In Re Termination of Parental Rights as to R.S.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL
RIGHTS AS TO R.S.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0066
FILED 11-28-2025

Appeal from the Juvenile Court in Maricopa County
No. JD535365
The Honorable Jay M. Polk, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Christiana K.

Denise L. Carroll, Scottsdale
By Denise L. Carroll
Counsel for Appellant Timothy S.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Jennifer L. Thorson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Canizales Law PLLC, Phoenix
By Carrie Shew Canizales
Counsel for Appellee Child R.S.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.S.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew M. Jacobs delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

J A C O B S, Judge:

¶1 Christiana K. (“Mother”) and Timothy S. (“Father”) appeal
the juvenile court’s ruling terminating their parental rights. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. R.S. Is Born Substance-Exposed and Then Referred to the
Department of Child Safety (“DCS”).

¶2 Mother and Father are the biological parents of R.S., who was
born in February 2023. Shortly after he was born, DCS received a report
that R.S. was in the NICU experiencing withdrawal due to prenatal drug
exposure. Mother refused to take a urine toxicology test at the hospital but
later told DCS that she used fentanyl, methamphetamines, and
amphetamines throughout the last few months of pregnancy. Father also
admitted to a history of addiction, two prior convictions for drug-related
offenses, and current fentanyl use one to two times a day.

¶3 In March 2023, DCS held a meeting to discuss continued
concerns with the family’s care for R.S. and enacted a safety plan where
R.S.’s maternal grandmother (“Grandmother”) was to live with the family
and monitor all interactions of Mother and Father with R.S.

¶4 By July 2023, neither Mother nor Father were engaged in any
of the services DCS offered them for recovery from drug use and could not
articulate a barrier to completion. Mother and Father both inconsistently
completed their scheduled urine toxicology tests, and all tests completed
were positive for fentanyl, methamphetamines, amphetamines,
methadone, and THC in different variations. The family also faced
continued difficulties with housing stability. Neither Mother nor Father
were employed and had been on the verge of eviction twice since moving
into their apartment in February 2023.

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B. The Dependency Proceeding Begins.

¶5 DCS filed a dependency petition on July 5, 2023. R.S. was
declared a temporary ward of the court at the initial dependency hearing
on July 26, 2023, and further proceedings were continued for the purpose
of Father establishing paternity. At the hearing, the juvenile court provided
Mother and Father with the “Form 1” warnings, advising them of the
consequences of failure to appear at future dependency or termination
hearings, including that “the court may find that you have waived your
right to object to the termination of your parental rights,” in which case,
“[t]he court may then consider evidence in your absence and terminate
your parental rights.” See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. Form 1.

¶6 In September 2023, the juvenile court found R.S. dependent as
to Mother “based on substance abuse and failure to care for the child’s
every day needs including housing.” R.S. remained at home with Mother
and Father under Grandmother’s supervision. For several months, DCS
continued to offer numerous services to Mother and Father, but neither
meaningfully participated or made progress toward sobriety. The juvenile
court later affirmed paternity and found R.S. dependent as to Father in
April 2024, citing “neglect due to substance abuse and instability.”

¶7 Despite both parents’ continued failure to engage in services
or demonstrate progress toward sobriety, DCS allowed R.S. to remain in
Mother’s physical custody and affirmed its goal was still to help Mother
and Father progress to where they could safely parent R.S. on their own.

C. DCS Removes R.S. From Mother’s Custody.

¶8 Mother tried to find an inpatient rehabilitation facility. DCS
helped Mother obtain a placement at an inpatient facility that would allow
her to bring R.S. with her. DCS helped ensure Mother did not lose her spot
at the facility by: (1) rescheduling her intake after it was cancelled when
Mother failed to appear; (2) arranging transportation for Mother, R.S.,
Grandmother, and Mother’s dog from Phoenix to the facility in Tucson; (3)
waiting nearly two hours past the scheduled transport time for Mother to
accept transportation; (4) communicating with the facility to extend
Mother’s intake window so she would not be rejected upon arrival due to
her delayed departure; and (5) trying to find a home for Mother’s dog
because Mother had not arranged to board the dog, eventually driving the
dog back to Father in Phoenix when the dog could not be placed in a shelter.

¶9 Mother completed intake at the inpatient facility on February
12, 2024. Three days later, the facility contacted DCS asking if someone

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could speak to Mother because she had called a taxi and wanted to leave
the facility. A DCS investigator met Mother and told her leaving treatment
could lead her to lose custody of R.S. Representatives of the facility tried to
convince Mother to continue treatment there so they could supervise both
her and R.S. Despite that, Mother left in a cab without R.S., knowing she
could thus lose custody of R.S. R.S. was placed in foster care the next day.

¶10 DCS referred Mother and Father for supervised visits and
further services to aid their progress toward sobriety and family stability.
Both parents said they wanted to begin inpatient treatment but failed to
follow through on referrals for residential treatment at Crossroads, CBI,
and Vogue Recovery Center. Neither parent completed drug testing or
engaged with Terros or Family Connections. And though Mother and
Father initially participated in a few supervised visits with R.S., they did
not visit or attempt to contact R.S. between March 21, 2024 and the February
21, 2025 hearing on DCS’s motion to terminate their parental rights.

