In Re Term of Parental Rights as to A.F.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0081
FILED 11-20-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD534759
The Honorable Michael Rassas, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Jamie R. Heller
Counsel for Appellant Mother

Maricopa County Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix
By Amanda Adams
Counsel for Appellee Child

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Maureen Stansberry Kottmer
Guardian ad Litem for Appellee Child
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO A.F.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which
Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Adrianh H. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her
parental rights to Aurora (a pseudonym).1 We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) first became
involved with Mother before Aurora’s birth. In April 2022, DCS petitioned
for dependency for Aurora’s siblings based on Mother’s neglect, substance
abuse, domestic violence, and mental health concerns. DCS removed the
siblings when drug paraphernalia was found in the parents’ homeless
shelter room. At that time, shelter staff reported that the parents were not
actively seeking stable housing. DCS began providing Mother with drug
treatment and testing, supervised visitation, mental health services,
parenting classes, and housing resources. But Mother only engaged
sporadically.

¶3 In January 2023, Mother gave birth to Aurora. Aurora was
diagnosed as a “medically fragile infant,” with medical conditions
requiring her to use a feeding tube. She later required surgery for her
digestive tract and was also found to have a hole in her heart. Aurora
remained in the hospital for two months. Upon her release, DCS took
custody of Aurora and placed her in a foster home. Mother thought “[DCS]
and [the] hospital were overblowing [Aurora’s] medical concerns and that
she did not need as much care as was being recommended.” The court
found Aurora dependent, and since then, Aurora has remained in foster
homes.

¶4 DCS noted its concerns with Mother’s sobriety, housing, and
income stability, and her ability to care for Aurora’s medical needs. To this

1 Aurora’s father’s rights were simultaneously terminated, but he is
not a party to this appeal.

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end, DCS continued to provide reunification services, including supervised
visitation, drug testing and treatment, mental health treatment, housing
support, and parenting classes. While Mother engaged in visitation, drug
treatment, and mental health services, she did not engage in drug testing or
parenting classes. She continued to minimize Aurora’s medical needs and
inconsistently attended her medical appointments.

¶5 In March 2025, Aurora moved to terminate the parental
relationship. Mother appeared and contested the severance at the initial
hearing, during which the court warned her that if she failed to appear at
future proceedings, it could adjudicate the issues in her absence. When
Mother failed to appear at the next hearing, the court found she had waived
her right to contest the allegations, received evidence, and terminated
Mother’s parental rights on substance abuse, six months’ time in care, and
fifteen months’ time-in-care grounds. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3), (B)(8)(b),
(B)(8)(c). Mother appealed, and we have jurisdiction under Arizona
Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 8-235(A) and 12-120.21(A)(1) and Arizona
Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 601(a).

DISCUSSION

¶6 A parent’s right to “the care, custody, and management of
their child[] [is] fundamental, but not absolute.” Dominique M. v. Dep’t of
Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 97-98, ¶ 7 (App. 2016). The court may terminate
that right based on clear and convincing evidence of a statutory ground for
termination and a preponderance of the evidence that severance is in the
child’s best interests. Id. If the evidence supports one ground for
termination, we need not consider the other grounds. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002).

¶7 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), the court may terminate
parental rights if (1) the child has been in court-ordered out-of-home
placement for fifteen or more months, (2) DCS has made a diligent effort to
provide appropriate reunification services, (3) the parent has been unable
to remedy the circumstances causing the out-of-home placement, and
(4) the evidence establishes a substantial likelihood the parent will be
unable to parent effectively in the near future. See also In re J.C., 259 Ariz.
60, 69, ¶ 36 (App. 2024).

¶8 Mother challenges the termination on three grounds. She
contends the record did not support the court’s findings on the statutory
grounds for termination or that DCS made diligent efforts to provide

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reunification services. She also argues the court erred by finding severance
in the child’s best interests.

¶9 The juvenile court is better situated “to weigh the evidence,
observe the parties . . . and resolve disputed facts.” Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (quotation omitted). Thus, we
accept its factual findings “if reasonable evidence and inferences support
them.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3, ¶ 9 (2016). We do not
reweigh the evidence on appeal. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz.
146, 151, ¶ 18. And we will only overturn the court’s legal conclusions if
they are clearly erroneous—that is, if “no one could reasonably find the
evidence to be clear and convincing.” Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 478-79, ¶ 31 (2023) (quotation omitted).

A. Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding That DCS
Made Diligent Reunification Efforts.

¶10 A diligent effort “requires—at the least—DCS to identify the
conditions causing the child’s out-of-home placement, provide services that
have a reasonable prospect of success to remedy the circumstances as they
arise throughout the time-in-care period, maintain consistent contact with
the parent, and make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where
compliance proves difficult.” Donald W. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 9,
23, ¶ 50 (App. 2019) (citation and emphasis omitted). DCS is not required
“to provide every conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates
in each service it offers.” Maricopa County Juv. Act. No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz.
348, 353 (App. 1994). But it must provide the parent with sufficient time and
opportunity to participate, so the parent may improve his or her ability to
care for the child. Jordan C., 223 Ariz. at 94, ¶ 20. Courts examine the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether DCS made diligent efforts.
Donald W., 247 Ariz. at 23, ¶ 49.

