and out of state. Mother did not
provide for S.M. at all during this period. The record supports the juvenile
court’s findings.

b. Termination of parental rights is in S.M.’s best interests

¶18 The record also supports the court’s findings that termination
was in S.M.’s best interests. The court found S.M.’s “adoptive placement . .
. is meeting all his daily physical, emotional, medical and educational
needs.” The court also found furthering the plan of adoption “would
provide [S.M.] with permanency and stability.” Furthermore, the court
found “[c]ontinuation of the parent-child relationship would be a detriment
to [S.M.] because Mother has untreated mental illness.” The court noted that
for almost three years, Mother has not been able to demonstrate progress
for her mental health and rather reported being “unable to provide for
many of her own necessities such as stable housing.” These findings by the
court justify its conclusion that continuing the parent-child relationship was
not in S.M.’s best interests. Because this Court affirms the court’s finding of
neglect it need not address the court’s alternative findings on out-of-home
placement grounds under § 8-533(B)(8)(c). See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002) (“If clear and convincing evidence
supports any one of the statutory grounds on which the juvenile court
ordered severance, [this Court] need not address claims pertaining to the
other grounds.”).

III. Mother waived any remaining arguments.

¶19 Mother contends the court failed to consider her progress and
active participation in reunification services; violated statutory kinship
placement preferences; failed to ensure reasonable efforts toward
reunification and that the Department presented an incomplete and biased
record. She also argues her initial attorney failed to advocate effectively,
which compromised her ability to present her case. Mother provides no
citations to the record or legal citations to support these claims. If an
appellant’s opening brief presents issues “not supported by adequate
explanation, citations to the record, or authority,” those issues may be
considered waived. Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 522, ¶ 8 (quotation omitted). Mother
has waived these remaining issues.

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 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.M.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶20 This Court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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