In Re Guardianship of J.B.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF J.B.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0080
FILED 12-17-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JG512398
The Honorable Jay M. Polk, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Crystal Huggins, Chandler
Appellant

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellee, Jasmine K.

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda L. Adams
Counsel for Child, J.B.
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Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Brian Y. Furuya delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Angela K. Paton and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.

F U R U Y A, Judge:

¶1 Crystal H. (“Former Guardian”) appeals the juvenile court’s
order terminating her guardianship of J.B. For the following reasons, we
affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 J.B. was born in July 2008 to Jasmine K. (“Mother”). Former
Guardian was granted permanent guardianship of J.B. in March 2015 by a
Georgia court upon her private petition. The Georgia court found that J.B.
and his older sibling could not be “adequately and safely protected at
home” because Mother, “on a habitual basis, deposit[ed] the children with
[Former Guardian] and [did] not retrieve the children for long periods of
time (at least weeks), [and because] she [had] no known housing or ability
to provide for the children.”

¶3 In the two years following Former Guardian’s appointment,
Mother maintained contact with the children and the children visited
Mother’s home for short periods of time. Then, in 2018, the children and
Former Guardian relocated to Arizona. Mother attempted to maintain
contact with the children in the ensuing years, but Former Guardian was
not always responsive. J.B.’s sibling also testified that the children did not
want to contact Mother “between 2020 and 2024” because they were upset
that she had given birth to four other children.

¶4 But in the summer of 2024, Former Guardian and Mother
began to discuss transitioning J.B. to live with Mother in Georgia, and
Mother and J.B. began to talk several times a week. Mother obtained a larger
home by the end of 2024 so that J.B. could have his own room when he
returned to her care. In January 2025, Former Guardian told the Department
of Child Safety (“DCS”) that she could no longer care for J.B. due to his
behavioral issues. Consequently, DCS took temporary custody of J.B.,
placed him in a group home, and initiated an out-of-home dependency with
the juvenile court in Arizona. At a Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and
Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”) conference held in late January 2025, the

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Georgia court relinquished jurisdiction to Arizona as the most convenient
forum.

¶5 DCS began an investigation in conjunction with the
dependency. As part of that investigation, a DCS caseworker spoke with
J.B. and Mother, and J.B. told DCS that he wanted to return to Mother’s care
in Georgia and did not want to return to Former Guardian’s home. Mother
reported having stable housing and employment in Georgia and that she
had successfully been parenting three of her younger children.

¶6 The next month, Mother petitioned the juvenile court to
revoke J.B.’s guardianship. She alleged she was “able and willing to
properly care” for J.B. because she had maintained stable housing, could
accommodate him in her home, was financially capable, and had
“identified educational and behavioral health resources for [J.B.] should
they be needed.” Mother also alleged that Former Guardian was unable to
properly care for J.B. and that revocation would serve J.B.’s best interests.

¶7 The court held a two-day hearing on Mother’s petition in May
2025. Following the hearing, the court issued a signed order granting
Mother’s petition to revoke the guardianship. The court found Mother had
proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that a “change of circumstance
had occurred since [Former Guardian] was appointed as guardian of the
child” and that Mother was now “able and willing to parent the child.”
Former Guardian timely appealed and we have jurisdiction under Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), and -
2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

I. Former Guardian’s Brief Does Not Comply with the Arizona Rules
of Civil Appellate Procedure (“ARCAP”) and She Has Waived All
Issues That Cannot Be Discerned.

¶8 Pursuant to the rules governing appeals, an appellant’s
opening brief requires, among other things, a statement of the background
facts, the issues presented for appeal, and an “argument” containing the
appellant’s contentions. ARCAP 13(a)(5)–(7). An appellant’s argument
must also include citations to supportive legal authorities, references to the
record, and a statement of the appropriate standard of review. ARCAP
13(a)(7)(A)–(B). “An appellant who fails to make a bona fide and reasonably
intelligent effort to comply with the rules will waive issues and arguments
not supported by adequate explanation, citations to the record, or
authority.” Ramos v. Nichols, 252 Ariz. 519, 522 ¶ 8 (App. 2022) (citation

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modified). Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys and
are not afforded any special leniency. Id.

¶9 Former Guardian failed to comply with these requirements.
Former Guardian’s brief fails to provide even a single citation to any legal
authority and there are minimal citations to the record. Moreover, Former
Guardian’s arguments in her opening brief are difficult to discern. For
example, Former Guardian complains that “[Mother] mentioned getting
food stamps as a source of income even when she didn’t have [J.B.]”
Mother’s receipt of food stamps is irrelevant to her willingness and ability
to care for J.B. Thus, Former Guardian has not made a “bona fide and
reasonably intelligent effort” to comply with ARCAP 13’s requirements. Id.
Because of her brief’s grave deficiencies, Former Guardian’s failure to
comply with ARCAP 13 may be treated as a waiver of all issues and the
juvenile court’s order may be affirmed. Id. at 523 ¶ 11.

