In Re Term of Parental Rights as to M.L.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.L.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0067
FILED 11-21-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
No. V1300JD820060038
The Honorable Anna C. Young, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Florence M. Bruemmer PC, Anthem
By Florence M. Bruemmer
Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Meredith Oakes Peterson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jelena Radovanov
Counsel for Appellee Child
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO M.L.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael S. Catlett delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Andrew M. Jacobs joined.

C A T L E T T, Judge:

¶1 Richard L. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights to M.L. (“Child”). Father challenges
whether the Department of Child Safety (“the Department”) established
two statutory grounds for termination—neglect, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2),
and a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, see A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3).
He also challenges whether termination was in Child’s best interests. We
affirm termination.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Rhiannon M. (“Mother”) are Child’s biological
parents. Child was born in California in November 2024. Shortly
thereafter, Mother returned to Arizona, but Father remained in California
with Child.

¶3 The Department received a hotline report that Child had been
exposed to substances before birth. During its initial investigation, the
Department discovered Father had an open dependency proceeding
involving another child due to substance abuse. He tested positive for
methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC earlier in November 2024 and
failed to participate in rehabilitative services. Due to these concerns and
unable to locate Father or Child, the Department initiated ex parte
proceedings for temporary custody of Child and to declare Child
dependent.

¶4 The court issued an order allowing the Department to take
temporary custody of Child and informing Father he could be arrested if
found with Child. On December 3, 2024, Father returned to Arizona and
gave Child to Child’s paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). That same
day, Grandmother notified the Department she had Child, and the
Department took Child to Verde Valley Medical Center. Doctors and the
Department discovered that Child had a heart murmur; his toes were blue,
he was making strange noises, and he was exhibiting early-stage heart

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Decision of the Court

failure. Because Child required urgent medical care, Child was airlifted to
Flagstaff Medical Center. Medical staff later informed the Department that
the heart murmur was no longer a concern, but Child had a hole in his heart
requiring follow up. When the hospital discharged Child several hours
later, the Department gave custody to Grandmother.

¶5 On December 4, the court held a preliminary hearing and
ordered Father to complete a hair follicle and urinalysis test. Father did not
comply. The next day, the Department moved to terminate Father’s rights
based on neglect and chronic abuse of dangerous drugs. See A.R.S. §§ 8-
533(B)(2), (3).

¶6 At the termination hearing, Father testified that despite
knowing Mother’s due date was close, he traveled with her to California.
Father admitted instructing hospital staff where Child was born not to
perform any additional testing without his approval because he “deemed
[Child] safe and healthy.” He then agreed with Mother to leave the hospital
against medical advice. Father acknowledged he left with Child despite
hospital staff’s concerns about Child’s possible heart murmur, which they
wanted to monitor.

¶7 Father explained he remained in California to keep Child
away from the Department. He returned to Arizona only because
Grandmother was worried the Department “was going to put out a
kidnapping charge” on him. Mother confirmed Father did not keep in
contact with her—she knew only that he was at a family member’s home in
California—and Father had no plans to return to Arizona. Mother learned
Father returned to Arizona only after he gave Child to Grandmother.

¶8 A Department specialist testified about Child’s current
placement. She believed Grandmother met Child’s needs and is willing to
adopt. She stated that if Grandmother was unable to adopt Child, he is
otherwise adoptable. She also confirmed that Child did not have any
special behavioral or educational needs. But she warned that it is too early
to know the effects of Child’s substance exposure, and he has been
diagnosed as having a hole in his heart.

¶9 The court terminated Father’s rights based on neglect and a
history of chronic substance abuse. The court concluded that the
Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Father
“neglected [Child] or failed to protect [Child] from neglect.” See A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(2). Specifically, Father was “unable or unwilling to provide [Child]
with . . . medical care . . . which caused a substantial risk of harm to

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Decision of the Court

[Child’s] health and/or welfare[.]” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). The court found
that Father’s conduct before Child’s birth, his efforts to prevent Child from
receiving necessary care, and Child’s condition when the Department
obtained custody supported that Father neglected Child.

¶10 For the chronic abuse of dangerous drugs ground, the court
relied on Father’s failure to meaningfully engage rehabilitative services in
the ongoing dependency action initiated a year before Child’s birth, his
positive drug test in early November 2024, and his refusal to participate in
further testing. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The court concluded that, because
of Child’s age and vulnerability, Child needs a parent who can safely care
for him, and Father is unable to do so.

¶11 The court also concluded termination was in Child’s best
interests. The court found Child’s current adoptive placement meets
Child’s needs and Child is otherwise adoptable. Child’s placement with
Grandmother is the least restrictive means. And adoption “would provide
[Child] with permanency and stability” while continuing the parent-child
relationship would require Child “to linger in care for an indeterminate
period” without “parents who are able to care for him.”

¶12 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 8-
235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶13 Father contends there was insufficient evidence to terminate
his rights.