D. After a Hearing Neither Parent Attends, the Juvenile Court
Terminates Mother’s and Father’s Parental Rights.

¶11 DCS moved to terminate both parents’ rights under A.R.S.
§§ 8-533(B)(1) (abandonment), 533(B)(3) (chronic substance abuse) and
533(B)(8)(b) (six months out-of-home placement). Neither Mother nor
Father appeared at the initial termination hearing on February 21, 2025,
despite receiving notice and being advised of the consequences of failing to
appear. Counsel asserted no good cause for their failure to appear.
Mother’s counsel asked the juvenile court to continue the hearing to make
sure DCS’s disclosures were up to date. The court found both parents’
failure to appear without good cause an admission of the allegations in the
termination motion and proceeded with the hearing in their absence. After
the close of the evidence, the court granted the motion to terminate the
parental rights of both Mother and Father. At the hearing, the juvenile court
made these findings in support of granting DCS’s motion to terminate:

¶12 As to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(1) (abandonment), neither Mother nor
Father had visited R.S. since March 21, 2024. Neither parent had been in
contact with DCS since April 2024, despite many attempts by DCS to locate
both parents. Neither Mother nor Father had attempted to contact R.S. and
had not sent cards, gifts, or letters. As a result, neither of the parents have
a normal parental relationship with R.S.

¶13 As to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3) (chronic substance abuse), R.S. was
born withdrawing from fentanyl, methamphetamines, and amphetamines.

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Mother and Father admitted to a prolonged history of substance abuse in
interviews with DCS. Mother and Father continuously failed to make
meaningful progress toward sobriety, failing to provide clean urinalysis
results or to complete any services DCS offered them. Given their chronic
substance abuse and inability to make progress toward sobriety, both
Mother and Father are unable to parent, and the chronic substance abuse
would continue for a prolonged period.

¶14 As to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b) (six months out-of-home
placement), R.S. had been in out-of-home placement for more than a year
and was under three years old. Mother and Father had neglected or
willfully refused to remedy the circumstances that caused R.S. to be placed
in out-of-home care.

¶15 As to R.S.’s best interests, DCS had identified an adoptive
placement for R.S. that could take care of his medical needs, including
braces for club feet and tubes in his ears for chronic infections. If this
placement does not work out, R.S. is adoptable. Given both parents’ failure
to show any interest in visiting or contacting R.S. for nearly a year,
termination was in R.S.’s best interests.

¶16 The court also ordered that DCS file an affidavit confirming it
had made all required disclosures and lodge a proposed order including
findings of fact and conclusions of law by March 14, 2025. DCS filed its
affidavit regarding disclosure on April 11, 2025, affirming that DCS did not
find any undisclosed documents that existed “prior to the date the case
[proceeded] to adjudication.” DCS lodged its proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law that same day. The juvenile court signed the proposed
order terminating both parents’ rights on April 23, 2025.

¶17 Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction.
Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 9; A.R.S. §§ 8-235, 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

The Juvenile Court Did Not Err By Terminating Mother and
Father’s Parental Rights.

¶18 “We review the court’s termination decision for an abuse of
discretion and will affirm unless no reasonable evidence supports the
court’s findings.” Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 574, 579 ¶ 10
(2021). A court may terminate parental rights where it finds: (1) a ground
for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by clear and convincing evidence;
and (2) termination is in the child’s best interests by a preponderance of the

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evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 22 (2005); A.R.S. § 8-
533(A)-(B). We apply a deferential standard under which “the juvenile
court’s legal conclusions regarding the statutory ground for termination . . .
will be affirmed unless they are clearly erroneous.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 255 Ariz. 471, 478-79 ¶ 31 (2023).

¶19 Neither parent disputes the factual basis for any of the three
grounds for termination, nor the finding that termination is in R.S.’s best
interests. Instead, Father argues DCS’s failure to provide timely disclosure
deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to contest severance or present
evidence of his sobriety and progress in recovery. Mother argues the
juvenile court deprived her of due process by accepting DCS’s proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law in full, despite alleged factual
inconsistencies. These arguments are unpersuasive, as we next explain.

A. DCS’s Untimely Disclosure Did Not Prejudice Father.

¶20 We review the late disclosures for fundamental error because
Father did not object to “the alleged due process violation[] in the juvenile
court.” Brenda D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 447 ¶ 37 (2018).
“Under fundamental error review, [Father] ‘bears the burden to establish
that (1) error exists, (2) the error is fundamental, and (3) the error caused
[him] prejudice.’” Id. at 447-48 ¶ 38 (quoting State v. Bearup, 221 Ariz. 163,
168 ¶ 21 (2009)).

