In Re Term of Parental Rights as to S.S.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.S.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0102
FILED 12-16-2025

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
No. S8015SV202400038
The Honorable Aaron Michael Demke, Judge Pro Tempore

VACATED AND REMANDED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant

Sarah R., Phoenix
Appellee

Mohave County Public Defender’s Office, Kingman
By Bobbie Shin
Counsel for Appellee S.S.
 IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO S.S.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Samuel A. Thumma joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 Kenneth S. (“Father”) appeals from the superior court’s order
terminating his parental rights as to his child, S.S., in this private severance
action. We vacate and remand because the superior court based its order
on facts not alleged as a basis for severance and did not complete the
required analysis for severance based on the length of Father’s felony
prison sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Sarah R. (“Mother”) have one child in common,
S.S., born in 2019. The two shared custody of S.S. and followed an agreed-
upon parenting schedule. During a custody exchange in 2023, Father
brandished a knife and strangled Mother. Father was convicted of
kidnapping, aggravated assault, and simple assault, and he was sentenced
to 15 years’ imprisonment. Father appealed, but this court affirmed the
convictions and sentences.

¶3 In October 2024, Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s
parental rights and amended the petition two months later. Mother’s
amended petition alleged four bases for terminating Father’s parental
rights. First, Mother alleged that Father neglected or abused the child
because the child “always had dirty clothes on, dirty undergarments,
would come to pick up [and] child was alone in room while dad was high
(multiple times).” See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2). Second, Mother alleged that
Father could not discharge parental responsibilities because of “drug [and]
alcohol abuse [and] mental illness/anger.” See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). Third,
Mother alleged that Father was deprived of civil liberties because of his
felony conviction and that the sentence length deprives the child of a
normal home for a period of years because “parent is incarcerated for 15
years on felony charges due to D.V. of Mother.” See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4).
Mother further alleged Father’s previous acts of domestic violence as
another basis for termination. Mother urged that it was in S.S.’s best
interests to terminate Father’s rights because he was incarcerated, struggled

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with anger management, abused drugs and alcohol, and committed
domestic violence.

¶4 In February 2025, a court-appointed investigator conducted a
social study, which was provided to the court. The social study suggested
that Father’s physical assault against Mother caused S.S. great distress. The
study noted that S.S. received regular counseling and was diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) as well as adjustment disorder
with mixed disturbance of emotions and conduct. She also had nightmares.
The social study observed that Father will be incarcerated until S.S. is 18
years old and that a continued relationship with him while he is in a prison
facility would cause S.S. stress. The study further noted that there was a
temporary no-contact order but did not list its duration. The social study’s
ultimate recommendation was that the court terminate Father’s parental
rights because it would be in S.S.’s best interests.

¶5 In June 2025, the superior court held a contested termination
adjudication hearing. The court considered the social study and heard
testimony from Mother, her mother (S.S.’s grandmother), Mother’s friend,
and Father. S.S.’s grandmother testified about S.S.’s negative reaction to
Father’s parenting time, nightmares, and drawings about her impression of
Father. She also recounted that, after the incident between Mother and
Father, S.S. stated, “Daddy punched mommy in face. Daddy held knife to
mommy.” Mother’s friend testified that she had seen Father call Mother
derogatory names and had observed S.S.’s reaction when Father picked her
up and dropped her off.

¶6 Mother presented evidence of a bruise on S.S., S.S. screaming
and crying in reaction to a custody exchange from Mother to Father, and
S.S.’s drawings depicting the assault incident. Additionally, Mother
testified to the strangulation, stating that Father put his hands around her
neck, kneed her in the stomach while she was pregnant, and held a knife to
her and S.S. Mother further testified that S.S. expresses fear of Father.

¶7 Father presented evidence of Mother’s previous social media
posts, which depicted a relationship between S.S. and Father, and he
presented evidence that his family tried to contact Mother, but she blocked
communications. Father testified that S.S. was not in Mother’s arms during
the assault incident, but he acknowledged that she was in the room. Father
agreed that S.S. would cry during Father’s pick up times, but he stated that
she would stop crying when they left.

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¶8 The superior court terminated Father’s parental rights on
multiple grounds. Using a Mohave County form last revised in 2014, the
court found the “Neglect/Abuse” ground because “Father has [a] long
history of Domestic Violence culminating in the strangulation and
kidnapping of Mother by [F]ather that resulted in Felony DV convictions.”
The court also found two grounds premised on his “Criminal Conviction”:
both that the nature of his felony conviction proved unfitness to have future
custody and that the length of his sentence would deprive S.S. of a normal
home for a period of years. To support each of the conviction-related
grounds, the court found that “Father [is] in DOC for 15 years. Release date
is 2037. Child was present at time of incident and witnessed it from her
Mother[’]s arms. Child has PTSD from this.” In addressing best interests,
the court stated that “Best interest of Child is served for psychological and
emotional benefit to Child as well as potential adoption by Mother’s
fiancé.”

