In Re Delinquency of M.S.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE DELINQUENCY OF M.S.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0076
FILED 11-14-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Navajo County
Nos. SO900JV202300174, SO900JV202300261
The Honorable Michala M. Ruechel, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Rigg Law Firm, PLLC, Pinetop
By Brett R. Rigg
Counsel for Appellant

Navajo County Attorney’s Office, Holbrook
By Myles A. Braccio
Counsel for Appellee
 IN RE DELINQUENCY OF M.S.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 M.S appeals the superior court’s order requiring him to
register as a sex offender until he turns 25 (in 2035). For reasons that follow,
we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In September 2023, the State filed a delinquency petition
alleging M.S. committed kidnapping, three counts of child molestation, two
counts of furnishing harmful items to minors, and theft. M.S. pleaded
delinquent to one count of child molestation. The court accepted the plea
and adjudicated M.S. delinquent on that basis, dismissing the other counts
with prejudice.

¶3 In December 2023, following a separate incident involving a
different victim, the State filed another delinquency petition alleging M.S.
committed two counts of sexual conduct with a minor and two counts of
child molestation. M.S. pleaded delinquent to one count of child
molestation. The court accepted this second plea and similarly adjudicated
M.S. delinquent on that basis, dismissing the other counts with prejudice.

¶4 At a consolidated disposition hearing, the court placed M.S.
on 24-months’ intensive probation with treatment in a juvenile inpatient
facility. The court also ordered sex offender terms and ordered M.S. to
register as a sex offender until age 25, but agreed to consider waiving the
registration requirement if he successfully completed probation, including
treatment.

¶5 In April 2025, the State petitioned to revoke and terminate
M.S.’s intensive probation in both matters. M.S. admitted he violated a
condition of his probation by being removed from the treatment facility
based on his failure to comply with the treatment rules and terms of
probation. The court accepted his admission, revoked the probation grants,
and set another disposition hearing.

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Decision of the Court

¶6 At the second disposition hearing, the court reinstated
intensive probation with treatment in an inpatient facility and declined to
waive the registration requirement previously imposed in December 2023.
Thus, M.S. was required to register as a sex offender until age 25. M.S.
timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶7 M.S. argues the court erred by ordering him to register as a
sex offender, asserting that the court lacked an adequate evidentiary basis
and that the court violated M.S.’s due process rights by doing so without
an updated psychological evaluation and without timely providing defense
counsel an advance copy of the disposition report. Because M.S. did not
object on these bases in superior court, we review only for fundamental,
prejudicial error. See In re Natalie Z., 214 Ariz. 452, 455, ¶ 7 (App. 2007);
State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 140, ¶ 12 (2018).

¶8 The superior court may require a juvenile adjudicated
delinquent of certain offenses, including child molestation, to register as a
sex offender until age 25. A.R.S. § 13-3821(A)(7), (D). We review a
registration order for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to sustaining the ruling. See In re Javier B., 230 Ariz. 100, 104,
¶ 17 (App. 2012); In re Amber S., 225 Ariz. 364, 366–67, ¶ 6 (App. 2010). An
abuse of discretion may be established if the court’s order is “characterized
by capriciousness, arbitrariness or by failure to conduct an adequate
investigation into facts necessary for an intelligent exercise of the court’s
sentencing power.” State v. Grier, 146 Ariz. 511, 515 (1985). We review due
process claims de novo, Jeff D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 205, 207, ¶ 6
(App. 2016), assessing whether the party received adequate notice and the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,
McClung v. Bennett, 225 Ariz. 154, 156, ¶ 8 (2010).

¶9 M.S. first contends the superior court failed to explain
adequately the basis for ordering him to register as a sex offender at the
second disposition hearing (after his probation violation), and that such a
basis was not established. But M.S.’s argument is grounded on a faulty
premise: the court imposed the registration requirement at the first
disposition hearing, not the second.

¶10 At the first disposition hearing, the court had an ample basis
for ordering sex-offender registration, and did so, albeit with an expressed
intent to waive the requirement if M.S. successfully completed probation,
including treatment. Before ordering registration at the first disposition,

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Decision of the Court

the court considered the disposition report, the psychosexual evaluation,
and the statements from the victim representative, the parents of the
juvenile, and both counsel. The evidence presented reflected a concern that
M.S. was not committed to change his behavior given his reluctance to
follow rules and his escalating behavioral incidents.

¶11 Based on this information, and after hearing argument from
counsel in the first disposition, the court ordered sex-offender registration
until M.S. turned 25, noting the psychosexual evaluation suggested a “fairly
high” risk of reoffending that was “certainly concerning.” M.S. had an
opportunity to appeal from that ruling but did not do so.

¶12 Given the court’s prior order for registration, the decision
before the court at the second disposition (after M.S.’s probation violation)
was not whether to order registration, but whether M.S. had fulfilled the
conditions previously imposed for forgoing the registration requirement. In
light of M.S.’s struggles in treatment and his admitted probation violation—
all of which the court considered, along with the updated disposition
report—the court did not err by affirming its prior order that M.S. register
as a sex offender until age 25.

¶13 M.S. further contends that the court should have ordered and
considered an updated psychological evaluation before imposing the
registration requirement. But the order in place after the first disposition
(at which the court did consider a psychosexual evaluation) gave M.S.
sufficient notice that sex-offender registration was in play and that the
court’s decision to forgo the previously ordered registration depended on
his progress on probation. While the court at the second disposition noted
that an updated psychosexual report might be “beneficial,” the court was
not required to consider that or any other specific factors in determining
whether to mandate registration. See Javier B., 230 Ariz. at 104, ¶ 18
(“Section 13-3821 does not direct the court to consider any specific factors
before making its determination on whether to order a juvenile to
register.”).

¶14 Finally, although defense counsel did not see the disposition
report until the time set for the disposition hearing, it was available to
counsel three days in advance. Moreover, the court printed a copy and took
a recess to allow M.S. to review and discuss the report privately, telling M.S.
to “call back in” when he was ready to proceed. M.S. did not object, request
more time, or highlight any unforeseen information that required further
review. Accordingly, M.S. has shown no error.

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Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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