¶21 Procedural errors, including late disclosures, must be
evaluated in the context of their impact on the fairness of the proceedings
and the ability of the affected party to defend their interests. See Dep’t of
Child Safety v. Carel G., ___ Ariz. ___, 573 P.3d 1120, 1127-28 ¶¶ 27-28 (App.
2025). Even assuming arguendo that Father satisfies the first two elements,
he has failed to establish the alleged error caused him prejudice. See Brenda
D., 243 Ariz. at 448 ¶ 38 (The party asserting prejudice “‘must affirmatively
prove prejudice’ and cannot merely ‘rely upon speculation.’”) (cleaned up).

¶22 Father cannot prove prejudice because the late disclosures are
not part of the record on appeal, and Father has not described their contents
or explained how the untimely disclosure harmed his presentation of his
case. Father does argue he would have offered evidence of his sobriety and
progress in recovery. But that evidence would not rebut the court’s
findings of abandonment and six months out-of-home placement, or that
termination was in R.S.’s best interests, which rested on the availability and
adequacy of an adoptive placement. Finally, Father could have presented
evidence of sobriety and recovery by appearing at the termination

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adjudication hearing, or through his counsel in his absence, but he did
neither. As such, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights. See id. at 448 ¶ 39 (finding parent who
“‘presented no evidence that a reasonable [judge] would have concluded
differently than did the [juvenile court] judge’ in this case . . . has not met
[their] burden under fundamental error review”) (quoting Monica C. v. Ariz.
Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 89, 95 ¶ 26 (App. 2005)).

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Deprive Mother of Her Due
Process Rights By Accepting DCS’s Proposed Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law.

¶23 Mother contends the juvenile court abdicated its role as
factfinder by accepting DCS’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law, despite supposed inconsistencies within them. Not so. DCS may
lodge, and the court may utilize, proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law in a termination order. See Francine C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 249
Ariz. 289, 298 ¶ 25 n.3 (App. 2020); see also Elliot v. Elliot, 165 Ariz. 128, 134
(App. 1990) (allowing the trial court to “adopt proposed findings that the
parties submit” so long as “those findings are consistent with the ones that
it reaches independently after properly considering the facts”). We
consider each of the three inconsistencies Mother notes, none of which
justify vacating the juvenile court’s termination decision on appeal.

¶24 First, the order states that parties received an admonition on
February 5, 2025 as to the consequences of failing to appear. Mother
correctly notes the juvenile court instead relied on admonitions given on
July 26, 2023. But so long as the juvenile court finds “the parent was warned
that ‘the hearing could go forward in the absence of the parent’ and that
‘failure to appear may constitute a waiver of rights,’” it can proceed in the
parent’s absence. Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 443-44 ¶ 22. These findings do not
need to be formally incorporated in the final written termination order. See
Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(f), (h). Thus, where Mother was properly advised of
the consequences of failing to appear (but the court recorded the date
incorrectly), and where the advisement need not appear in the final order,
the fact that the wrong date of the properly given advisement appears in
the final order is no abridgment of fundamental fairness.

¶25 Second, the order recites that R.S. currently resides in an
adoptive placement, while testimony at the termination adjudication
hearing reflects that while DCS had found an adoptive placement for R.S.,
he was not yet residing there. Despite this error, the order correctly
concludes that termination is in R.S.’s best interests because his caregivers

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are familiar with his medical needs and would provide a calm and
consistent home, and that R.S. was adoptable. These findings of fact are
sufficient to uphold the juvenile court’s conclusion of law that termination
was in R.S.’s best interests. See Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532,
537 ¶ 14 (App. 2018) (“[T]he order must specify the juvenile court’s
conclusions of law and ‘at least one factual finding sufficient to support
each of those conclusions of law.’”) (cleaned up).

¶26 Third, Mother alleges the termination order’s reference to a
narcotics offense and a related warrant for Mother’s arrest in its findings of
fact lacks record support, calling into question the chronic substance abuse
ground for termination. But many facts Mother does not question support
the statutory ground of chronic substance abuse: R.S. was born
withdrawing from several addictive substances; Mother consistently failed
to complete substance abuse treatment or provide clean urine toxicology;
and Mother left the inpatient detox treatment against staff advice. These
findings are reasonable evidence supporting the substance abuse ground
for termination. See Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478-79 ¶ 31.

¶27 Alternatively, Mother argues that if there was a narcotics
offense and a related warrant, that would tend to negate the juvenile court’s
finding of abandonment, citing In re B.W., ___ Ariz. ___, 572 P.3d 88, 97 ¶ 27
(2025) (holding Father may have “just cause” to rebut presumption of
abandonment despite not pursuing time with child because counsel
“advised him that these acts would likely jeopardize his chance of
prevailing at his criminal trial”). This argument lacks merit. Mother was
not acting on advice of counsel when she concededly “complete[ly] fail[ed]
to appear and testify,” or contact R.S. for the eleven months preceding the
termination adjudication hearing. Mother has no “reasonable and fair
justification for not maintaining a normal parental relationship with” R.S.
nor has she suggested any such justification. Id. at 96 ¶ 24. The juvenile
court neither abused its discretion by finding Mother abandoned R.S., nor
deprived Mother of due process by entering its termination order.

CONCLUSION

¶28 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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