¶11 When DCS removed Aurora, it noted Mother failed to
recognize her substance abuse’s effects on Aurora, and that she needed
stable housing and income. Mother also minimized Aurora’s medical
needs. DCS provided housing support, parenting assistance, and substance
abuse assistance. And Mother could attend at least some of Aurora’s
medical appointments. The record supports that DCS made diligent efforts
and provided Mother sufficient time to participate.

¶12 Mother claims that the record does not show that DCS
provided diligent efforts to help her understand Aurora’s medical needs.
Mother was notified of at least some of Aurora’s medical appointments,

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during which professionals explained the medical issues. To the extent that
Mother challenges the sufficiency of the services provided, that claim
needed to be raised before the juvenile court in the first instance. See
Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 18 (App. 2014).
And to the extent that Mother challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,
her objection before the juvenile court would have established a more
complete record of the services provided. See id. at ¶¶17-18. Although
Mother objected to the reunification services before the juvenile court in
May 2024, the grounds for the objection are not apparent in the record on
appeal. As the appellant, Mother had the duty to ensure that the record
included all necessary documents for us to review the issues. See Baker v.
Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995); ARCAP 11(c)(1). Without that record, we
presume that Mother did not challenge the sufficiency of services before the
juvenile court. See Baker, 183 Ariz. at 73 (“When a party fails to include
necessary items, we assume they would support the court’s findings and
conclusions.”).

¶13 Mother’s challenge to the evidence supporting DCS’s
consistent contact also fails. DCS repeatedly communicated with Mother
about drug testing, reopened services, and communicated with the court
and the Foster Review Board about Mother’s situation. From this, the
juvenile court could reasonably infer that DCS stayed in communication
with Mother. That the evidence was not introduced during the trial is
inconsequential, as it was in the court’s records. The juvenile court is not
limited to considering the testimony and exhibits at trial; it may review the
entire record of the case. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(f)(2); Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t
of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 205, 215, ¶ 34 (App. 2008).

¶14 Finally, Mother’s claim that she was given insufficient time
and opportunity to improve her mental health is belied by the record.
Mother’s mental health was a noted concern in 2022, and DCS tried to
provide services for her at that point. In early 2024, DCS provided Mother
with a psychological evaluation and provided therapy starting in December
2024. Mother had about half a year to engage in therapy before the
termination hearing and could have engaged services earlier. The court did
not err by finding Mother had sufficient time to participate in mental health
services.

¶15 We see no clear error in the court’s diligent reunification
efforts finding.

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B. Reasonable Evidence Supports Mother Being Unable to Parent in
the Near Future.

¶16 The fifteen-months out-of-home placement ground considers
not only a parent’s efforts but also the parent’s success (or failure) in
changing the circumstances leading to placement. In re J.C., 259 Ariz. at 68,
¶ 38; A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). Under this prong, the party requesting
severance bears the burden of proving “it is substantially likely the parent
will be unable to exercise proper and effective parental care and control in
the near future.” See In re J.C., 259 Ariz. at 68, 69, ¶¶ 36, 38; Jordan C., 223
Ariz. at 97, ¶ 33.

¶17 Reasonable evidence supports the superior court’s conclusion
that Mother may be unable to parent effectively in the near future. While
Mother points to her participation in services as proof of her ability to care
for Aurora, the record is silent about improvements in her ability to
maintain a steady income—a noted concern throughout the dependencies.
And Mother continued to minimize Aurora’s medical needs. There is no
evidence that Mother could care for Aurora’s additional needs. The court
did not err in this finding.

C. Mother Shows no Error in the Best-Interests Analysis.

¶18 Once a parent is found unfit, i.e., the court finds a statutory
ground for termination, “the focus shifts to the interests of the child” rather
than the parent. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 12 (quotation omitted). The
court’s concern at this stage is the child’s interest in stability, security, and
a safe and stable home life. Demitrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4, ¶ 15. To that end,
termination serves the child’s best interests if the totality of the
circumstances shows the child would benefit from severance (like when
they are in an adoptable or more stable placement) or be harmed by its
denial. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 150-51, ¶ 13; Dominique M., 240 Ariz. at 98, ¶ 8.

¶19 Mother contends that the court failed to consider the totality
of the circumstances by overlooking her rehabilitation efforts. A parent’s
rehabilitation efforts should indeed be part of a court’s best-interests
analysis. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 15. But Mother fails to show that
the court did not consider her rehabilitation efforts. See State v. Ramirez, 178
Ariz. 116, 128 (1994) (A trial court is presumed to know and follow the law.).
The court twice stated that it considered the evidence submitted at trial,
including evidence of Mother’s rehabilitation and recovery. And in its
termination order, the court stated it “heard, considered, and weighed all
of the testimony [and] admitted exhibits.” Given this, Mother’s argument

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Decision of the Court

is not a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence but an invitation for us
to reweigh the evidence. We decline. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, ¶ 18.

¶20 Reasonable evidence supported the court’s finding about the
best interests of the child. While Aurora participated in familial visits, she
was adoptable and bonded with an adoptive placement that could care for
her medical needs. She had been in an out-of-home placement and away
from Mother shortly after her birth. And if her placement did not adopt her,
she is adoptable by others. The record supports the court determining that
severance would further the plan of adoption and provide Aurora with
permanency and stability. We find no error in its determination.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JT

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