¶9 Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶10 The superior court may terminate a parent–child relationship
if clear and convincing evidence establishes at least one statutory ground
for termination and a preponderance of the evidence shows termination to
be in the child’s best interests. A.R.S. § 8-533(B); Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210
Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 22 (2005). We defer to the superior court’s factual findings
if supported by reasonable evidence and accept the court’s legal
conclusions unless clearly erroneous. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 255
Ariz. 471, 478–79, ¶¶ 30–31 (2023).

I. Neglect.

¶11 Father argues that the superior court relied on facts not
alleged in Mother’s petition to find the statutory ground for termination
based on neglect. He asserts that this departure from the facts underlying
Mother’s allegation deprived him of due process. We agree.

¶12 “[A] parent’s interest [in the parent–child relationship] . . .
may not be changed without due process and compliance with the statutes
involved.” Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-734, 25 Ariz. 333, 338 (App.
1975). Due process requires “notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action
and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v.
Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Mara M. v.

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Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 201 Ariz. 503, 507, ¶ 24 (App. 2002). Compare
Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 355–56 (App. 1994)
(holding that where the parent has adequate notice of the grounds for
termination and the court bases the termination on the grounds in the
petition, there is no error).

¶13 Mother’s amended petition alleged “Neglect/Abuse” as a
statutory ground supporting termination. This ground authorizes
termination of parental rights if “the parent has neglected or wilfully
abused a child [including] serious physical or emotional injury or situations
in which the parent knew or reasonably should have known that a person
was abusing or neglecting a child.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2).

¶14 As facts supporting this allegation, Mother alleged that Father
left S.S. in dirty clothing and undergarments and that he left her alone in
her room while he was high. The court concluded that these facts did not
establish the neglect ground. The court instead found this ground was
established because “Father has long history of Domestic Violence
culminating in the strangulation and kidnapping of Mother by [F]ather that
resulted in Felony DV convictions.” Although Father was arguably on
notice of these facts, he was not necessarily on notice that they could be
used to establish the neglect ground. Having rejected the only facts Mother
alleged to support this ground for termination, the court denied Father due
process by relying on different factual underpinnings of which Father
lacked adequate notice. We thus vacate the finding of grounds for
termination based on neglect.

II. Felony-Conviction-Related Grounds.

¶15 Preliminarily, as with the neglect ground described above,
Father was denied due process in addressing the felony conviction
allegation. Mother sought termination based on the length of Father’s
felony sentence but did not seek termination based on the nature of his
felony conviction, a different statutory ground than the length of a felony
sentence. Compare A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4) (first portion, where the felony
conviction “is of such nature as to prove the unfitness of that parent to have
future custody and control of the child, including” examples of specified
crimes), with id. (second portion, where the sentence for the felony
conviction “is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal
home for a period of years”). Nevertheless, the superior court terminated
Father’s parental rights on both the length of the felony sentence (which
Mother had alleged) and the nature of the felony conviction (which Mother
had not alleged). The court thus erred and denied Father due process by

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finding grounds for termination based on the nature of his felony
conviction, a statutory ground that had not been alleged.

¶16 Additionally, the superior court’s findings as to the length-of-
felony-sentence ground are inadequate. This statutory ground authorizes
termination of parental rights if an incarcerated parent’s felony sentence “is
of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period
of years.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). A “normal home” in this context means “a
stable and long-term family environment outside a foster care placement,
where another parent or a permanent guardian resides and parents the
child, and where the incarcerated parent affirmatively acts to maintain a
relationship with the child that contributes to rather than detracts from the
child’s stable, family environment.” Timothy B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 252
Ariz. 470, 477, ¶ 27 (2022). In assessing deprivation of a normal home, the
court must consider all relevant circumstances, including the six factors
enumerated in Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 196
Ariz. 246, 251–52, ¶ 29 (2000) (requiring the superior court to “consider all
relevant factors, including, but not limited to: (1) the length and strength of
any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the
degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and
nurtured during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the
relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that incarceration
will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the sentence, (5)
the availability of another parent to provide a normal home life, and (6) the
effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue”).

¶17 Mother alleged this termination ground, specifically alleging
that Father was sentenced to 15 years’ incarceration based on felony
convictions stemming from domestic violence he committed against
Mother, in front of S.S. The superior court found grounds for termination
on this basis, explaining that “Father [is] in DOC for 15 years. Release date
is 2037. Child was present at time of [the] incident and witnessed it from
her Mother[’]s arms. Child has PTSD from this.”

¶18 These findings, however, addressed only one of the six
Michael J. factors—the length of Father’s sentence. There is no indication
that the court considered the other Michael J. factors. Although the court
noted that S.S. has PTSD, the court did not explain how that fact was
relevant to the other Michael J. factors, and the court did not otherwise
analyze those other factors. Thus, we vacate the finding of grounds for
termination based on length of felony sentence and remand for the superior
court to reassess termination under the correct legal standard and clarify its
findings under Michael J. See id.

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CONCLUSION

¶19 Given these errors regarding each of the termination grounds
on which the termination ruling was based, the superior court erred by
terminating Father’s parental rights. We thus vacate the termination ruling
without prejudice to Mother filing an amended petition for termination
and/or the superior court re-assessing the felony conviction grounds for
severance.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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