¶14 “Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children as
they see fit, but that right is not without limitation.” Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79 ¶ 14 (App. 2001). A court may terminate
parental rights based on the grounds listed in A.R.S. § 8-533(B). Michael J.
v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 248–49 ¶ 12 (2000). A party seeking
termination must first prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that one of
those grounds exists. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 149 ¶ 8
(2018); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 22 (2005). The party must
then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the
child’s best interests. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 149–50 ¶ 8; Kent K., 210 Ariz. at
284 ¶ 22. We review a termination order for an abuse of discretion. Timothy
B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252 Ariz. 470, 474 ¶ 14 (2022). We affirm the
juvenile court’s factual findings if reasonable evidence and inferences
support them. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255 Ariz 471, 478 ¶ 30 (2023).

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I. Neglect

¶15 Father argues the court erred because its neglect findings
were premised on the same allegations as its substance abuse findings. But
Father is mistaken. The court’s findings supporting neglect do not rely on
allegations about Father’s substance abuse.

¶16 Neglect justifying termination requires “[t]hat the parent has
neglected or willfully abused a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). Neglect
includes “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent . . . to provide that
child with . . . medical care” which “causes substantial risk of harm to the
child’s health or welfare[.]” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a). Father asserts there was
no evidence he failed to provide Child with care causing a substantial risk
of harm to Child’s health or welfare. We disagree.

¶17 Sufficient evidence supported termination based on neglect.
Father’s own testimony and the Department’s report confirmed Father
knew about Child’s medical needs; Father prevented hospital staff from
providing necessary medical care to Child; and Father left with Child
against medical advice. Hospital staff confirmed they could not adequately
check Child or address his heart murmur because Father left the hospital
with Child when he was only ten hours old. The record adequately
supports the court’s conclusion that Father was unable or unwilling to
provide Child with necessary medical care.

¶18 Father also contends his actions did not cause a substantial
risk of harm to Child because Child was “ultimately” found to be healthy
and the hole in Child’s heart is due to Mother’s neglect. Father primarily
relies on the fact that Child does not now exhibit any special behavioral or
educational needs and Child’s heart murmur resolved. But a neglect
finding does not require permanent harm to the child; all that is required is
that a parent’s unwillingness to provide medical care “causes substantial
risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare[.]” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a).

¶19 The record supports that the “substantial risk of harm”
requirement was met. Father admitted he stayed in California to keep
Child away from the Department. Father returned to Arizona only after
the Department sought to obtain custody of Child. By the time the
Department obtained custody, Child’s toes were blue, he was making weird
noises, and he was experiencing symptoms consistent with early-stage
heart failure. Child’s condition was urgent enough that he was airlifted to
a different hospital. Father ignores that Child’s health improved because
the Department provided Child with life-saving medical care, and that

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Decision of the Court

Father knew of Child’s needs and failed to provide him with appropriate
care. Even if Child did not suffer permanent harm, the record supports that
Father put Child at substantial risk of harm to his health or welfare. Lastly,
Father’s argument that the hole in Child’s heart is due to Mother’s neglect
does not absolve Father of his own neglect.

¶20 There is sufficient evidence supporting termination for
neglect—a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the Department
established neglect by clear and convincing evidence. See A.R.S. § 8-
533(B)(2); Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 30. Because we affirm termination
on that ground, we need not address termination based on chronic
substance abuse. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 27 (declining to consider
other statutory grounds after affirming on one ground).

II. Best Interests

¶21 Father also argues there was insufficient evidence that
termination was in Child’s best interests. The court found termination
would benefit Child and continuing the parent-child relationship would
harm him.

¶22 Termination is in a child’s best interests if a party proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the child will benefit from, or be
harmed without, termination. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150 ¶ 13; Demetrius L. v.
Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 4 ¶ 16 (2016) (recognizing that because this standard
is “[f]ramed in the disjunctive,” a best interests finding may be supported
by either). The court must consider all the circumstances at the time of
termination. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150–51 ¶ 13. A benefit from termination
exists when an adoptive placement meets the child’s needs, the child is
adoptable, and an adoption plan “is otherwise legally possible and
likely[.]” Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 3–4 ¶ 12; Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar
O., 209 Ariz. 332, 335 ¶ 8 (App. 2004) (“[T]he immediate availability of a
suitable adoptive placement . . . support[s] a [termination] order.”)

¶23 Father does not contest the court’s factual findings underlying
its best interests finding. Father concedes Grandmother provides Child
with a stable home. But Father contends termination was not in Child’s
best interests because he was bonded with Child and intended to
participate in rehabilitative services. Contrary to Father’s argument, the
record sufficiently supports that termination would benefit Child because
it would further adoption, thereby providing permanency and stability.
Child has lived with Grandmother since December 2024, Child is bonded
with her and she is meeting his needs, and she wants to adopt him. Even if

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Decision of the Court

Child’s current placement does not adopt him, he is adoptable. The juvenile
court did not err in determining that termination was in Child’s best
interests. Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4–5 ¶¶ 14, 17.

CONCLUSION

¶24 We affirm the order terminating Father’s parental rights as to
Child.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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