¶10 Nevertheless, “the decision to apply waiver is discretionary.”
In re E.C., ___ Ariz. ___, ___, 1 CA-JV 24-0203, 2025 WL 2810785, at *3 ¶ 17
(App. Oct. 3, 2025) (citation modified). As to those of her arguments that
can be discerned, though they are non-compliant, we decline to apply
waiver because a child’s best interests are at stake. Id. (“When the best
interests of the child are at stake, the court generally will not apply
waiver.”). We address these below. However, as to those arguments that
are not stated with sufficient clarity to allow for any meaningful review,
Former Guardian has waived these arguments. Ramos, 252 Ariz. at 523 ¶ 11.

II. The Juvenile Court’s Findings Are Supported.

¶11 We will uphold an order granting a petition to revoke a
guardianship absent an abuse of discretion. See Jennifer B. v. Ariz. Dep’t of
Econ. Sec., 189 Ariz. 553, 555 (App. 1997). And we do not reweigh conflicting
evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses on appeal. Alma S. v.
Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 151–52 ¶¶ 18–20 (2018). Instead, we view
the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
affirming the juvenile court’s order, Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 479 ¶ 32 (2023), and will affirm its findings “unless no reasonable
evidence supports those findings,” Jennifer B., 189 Ariz. at 555.

¶12 “The court may revoke the order granting permanent
guardianship . . . if the party petitioning for revocation proves a change of
circumstances by clear and convincing evidence and the revocation is in the
child’s best interest.” A.R.S. § 8-873(C). A significant change of
circumstances may include evidence that “[t]he child’s parent is able and

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willing to properly care for the child” or that “[t]he child’s permanent
guardian is unable to properly care for the child.” A.R.S. § 8-873(A)(1)–(2).

¶13 Here, Former Guardian appears to argue that the court erred
because Mother allegedly established “no stability/proof of income.” But
there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that Mother was
able and willing to properly care for J.B. at the time of the hearing, which
was a significant change of circumstances since the Georgia court’s decision
to issue the guardianship. Mother testified that since the Georgia court’s
decision, she had maintained stable housing for the last ten years, and in
2024, she had obtained a larger home so that J.B. could have his own room.
She also testified that she was parenting her other minor children and had
sufficient income, in addition to receiving support from family members if
needed. Because the court expressly found that “Mother is able and willing
to parent the child,” we presume that the court found her testimony
credible and we will not reweigh the evidence on appeal. Alma S., 245 Ariz.
at 151 ¶ 18.

¶14 The evidence also supports the court’s finding of a change of
circumstances because Former Guardian was no longer able or willing to
care for J.B. due to his behavioral issues. See Maria G. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
253 Ariz. 364, 366 ¶ 9 (App. 2022) (recognizing that a guardian’s inability to
properly care for a child is a significant change of circumstance).

¶15 In January 2025, Former Guardian contacted DCS to report
that she could no longer care for J.B. Following her call, DCS initiated a
dependency proceeding and placed J.B. in a group home, where he
remained until the revocation of guardianship. Former Guardian testified
that she would not be willing to have J.B. back in her home unless he was
willing to participate in counseling, and J.B. was not willing to do so. The
DCS caseworker testified that if the court denied the revocation, J.B. would
likely remain in a group home until he turned eighteen because DCS was
not planning to reunify him with Former Guardian. Therefore, Former
Guardian was unable and unwilling to care for J.B.—a ground for finding a
change in circumstances. Id.

¶16 Further, reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that
revocation would serve J.B.’s best interests. The court found that given J.B.’s
age, maturity, and intelligence he was able “to advocate on his own behalf
and protect himself,” and the DCS caseworker testified that J.B. had
expressed a desire to return to Mother’s care. The caseworker also testified
that DCS “[didn’t] see any reason why [J.B.] shouldn’t return to [Mother,]”
as Mother had housing in Georgia and was safely parenting her younger

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children. Former Guardian’s mother, Nancy H., also testified that it would
be in J.B.’s best interests to return to Mother’s care because as J.B. had
matured, the relationship between Former Guardian and J.B. had
deteriorated.

¶17 Thus, the court considered the evidence presented and it was
in the best position to weigh it. Brionna J., 255 Ariz. at 478 ¶ 30. We discern
no error in the court’s findings.

III. The Court Did Not Otherwise Abuse Its Discretion.

¶18 Former Guardian seems to argue that the court abused its
discretion because its order terminating J.B.’s guardianship conflicted with
one entered by the Georgia court eight months before. True, Georgia
initially had jurisdiction over J.B.’s guardianship, but it later ceded that
jurisdiction to Arizona as the more convenient forum under the UCCJEA.
See A.R.S. §§ 25-1032 to -1033, -1063. Thus, Georgia’s prior rulings do not
control Arizona’s consideration of the question.

¶19 Former Guardian criticizes the juvenile court’s alleged failure
to obtain a favorable home study of Mother’s home under the Interstate
Compact on the Placement of Children (“ICPC”) to support its finding of a
change of circumstances. But Arizona does not require an out-of-state
parent to obtain a favorable ICPC home study before granting that parent’s
petition to revoke a permanent guardianship. See A.R.S. § 8-873(C); see also
Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 349(f)–(g). As such, absence of an ICPC study, by itself,
does not thwart a finding of significant change of circumstances. Therefore,
the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that revocation of the
guardianship was justified following a change in circumstances.

CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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